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For more than a century, planning scholars have been both frustrated and fascinated with 
the notion of regional cooperation, which has become one of the most sought after yet 
elusive ideals of land use planning. While scholars view regional cooperation as the 
answer to most land use problems, they debate whether regional cooperation can be 
achieved without substantial mandates, incentives, or both. My dissertation contributes to 
this planning literature by focusing on the problematic of regional cooperation in 
Michigan, which is regarded in the planning literature as a state with permissive planning 
institutions that are unfavorable to cooperation. There are two parts to the puzzle of 
cooperation in Michigan: first, whether municipalities voluntarily cooperate, and second, 
whether this ensuing regional cooperation produces desirable planning outcomes. My 
dissertation focuses on the first part. Using mixed methodology comprised of surveys of 
local elected officials and case studies of selected municipalities, I focus on whether 
regional cooperative arrangements can be crafted voluntarily, and assess the factors that 
affect the formation of such arrangements. Results show that half of the surveyed 
Michigan municipalities cooperate on land use issues. These municipalities, however, 
differ considerably in the cooperative arrangements they employ. While some 
  xii 
municipalities cooperate informally by just conversing, others establish formal 
cooperative mechanisms such as joint master plans and zoning ordinances. Further, the 
factors that determine whether a municipality makes the initial decision to cooperate are 
not the same factors that determine whether a cooperative effort is formalized. The 
perception of future growth pressure and the internal support for cooperation in a 
municipality are important in explaining a municipality’s initial decision to cooperate. 
The roles of informal institutions and county and regional planning agencies serve as 
important explanatory factors of the extent to which municipalities formalize their 
cooperative efforts. Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, a high degree of regional 
governance culture appears to make it less likely that localities will engage in formal 
cooperation. Examining cooperation in this light not only allows an in-depth view into 
decision makers’ calculus of cooperation but also offers insight into the underlying causal 
mechanisms of the key factors predicting cooperation.  
 





Recent emphasis on growth management has resulted in a revival of notions of 
regionalism, but with one difference: the new regionalism is based on governance and 
cooperation rather than government and mandates.1 From a land use perspective, this 
shift in thinking2 has resulted in a flurry of calls for greater intergovernmental 
cooperation around land use issues (see Healy 1978; Innes 1993). How cooperation 
evolves, however, is not self-evident. In fact, scholars have been both fascinated and 
frustrated by trying to understand how cooperation evolves, especially in situations where 
there is no top-down, central authority to enforce cooperative action. A majority of the 
literature so far has focused on cooperation around three areas: service delivery, 
common-pool resources, and economic development. Yet, from the planning perspective, 
regionalism cannot be attained without some level of cooperation around land use issues,  
 
                                                 
1 I use the term new regionalism to distinguish early calls for metropolitan or area-wide government and 
governmental consolidation from calls for cooperation today that focus on voluntary regionalism. Also, I 
use the term mandates as growth management scholars use it – to refer to states where state governments 
mandate local governments to undertake certain planning tasks (see May et al. 1996; Burby and May 
1997). 
2 Again, reflecting a more pragmatic thinking laced with political realism that regional governance through 
voluntary cooperation would be easier to achieve than regional government through consolidation. 
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which are arguably different from these three areas. This dissertation examines how and 
why local decision makers cooperate around land use issues, and develop an 
understanding of the key impediments to cooperation from a land use perspective. I also 
offer three different conceptualizations of cooperation. I will examine these questions in 
Michigan, which as a permissive state is central to debates on whether cooperation is 
possible voluntarily at the local government level. Data-collection methods include 
document review, survey, and case-study research.  
 
In the 1980s the Grand Rapids, Michigan metropolitan area faced unprecedented growth 
and development. This growth was evidenced by the rapid conversion of farmland to strip 
commercial and low-density residential subdivisions (Fulton et al. 2001). During this 
time, Kent County, which includes the City of Grand Rapids, saw its urbanized area grow 
by 80 percent, while its population increased by only 18 percent (Dutzik and Imus 2002). 
This rapidly sprawling growth soon exposed the problems associated with the lack of 
comprehensive and coordinated land use planning in the metro area. One of these 
problems was that the regional infrastructure had not kept pace with the new housing. 
Officials in Grand Rapids and surrounding localities were soon discussing the prospect of 
extending a 40-mile-long water line to Lake Michigan. However, what seemed initially to 
be a straightforward solution ran into roadblocks when the two primary cities in the metro 
area, Grand Rapids and Wyoming, could not come to an agreement over who would be 
responsible for constructing and maintaining the new water line.  
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The dispute over the water line was emblematic of historic relations between the two 
cities, which can be traced as far back as 1959, when the township of Wyoming 
incorporated as a municipality to avoid being annexed by Grand Rapids. Finding their 
differences irreconcilable, the cities of Grand Rapids and Wyoming, located just 5 miles 
apart, each built separate parallel water lines to Lake Michigan. The two water lines have 
never since operated at more than half their total capacity each. Grand Rapids and 
Wyoming also separately operate the two largest wastewater treatment facilities in the 
area. The lack of cooperation between these two municipalities has tremendous 
implications for the region. First, these two separate projects cost taxpayers in excess of 
$100 million (Elderkin and Riseman 1993). Second, because these two pipes operate at 
half their total capacity each, the cost of operating and managing them can only be 
effectively offset by adding customers. More growth means more customers. Both cities 
now have an incentive to seek growth in their service areas. Third, historically 
antagonistic relations between the two cities were reinstated with this debacle. Regional 
planning in the Grand Rapids metro area cannot succeed without the buy-in of either city, 
yet the two water lines remain a testament to the status quo in the region. One local 
official in Michigan summarizes this kind of parochialism and lack of cooperation aptly: 
“Local government officials in Michigan have acted as if the world were flat and as if 
they’d fall off the end of the earth if they strayed beyond their city or township 
boundaries” (Jacobs 2004, p. 497).  
 
Many such examples of the absence of regionalism and lack of cooperation among 
jurisdictions have emerged over the past century, exposing a system of land use planning 
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in the United States that has been ctiricized as predominantly characterized by 
fragmented decision making, pro-growth ideologies, and localism (see Nolon 1996; Scott 
1969). This lack of regionalism is evident when one urban municipality extends its 
infrastructure alongside another rural community, spurring growth in areas with prime 
farmland; when only one community enforces regulations to protect the water quality of a 
lake shared among three communities; when one community zones land for industrial use 
while the contiguous property in the adjacent community is zoned for residential use; and 
when one community attempts to incentivize compact development and open-space 
preservation, while the adjacent communities subsidize large-scale subdivisions and strip 
commercial development. Recent literature has shown that the lack of cooperation and 
collective action among jurisdictions has fuelled sprawling development patterns; 
fragmented natural resources; and social, economic, racial, and territorial inequality at the 
regional scale (Rusk 1993; Porter 1997; Judd and Swanstrom 1998). There are 
compelling reasons to conclude that these development patterns are not sustainable 
environmentally, economically, or socially. As a result, scholars, legislators and policy 
makers have called for greater intergovernmental cooperation to remedy the negative and 
inequitable consequences of sprawl (Florida Governor’s Task Force 1989; Innes 1993; 
Downs 1994; New Jersey Office of State Planning 1997; Porter 1997; Lowery 2000).  
  
Today, hundreds of communities face situations such as those outlined above, where the 
lack of regional planning poses severe threats to the communities’ economy, 
environment, and quality of life. On such occasions, communities have choices to make – 
to act together (cooperate) or to act alone. Scholars have long been fascinated with how 
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and why some situations allow for greater cooperation among jurisdictions than others 
(see Stone 1989, Ostrom 1990, Olson 1965, Axelrod 1984). In fact, explanations for the 
evolution of cooperation have been anything but straightforward and are plagued by 
many unresolved debates. Therefore, developing an understanding of how decision 
makers choose to cooperate is of central importance to this dissertation.  
 
In the literature, one can find several debates on how collective action evolves. First, 
some scholars assert that certain levels of central authority and mandates are required to 
elicit cooperation from self-interested decision makers, while others suggest that 
cooperation can voluntarily evolve in decentralized settings even in the absence of 
mandates. Second, there is tremendous interest in identifying the formal and informal 
mechanisms that are created to further cooperation, including questions on the relative 
importance of these various mechanisms. Third, debates also focus on the calculus that 
decision makers employ while making decisions to cooperate (or not to cooperate), 
including whether cooperative decisions result from rational efficiency-based calculations 
or more behaviorally and culturally motivated calculations.  
 
The Grand Rapids example reflects some of these debates. Here, cooperation occurred 
voluntarily at the local level when the Grand Rapids-Wyoming water-line debacle 
prompted leaders in the Grand Rapids metro area to lobby the legislature to enable the 
formation of a formal regional authority (the Grand Valley Metro) to oversee land use 
issues of regional impact (albeit with limited powers). It is also relatively easy to see in 
this case that historic relations and politics between the two cities trumped the economic 
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calculus of efficiency in the decision not to cooperate over the water line.  In my 
dissertation I seek to develop a detailed view of how many of these debates and factors 
interact in decisions to cooperate regionally. I will use Michigan as the context in which 
to study local government cooperative efforts to further regional planning. 
 
1.1 The Michigan Context 
Michigan consists of four types of general-purpose local governments: villages, cities, 
counties, and townships. Like the other Great Lakes states, and unlike most of the 
growth-management states, Michigan is a civil-township state. Representing a hybrid 
between the New England town and the Southern county (Platt 2004), the township is a 
layer of local government that exists between the county and the municipality. While 
conventionally thought of as a “home rule” state, Michigan is in fact quasi-home rule in 
that its several types of local government enjoy different levels of delegated authority, 
with townships differing from counties and municipalities primarily in their taxing 
authorities and the services they provide. Even so, Michigan townships, counties, and 
municipalities enjoy land use planning and regulatory authorities that are virtually 
identical. Michigan’s local government structure is thus often described as highly 
fragmented, with 83 counties, 1,241 townships, 273 cities, and 262 villages (Citizens 
Research Council of Michigan 1999), each having substantial authority to influence land 
use and development within their jurisdictions. Because of this authority to independently 
influence land use patterns, Michigan municipalities have typically been regarded as 
producing a patchwork quilt of land use policies. Reports studying land use policy have 
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observed that in Michigan land use-related cooperation is an exception rather than the 
norm (see Dutzik and Imus 2002).  
 
Regional cooperation is not a new term in the lexicon of land use planning in Michigan. 
Michigan stood at the forefront of regional planning and served as a model for 
implementing the idea of regionalism when the metropolitan Detroit local governments 
created the Supervisors Inter-County Committee. This intercounty group was the first of 
more than 100 Councils of Governments (COG) now functioning in American 
metropolitan regions (Scott 1969).  While it was quite clear during the creation of this 
COG that Detroit-area municipalities found the idea of regional government repugnant, 
the motivation behind the COG was nonetheless to develop an arena for promoting 
municipal cooperation through area-wide problem solving. Despite early success with the 
formation of the Detroit area COG, Michigan has also had a long and arduous history of 
planning reform aimed at cooperation, especially when such reform has been initiated at 
the state level. More than 70 years ago, in 1934, the State Planning Commission was 
created to achieve integrated and coordinated land use planning in Michigan. This 
commission’s role was not only to coordinate substantive economic development, natural 
resource, and land use planning concerns across Michigan, but to also coordinate local, 
county-level, and regional planning and plan-making processes. Fears of loss of local 
autonomy and centralization led to the disbandment of this commission in 1947. In 1975, 
Governor Milliken established a Special Commission on Land Use (SCLU) emphasizing 
the need for developing coordinated land use planning legislation in Michigan. He 
warned the legislature, “No area is more critical to improving man’s relationship with the 
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environment than land use. Yet in no area is legislation more fragmented, standards less 
certain, and decisions more shielded from the people.” During this time a report titled 
“Michigan’s Future Was Today” set forth an agenda to develop a coordinated state and 
local land use planning framework to remedy the land use trends of that period. Between 
1974 and 1978, several different versions of state land use legislation were considered by 
the Michigan legislature. Most of the debate focused on local governments’ fear of losing 
local control should the bills pass, and this fear eventually stymied the passage of these 
bills (MSPO 1995).  
 
Conversations on state-level planning and regionalism in Michigan would not be revived 
again until the early 1990s, when the Michigan’s Environment and Relative Risk Report 
commissioned by Governor Engler listed the “lack of coordinated and integrated 
planning” as the greatest threat to Michigan’s environment and economy. Several other 
studies commissioned in the 90s echoed the findings of this report and highlighted the 
importance of regional planning in Michigan (PSC 1992). More importantly, the activity 
in this period swung the momentum back in favor of having more discussions on 
planning in Michigan. The environment was ripe for Governor Granholm to convene the 
Michigan Land Use Leadership Council, a blue-ribbon commission, to examine concerns 
about the environmental, social, and fiscal impacts of suburbanization throughout the 
state. The council prepared a report premised on notions of smart growth and sustainable 
development. Not surprisingly, the report paid considerable attention to regional 
cooperation, emphasizing the urgency of the needed comprehensive reforms to make 
cooperation viable in Michigan. 
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Altogether, these efforts and reports reached a few key conclusions: First, land use, 
economic and environmental issues do not follow political boundaries and therefore 
should be addressed at a larger metropolitan or regional scale. Second, Michigan’s 
fragmented local government structure and its patchwork quilt of land use policies are 
creating a checkerboard of development patterns with little attention to the long-term 
sustainability of natural resources and livability of urban spaces. Third, Michigan’s 
home-rule tradition is a tremendous impediment to regional planning and cooperation. 
Fourth, mandates, incentives and guidelines for regional cooperation are visibly absent in 
Michigan (MSPO 1995; PSC 1992; TRCPC 2002). Despite these conclusions, drawn 
over the course of more than 70 years, there has been little state-level institutional 
activity to mandate, incentivize or institutionalize the idea of cooperation among 
Michigan municipalities.  
 
Two state-level actions on coordinated land use planning are nevertheless notable.  
1. The Coordinated Planning Act of2001, which requires all municipalities to send 
drafts and completed master plans to neighboring municipalities, the county or 
Regional Planning Agency (RPA), among other entities, during plan preparation 
and updates. My surveys and interviews of elected officials reveal that while 
county and regional agencies comment on the master plans and plan updates they 
receive, most neighboring municipalities do not. Local governments, for their 
part, incorporate most of the county and RPA comments in their plans but 
typically receive limited feedback from neighboring municipalities. Feedback 
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from neighboring municipalities is not mandated. This legislation therefore does 
not provide for systematic interactions among municipalities. 
 
2. The Joint Municipal Planning Act of 2003, which enables local governments to 
form Joint Planning Commissions. My research reveals that at least seven Joint 
Planning Commissions (JPC) have been formed under this legislation. This 
legislation, however, is not comprehensive. It neither establishes incentive 
packages for municipalities nor provides more substantive tools to aid in the 
formation of JPCs. An example of such a tool would be permitting municipalities 
to engage in regional Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) programs.  
 
This minimal legislative activity arguably reflects a sort of political pragmatism or 
realism on part of the state, only enabling municipalities to cooperate should they desire 
to do so of their own accord. To place Michigan’s land use setting in perspective, one has 
to discuss this minimalist approach in contrast to the approaches taken by the so called 
growth-management states.  
 
1.2 Growth-management strategies 
State-level land use planning, growth management and intergovernmental cooperation 
strategies in the United States can be broadly divided into mandate-based strategies, 
incentive-based strategies, and permissive strategies (Innes 1993). In states with planning 
mandates, compliance with state mandates is typically achieved through sanctions. State 
and/or regional agencies have monitoring, cooperation and enforcement roles. 
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Comprehensive plans are mandated, and in some states even the broad content of plans is 
specified by the state.   In the incentive-based states, local compliance with state 
directives and goals (presumably encouraging regional cooperative and statewide land 
use planning) is encouraged through both direct and indirect financial and policy 
incentives. Comprehensive planning is often not mandated, but if communities choose to 
plan, a minimum content of plans is specified. Similarly, cooperation is not mandated, 
but informal communication channels provide opportunities for cooperation. In the states 
with permissive land use policies, neither comprehensive planning nor the content of 
plans is mandated (or only minimally so, if localities choose to plan—as is the case in 
Michigan). Incentives for cooperation and planning are rare.  
 
With regard to cooperation in permissive states, typically, any administrative function 
that can be undertaken by a single unit of government can be performed jointly by 
multiple governmental units. In other words, local governments are permitted to engage 
in a wide variety of cooperative activities should they choose to. Substantive legislation 
permitting different land use policies such as Purchase of Development Rights (PDR’s) 
and Transfer of Development Rights (TDR’s), however, might be lacking. In the 
planning tradition, states with some level of policy interventions at the state-government 
level (e.g., mandates and/or incentives) have been typically regarded as the more 
progressive states with regard to regional planning and cooperation.  
 
Michigan is prototypical of a permissive planning state. In Michigan, local governments 
do not feel the “push” from the state to plan or cooperate. Further, there are very limited 
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state-sponsored and institutionalized channels for cooperation; much of the ensuing 
planning and cooperation should therefore be explained by “other” factors, particularly 
relating to municipal level decision making. This institutional context places Michigan at 
the center of debates on whether regional cooperation around land use issues can evolve 
without state involvement (i.e., without state mandates or extensive state incentives).  
  
1.3 Cooperation or competition? 
Some of the most contentious debates in the literature on intergovernmental cooperation 
surround the need for cooperation as established by the two predominant models of 
intergovernmental relations: the model of governmental competition and the model of 
governmental cooperation. On one hand, following Tiebout (1956) and his optimum-city 
size model, some scholars believe that competition between decentralized and 
fragmented local governments offers the choice of “exit” to citizens, who can choose to 
live in jurisdictions offering services that match their preferences. Because municipalities 
in this model compete for citizens, decision makers are held more accountable, and 
governmental responsiveness and efficiency are promoted (Tiebout 1956; Lowery, Lyons 
and DeHoog 1995; Teske et al 1993). Adherents to this public-choice perspective see 
little need for cooperation, as they see competition between governments as providing 
greater opportunities for citizens to increase their quality of life.  
 
On the other hand, proponents of models of cooperation suggest limiting the number of 
local governments by advocating regionalism and consolidated governments. Proponents 
of regionalism and cooperation assert that optimal outcomes are better identified when 
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governments can recognize their interdependencies and act together to capitalize on them 
(Barnes and Ledebur 1991; Peirce 1993; Wallis 1994). This perspective promotes 
cooperation not just as a way to achieve economies of scale and financial efficiency 
through pooled resources, but most importantly to address equity and environmental 
issues that transcend local boundaries (Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog 1992; Rusk 1993; 
Lowery 2000; Downs 1994).  
 
Therefore, while researchers on both sides of the competition-cooperation debate agree 
that local government fragmentation increases competition between governments, they 
disagree about the social, economic and environmental impacts of this competition. In 
light of this debate, it is important to note that approaching local planning and 
development management primarily from the public-choice perspective limits discussions 
of the need for government to just the provision of services. But governments do more 
than just provide services, and the provision of adequate services is only one component 
of the array of factors that contribute to a community’s quality of life. Government also 
establishes the regulatory landscape through which decisions that affect the quality of life 
are made. The question, then, is this: if government does more than provide services (e.g., 
increase quality of life by enacting regulations that protect natural resources in the area), 
to what extent does cooperation aid in this process, and to what extent can fragmented 
jurisdictions engage in cooperation without mandates or state-level incentives to do so? 
 
1.4 Mandates or voluntary cooperation? 
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While proponents of regionalism can agree that cooperation is important to address 
problems that cross jurisdictional lines, they differ in their views of how this cooperation 
ought to be achieved. While some scholars believe in the need for state governments to 
mandate cooperation, others believe that cooperation can evolve voluntarily.  Among 
those who believe that cooperation can evolve voluntarily, some suggest there is an 
inherent order in decentralized systems, which allows spontaneous, unconscious, and 
non-engineered cooperation. This laissez-faire approach to cooperation is often referred 
to as a spontaneous regime wherein cooperation is achieved without intervention or 
explicit design (Hayek 1973). In this case, if collective-action problems are defined as the 
convergence of expectations around certain issues, such a convergence is expected to 
occur through natural processes without centralized intervention, conscious cooperation, 
or explicit consent between participants (Young 1989). For example, those who write in 
the New Institutional Sociology (NIS) literature believe that people live in a socially 
constructed world that is filled with taken-for-granted meanings and rules. Much of their 
action is neither intentional nor conscious. Rather, action is undertaken unconsciously 
and as a matter of routine (see Scott 1991 and 1995). The tacit rules that govern such 
cooperation are neither written nor spoken. Through what Lindblom (1965) describes as 
mutual adjustment, participants take unilateral actions, and the cooperation that evolves is 
a by-product of ordinary decisions without a specific intent to cooperate. There is no 
common purpose and no explicitly defined relationships. There is therefore no weighing 
of benefits or costs in this type of spontaneous cooperation. 
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Another type of cooperation without central authority is a common subject of research for 
game theorists and those studying complex situations where cooperation has been shown 
to “evolve” from strategic interactions and adaptations of agents with their surroundings 
and with each other, without policy interventions (Axelrod 1984; Axelrod, Riolo and 
Cohen 2001). In this type of cooperation, however, interacting participants make 
conscious decisions to cooperate. These decisions are voluntary and made using a 
rational calculus wherein individuals weigh the benefits of cooperating against the cost of 
non-cooperation. Ostrom (1990) describes this kind of voluntary cooperation in her study 
of common-pool resources. Here participants voluntarily create rules that govern their 
behavior.  Evaluations of benefits and costs might be “self” motivated or viewed through 
the lens of shared norms. In common-pool-resource scenarios, Ostrom (1990) explains, 
the interdependence of participants operating around the common resource is structured 
in such a way that net benefits to participants are often higher through joint rather than 
individual action. Not only are the individual benefits clearly calculated, the group that 
needs to act together for these individual benefits to be realized is also clearly defined. 
That is, in a common-pool resource setting, the physical interdependence of the 
participants is well defined– so long as the participants continue to share the common-
pool resource in question. 
 
Scholars who have explored whether cooperation can evolve consciously and voluntarily 
have indeed found evidence to support Ostrom’s (1990) thesis. These scholars have 
found evidence of voluntary cooperation around service-delivery issues, watershed 
management, and in some cases economic development (Gillette 2000; Summers 2000; 
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Visser 2004; Lubell 2004). These three types of scenarios, however, contain many of the 
same situational factors that common-pool resources offer. When participants cooperate 
around services and economic-development issues, the benefits that cooperating accords 
to individuals is at least relatively clear. Since these benefits are primarily economic, they 
can also be calculated easily. Similarly, watersheds are well defined, and cooperation 
around watershed issues is conceived of in a manner very similar to that of cooperation 
around common-pool resource. That is, it is easy to see how cooperating will produce 
greater individual benefits than would independent action.  
 
1.5 Uniqueness of land use settings 
 
1.5.1 Lack of well defined boundaries 
Land use issues, however, present a different challenge. Typically, a well-defined 
common-pool resource such as a forest, bridge, or lake around which cooperation is 
sought, is absent. Well defined boundaries help assert the physical interdependency of 
those involved in appropriating a resource. Interdependency is a condition that is a 
characteristic feature of common pool resources where the appropriators of the resource 
are jointly affected by almost everything they do. Each individual therefore, must take 
others’ actions into account while making their own choices. In land use settings, 
asserting interdependence is a much more complicated endeavor.  The complication 
arises from the fact that regional boundaries are not well established. Absent well defined 
boundaries, the “group” that should cooperate for individuals to reap the benefits of such 
cooperation is typically not easily identified.  
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Figure 1.1 Interdependency among municipalities 
 
Consider eight townships (A,B,C,D,1,2,3,4) located within the same county as depicted 
in figure 1.1. At the most basic level, these townships are interdependent by virtue of the 
fact that they share boundaries. That is, townships A,C,D,3 and 1 have at least one thing 
in common – they all share boundaries with township B. Similarly, townships 1,3, and 4 
share boundaries with township 2 and share that as a commonality. When deciding to 
cooperate meaningfully, by writing a joint master plan for example, who should 
townships 1, and 3 cooperate with? Should they primarily cooperate with townships B 
and D or townships 2 and 4, or both sets of townships? Say townships 1 and 3 decide that 
most of the expected growth pressure to their municipality is from the western part of the 
county. They decide to primarily join forces with townships B and D. But townships B 
and D, using a similar logic might find it most appropriate to cooperate to townships A 
and C rather than townships 1 and 3. How does one resolve this? How do townships 1 
and 3, and B and D determine the set of municipalities that they are interdependent with 
and in doing so define a region? In the example of common pool resources the 
participants are those who appropriate a resource. In service sharing examples, the 
participants of a cooperative effort are those who see the need for the efficient provision 
of a particular service. When municipalities seek to cooperate on land use issues by 
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variety of factors such as commuting patterns, school district boundaries, watershed 
boundaries and so on. On some occasions, evaluating interdependencies using each of 
these factors might yield the same larger regional boundaries, and on other occasions 
each of these factors might define a different or even an overlapping conception of the 
larger region.  
 
The inherent difficulty with land use issues is that agreeing on a common definition of 
the larger region might be easier said than done (see Kimble 1951). It is the fluidity of the 
region in a land use setting that makes regional cooperation a problematic working 
concept (Talen 2005). That said, common pool resource settings require that all actors 
whose actions affect your own be identified so that most externalities can be internalized. 
In this way, participants are identified. Further, defining the set of participants would 
ensure that all interdependencies are managed and accounted for. It is for these reasons 
that common pool resource scholars have time and again emphasized the need for well 
defined boundaries as one of the starting points of collective action, and as an element 
that is most often found in successful, long and enduring common pool resource 
situations (see Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990). 
 
1.5.2 Lack of discernible individual benefits 
The concept of individual benefits from cooperating on land use issues might be moot for 
two reasons. First, there are few individual benefits (such as individual economic 
benefits) to be gained from concerted action. Imagine the case of a township that wants to 
stay rural. This township has complete control over land uses within its boundaries. That 
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is, it is in charge of its own destiny. This township can stay rural should it want to stay 
rural. There might be instances where neighboring municipalities push growth outward 
towards this township. This might complicate local decisions by increasing the pressure 
for development – particularly when developers request additional permits to build in the 
areas close to where growth is occurring. The township, however, can deny permits if it 
can demonstrate through its master plan and zoning ordinance that the intent is to stay 
rural and that the requested development is not in keeping with the goals of the plan. As 
surrounding municipalities continue to develop, farming might become less viable in 
fragmented parcels within the township in the long run, but this is hard to envision in the 
present. Why should this township cooperate with neighboring municipalities in this 
case? What individual benefits would accrue to this township in the present that can be 
easily identified and calculated?  
 
Second, in land use settings, regionally rational outcomes and consequent benefits to be 
attained through cooperation not only might fail to produce individual benefits, but might 
also produce net costs to a municipality (that is, sub-optimal outcomes from the local 
perspective). Consider a simple case where cooperation is optimal from the regional 
standpoint to ensure the consistency and compatibility of regional policies and land uses. 
This would involve municipalities cooperating to ensure that land use classifications are 
consistent across jurisdictional lines and boundary uses are compatible. The transaction 
costs of ensuring such consistency and compatibility are tremendous. The benefits to 
individual municipalities, however, might not amount to anything substantial. It might be 
more profitable to a municipality to deal with inconsistency and incompatibility problems 
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at their boundaries as they arise. Consider another case of potential regional benefits from 
concentrating density around a city. This kind of clustering produces efficient land use 
patterns regionally, but city officials might regard more density at their boundaries as 
detrimental to their environment – a sub-optimal outcome in which the city might 
evaluate individual benefits to be extremely low.  
 
In other words, even in a case where a township wants to stay rural and a city wants to 
stay urban, the township and city might find the benefits of cooperating to be lower than 
the costs of accomplishing such cooperation. In land use scenarios, therefore, benefits 
have to be considered from a regional standpoint. That is, individual benefits are 
primarily derived from group benefits – a municipality is better off because the region is 
better off.  
 
1.5.3 The nature of cooperative land use policies 
In his book City Limits, Peterson (1981) describes three types of public policies that 
governments undertake: developmental policies; allocational policies; and redistributive 
policies. Developmental policies enhance the economic position of a municipality or 
group of municipalities who bear the cost of these policies. Developmental policies result 
in net benefits to municipalities. Commonly citied examples of developmental policies 
are economic development partnerships among municipalities and joint transportation 
projects. Allocational policies result in neither benefits nor costs to municipalities. That 
is, they are relatively neutral in their economic impacts across municipalities. Joint 
service provision is typically citied as an example of an allocational policy. Finally, 
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redistributive policies are those sets of policies that typically do not enhance the 
economic standing of the municipality that bears the costs of such a policy. These 
policies have the potential to at least in the near term negatively affect the economic 
standing of a municipality. Cooperative land use policies are typically classified as 
redistributive. In his discussion, Peterson argues that municipalities are well equipped to 
deal with and undertake developmental and allocational policies but fall short when it 
comes to implementing redistributive policies. Any number of reasons, such as not 
wanting to pay for others’ benefits, the fundamentally fragmented and competitive nature 
of municipalities, lack of political willingness, and the ability of such policies to drain 
resources and local capacity are citied. For these reasons, Peterson suggests that the 
federal and state governments are better equipped to implement redistributive policies.3  
 
When viewed in this light, cooperation on land use issues is arguably difficult because 
such cooperation has the potential to fundamentally alter and threaten the status quo in a 
municipality (see Stone 1989). For example, imagine a plan that is jointly written by 
several municipalities. Municipality “A” is part of this joint planning effort. In the plan, 
these municipalities jointly decide to direct economic development towards the most 
suitable area for such development (e.g. where infrastructure already exists). This 
decision could be redistributive in the sense that such a policy directs development away 
from municipality “A” that left to its own devices might have sought this development 
within its own boundaries.  Apart from moving commercial development away from 
                                                 
3 If meaningful cooperation on land use issues is regarded as fundamentally redistributive, then this lends 
credibility to critics of voluntary regional cooperation who assert that regional cooperation will not be 
possible without state level mandates and incentives (e.g. Tax base sharing in Minnesota; Developments of 
regional impact in Florida). That is, the sense that municipalities will not undertake such policies of their 
own accord and therefore need mandates or inducements. 
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municipality “A”, this joint plan also redirects affordable housing, multi-family housing, 
and mobile home parks, towards municipality “A” on grounds that support structures 
(e.g. community facilities and transportation) for these housing projects are more readily 
available in this municipality. It is quite conceivable in this situation that had 
municipality “A” planned independently, the preferable approach would have been to 
exclude such development entirely. It is also conceivable that the joint plan in these two 
examples was crafted with an emphasis on group or regional benefits rather than 
individual benefits and that the group benefits were indeed expected to translate into 
greater individual benefits in the long run. Olson (1965) warns that a decision to 
cooperate based on long term and/or group benefits in a case like the one described 
above, might be the exception rather than the rule. In this way the redistributive nature of 
cooperative land use policies complicates land use related cooperation by fundamentally 
altering the status quo. In examining the redistributive nature of meaningful land use 
policies and the dilemma of individual and group benefits, Fainstein (2005) argues that 
there is a need to persuade people to transcend their own narrow self-interest and realize 
that there are gains to be had from the collective enterprise. Such a mobilization, she 
asserts, depends on a widely felt sense of justice so that redistribution can be viewed as a 
rational response. She calls for the infusion of justice and morality in decision making 
such that municipalities do not resist and will even support, redistributional measures.  
  
In summary, the difficulty of asserting physical interdependence,  defining common 
interests that necessitate joint action, and the redistributive nature of meaningful land use 
policies contribute to the uniqueness of land use settings. Consequently, these 
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characteristic features of land use settings contribute to regional cooperation being one of 
the most sought after, yet elusive ideals of planning.  
 
Because cooperation in land use settings is complicated by the reasons described above, 
some scholars assert that the action of a higher level of government is needed to compel 
local cooperation (May et al. 1996). This higher level of government would define the 
region, establish the common interest, justify this common interest through claims of 
physical interdependence, and prescribe means for achieving the common interest. That 
said, most state governments are hesitant to get involved in land use planning issues and 
have consequently established more permissive institutional environments for land use 
planning (Altshuler 1996).  Although the permissive planning states are more prevalent in 
the United States, most of the existing planning research on cooperation has focused on 
selected growth management states, addressing the question of whether state government 
involvement in these states has produced better planning outcomes. Therefore, very little 
is known empirically about whether and how land use cooperation evolves in the 
permissive states like Michigan, where there are neither mandates nor substantial 
incentives to promote such cooperation. The first question I ask in this dissertation is: Do 
municipalities voluntarily cooperate on land use issues in these permissive states?  
 
Although several scholars view intervention by a higher-level authority (e.g., the state) as 
the only way through which to achieve cooperation on land use issues, mandated or 
incentivized cooperation is not without its problems (Olson 1965, May et al. 1996, Burby 
and May 1997). These problems seem to arise fundamentally from the fact that mandates 
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and incentives are structural reforms and that structural reforms do not always lead to 
behavioral modifications on part of local decision makers. For example, with regard to 
compliance, Innes (1992) found that even in mandated settings with the looming threat of 
sanctions against non-compliance, additional negotiations were necessary between the 
state and local governments to promote local compliance. Similarly, in incentive based 
environments, May et al. (1996) describe that incentives alone were not enough to 
explain compliance to state agendas (also see Berke et al. 1999). Compliance was 
explained as a result of the locally perceived need for regional action, the general 
commitment or preferences of local decision makers to undertake regional actions, and 
the extent to which the state and regional entities could provide supportive structures to 
facilitate regional planning.  Further, May et al. (1996) describe the downside of 
mandates – in that it straightjackets local governments and stifles local innovation. They 
also found that the promise of local innovation in the incentive-based states was not 
realized. These findings leave them to ponder about the role of local motivations within 
the larger context of mandated and incentivized planning settings.  
 
For example, they describe compliance in mandated settings as procedural pro-forma 
compliance to the mandate itself. In other words, while they were able to discern a 
calculated commitment among local decision makers to the mandate, a normative 
commitment to the cause of regional planning was found to be completely lacking. In this 
regard, they found that municipalities only “step through the motions of the 
requirements” without effectively implementing mandated activities when they are not 
fully committed to the purposes underlying those activities (May et al. 1996). These 
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conclusions are not new. Petak and Atkisson (1982) found that much of regional level 
planning can be explained by the willingness of local municipalities to undertake such 
actions. In an effort to understand how local willingness and commitment to regional 
planning can be increased, May et al. 1996 subsequently crafted an exploratory study 
which revealed that commitment in both mandated and incentive-based states could be 
increased through information, education and training. They further found that regional 
planning agencies could influence local willingness and commitment when they stepped 
beyond their enforcement roles and engaged in a more facilitative role (also see Berke et 
al. 1999).  
 
The discussion of mandates and incentives and whether these affect the willingness and 
commitment of local decision makers to engage in planning is not to suggest that 
calculated commitment precludes normative local commitment to regional cooperation or 
to suggest that cooperation, no matter the motivations (normative or calculative), should 
be inherently good or bad. Rather, I engage in this discussion to argue that even in states 
with extensive state level institutional arrangements for cooperation, the state level 
mandates and incentives do not in isolation tell the whole story of regional planning. In 
fact, the role of local decision makers’ preferences, the calculus they employ to evaluate 
regional cooperation (although they might comply pro-forma) and the expanded and in 
many ways self motivated roles of regional planning agencies at fostering local 
commitment to regional planning seem important. I argue that this finding coupled with 
the discussion about the inherently redistributive nature of land use policies and the 
cultural motivations for decisions to cooperate (or not) suggest that any evaluation of 
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how cooperation evolves should consider a more comprehensive range of factors. That is, 
the preferences of decision makers to engage in voluntary cooperative behavior are 
induced not just by situational factors and strategic interactions with other decision 
makers (the calculus approach of weighing benefits and costs), but also by the building 
blocks of preferences such as beliefs, attitudes, and values (the cultural approach of using 
moral justifications). In addition to the environmental conditions (such as growth 
pressure or resource deterioration) and formal institutions (such as the role of regional 
and county planning agencies at facilitating cooperation, the informal institutions that 
contribute to the regional governance culture of an area (such as prior cooperation) and 
the decision maker related factors (such as education and training) would be important 
explanatory factors of cooperation. These factors would be even more important to 
consider in permissive states where “motivations of compliance” to mandates or 
“estimated benefits” from incentives are absent.  The second question I ask in this 
dissertation is:  If municipalities indeed cooperate voluntarily on land use issues in 
permissive states, what factors predict this ensuing cooperation? Conversely, what factors 
serve as limits or impediments to regional land use cooperation. 
 
1.6 Research questions placed in the context of larger discussions of regional 
planning 
 
This dissertation does not necessarily take a stance on whether regional cooperation is 
needed to solve interjurisdictional problems or whether regional cooperation has the 
potential to produce the normative outcomes that planners seek. Further, the planning 
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tradition is deeply rooted in historic debates between the regionalists and the 
metropolitanists about whether regionalism is an end in itself or the means to other ends. 
On one hand, the regionalist emphasis tends to be less about the specifics of internal 
urban form, plan making and the ability of both to produce better land use patterns and 
more about urban positioning within its natural regional context. On the other hand, the 
metropolitanist version of regional thinking is more grounded on how regional 
arrangements through discussions of governance can be crafted to produce more 
sustainable urban forms (see Fishman 2000; Talen 2005). In this regard, this dissertation 
does not particularly address whether regional cooperation should be conceived of as an 
end in itself as Mumford, Geddes and other regionalists promoted it or whether regional 
cooperation should be viewed as the means of producing governance options that result 
in desirable land use patterns as Adams envisioned. Rather, it takes for granted that both 
the regionalist and metropolitanist versions of regional planning rely on regional 
cooperation as central to their understanding of land use planning without contemplating 
the motivations behind such an assertion. The starting point for this dissertation therefore 
is a conditional formulation: if we rely on regional cooperation, then what do we know 
about how this cooperation might be attained? 
 
Also, regional planning can be studied using different units of analyses. The regulatory 
landscape for planning in the United States is organized in such a way that several state, 
regional and local entities make decisions that affect the fabric of the land use system. 
For example, state governments influence regional patterns through the environmental 
regulations they institute (e.g. coastal development regulations). Federally mandated 
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Metropolitan Planning Organizations affect regional patterns through the investments 
they make and the plans they write (e.g. highway development plans). Local governments 
(municipalities) affect regional development patterns through the master plans and zoning 
ordinances they implement. No doubt, there are tremendous benefits to understanding 
regional planning and cooperation through a study of this multi-tiered enterprise 
comprising of a variety of geographic scales. The scale of such a study is however 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, the focus of this dissertation is on a 
piece of the larger puzzle of regional planning: the horizontal cooperation among 
municipalities on land use issues. This study therefore uses the local government as the 
unit of analysis. 
 
Finally, much of the recent focus in the growth management literature has been on 
evaluating whether mandates or incentives increase the potential for regional cooperation. 
In other words, the focus has been on evaluating how statewide institutional 
arrangements affect cooperation. This flurry of excitement surrounding the growth 
management states has resulted in a dearth of information and a lot of critical questions 
about whether cooperation can be achieved in states with neither state level mandates nor 
incentives to promote regional cooperation. This dissertation does not address whether 
voluntary or incentive-based or mandate-based arrangements produce more regional 
cooperation. Rather it takes on the case of a sub-state system (Michigan) with a voluntary 
cooperative planning framework to understand how and whether regional cooperation 
evolves within such a setting. Evidence of cooperation will be ascertained by looking for 
locally crafted regional cooperative mechanisms around land use issues. If such evidence 
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of regional cooperation exists, then the conditions that promote regional cooperation will 
be evaluated.  
 
1.7 Results at a glance 
A substantial part of this dissertation is dedicated to providing different 
conceptualizations of cooperation. My literature review revealed that most scholars 
measuring cooperation do so in a rather simplistic way (e.g. treating cooperation as a 
binary yes/no variable).  This dissertation provides evidence that cooperation is a much 
more dynamic concept than scholars have viewed it to be. This means that cooperation 
needs to be measured in a more nuanced manner. I measure cooperation in three different 
ways, each of which captures a different dimension of regional cooperation. In the first 
conceptualization, I measure a municipality’s initial decision to cooperate. An alternate 
dimension is the extent to which municipalities formalize their cooperative efforts. Here 
cooperation is regarded as a continuum of informal to formal. In the third conception of 
cooperation, I treat informal and formal cooperation as two distinct and equally important 
categories.  
 
The first question posed in this dissertation evaluates whether municipalities do indeed 
cooperate voluntarily on land use issues. Results show that about half of Michigan 
municipalities cooperate on land use issues. Theses municipalities however, use a wide 
range of mechanisms or arrangements to engage in cooperation. These cooperative 
arrangements are as informal as conversations between elected officials and as formal as 
joint planning commissions and joint master plans and ordinances among municipalities.  
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With regard to the factors affecting cooperation, my dissertation reveals that the factors 
that determine whether municipalities make the initial decision to cooperate are not 
always the same factors that affect whether municipalities formalize their cooperative 
efforts. Most interestingly, environmental factors and decision maker related factors such 
as support for cooperation, affect whether municipalities make the decision to engage in 
cooperation. Neither formal nor informal institutions have significant effects on this 
initial decision. Similarly, environmental factors do not significantly determine the extent 
to which a municipality formalizes its cooperative effort.  In this regard, informal 
institutions, formal institutions and decision maker related factors significantly impact the 
level of formal cooperation. Typically, in voluntary settings, one dismisses the ability of 
regional and county planning agencies (formal institutions) to influence local action, 
because of the fact that these agencies for the most part do not have the regulatory 
authority to implement land use policies.4 While my results reveal that these planning 
agencies do not play a significant role in whether municipalities decide to engage in 
cooperation, they do play an important role in assisting municipalities with the 
formalization of their cooperative efforts. This dissertation highlights the facilitative role 
of planning agencies as important in understanding formal regional land use cooperation.  
 
The most surprising findings are related to the role informal institutions play in 
determining the extent of formal cooperation. Service related cooperation and the 
regional governance culture of an area were significantly and negatively related to the 
formality of cooperative efforts. Although initially puzzling, the results seems justifiable 
                                                 
4 Cases where counties plan for townships in rural areas in Michigan are an exception  
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upon further contemplation. Municipalities in Michigan, in general, find it difficult to 
take the long term view of planning. This seems especially so when they get accustomed 
to the path of increasing returns that service related cooperation offers. The negative 
impact of regional governance culture on formal cooperation suggests at least one or a 
combination of the following: First, that areas with a governance culture that is favorable 
to regional planning see little need for formal cooperation. The culture of cooperation 
decreases the need for the stability of formal cooperation. Second, this regional 
governance culture provides an illusion or false ceiling of cooperation. Finally, that 
municipalities substitute the regional governance culture for cooperation in a way that 
affects their behavior – that is, the governance culture ensures certain types of 
cooperative behaviors that do not necessitate formal cooperation (related to the first 
explanation).  
 
In the following chapter, I develop a conceptual framework to evaluate the factors that 














Literature review and conceptual framework 
 
In this dissertation, I am primarily interested in understanding the factors that affect 
conscious voluntary cooperation among municipalities  on land use issues. To develop 
such an understanding, however, one first has to begin to craft a model of how decision 
makers’ preferences to engage in cooperation are shaped. I derive the factors affecting 
cooperation from this model. I then follow that with a discussion of each of the factors 




The traditional interpretation of human agency in both the political science and sociology 
literatures has been to view it as highly determined by the structures in which actors 
operate. That is, actors’ positions in structures shape their thinking, their interests, and 
their actions in a given situation. The priority therefore was to conduct a structural 
analysis of how decision makers, by virtue of the organization they served and the 
position they occupied, made choices mindful of the constraints imposed by the 
organizational environment. Economists offered an alternate view of structure and 
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agency by suggesting that organizational environments (apart from imposing constraints) 
also provide actors with opportunities – albeit opportunities to maximize their own 
preferences and produce positive outcomes for themselves. With the emergence of the 
neo-institutionalist literatures, these divergent views have been expanded to suggest that 
“structure” no longer just offers opportunities and places constraints on actors, but rather 
functions as an action arena with rules where actors interact with each other. In this 
evolving literature, the actors’ beliefs, motivations, social norms, preferences, and 
interpretations of others’ actions have become important (see Lubell 2003). Further, 
many scholars of intergovernmental cooperation have become increasingly frustrated that 
the calls for cooperation in governmental programs are largely answered with structural 
reforms rather than efforts to change the behavior of those operating within these 
structures (Peters 1998). Consider the commitment conundrum articulated by May et al. 
(1996). This commitment conundrum essentially exists because structural changes to a 
state’s growth-management institutions (e.g., through the introduction of mandates) do 
not always result in concurrent behavioral modifications by the actors working within the 
system (e.g., through the development of a commitment to the mandate). In other words, 
most state- level efforts to promote municipal cooperation have targeted superficial 
aspects of government (e.g., rules, organization) rather than underlying issues (e.g., 
beliefs and behaviors of decision makers). Critics of purely structural reforms have 
therefore suggested that any study of cooperation should entail not just an examination of 
the structures within which cooperation is sought and the formal institutions of rules, 
incentives, and sanctions that govern the interactions among decision makers; but also 
decision makers’ personal motivations, belief systems, preferences and perceptions.  
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2.2 Analytical approach 
I propose the following model to elucidate how decision makers’ preferences to 
cooperate might be shaped. Giddens’ theory of structuration is an analytic framework that 
allows mediation between structure and agency, and a consideration of both these 
concepts in the context of decision making. Giddens offers the theory of structuration, not 
only as a way to bridge the duality of structure and agency but also to move away from 
the traditional deterministic interpretations of these two concepts. According to this view, 
behavior is a product of of both context (rules, environment, norms) and independent 
decision making. For example, the structuralists would explain planning decisions as the 
result of the institutional environment (e.g. mandates, incentives, both or neither) and 
other contextual factors. The action theoristis would explain the same planning decisions 
through individual purposive behavior (e.g. individual self interest). According to 
Giddens, individuals are neither social “dupes” nor free-floating. Their behavior can 
deviate from the prevailing institutional rules as well as reflect normative considerations. 
Further, Giddens employs a recursive notion of actions constrained and enabled by 
structures which are produced and reproduced by those actions.  
 
Drawing from Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration, I view the institutional context in 
Michigan as providing the arena within which agents or decision makers operate. 
Regional and local contexts can be viewed as subsystems of the Michigan’s larger 
institutional framework. The concept of structuration allows for a broad lens through 
which to view the dynamic interaction between decision makers and the systems 
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(structural, institutional, and environmental) within which they are situated. Structuring 
or structuration allows the researcher to accommodate concepts like Argyris and Schon’s 
(1974) double loop learning, allowing for a model where both formal and informal 
institutions can be restructured as decision makers “learn.” That is, structuration allows 
feedback loops that in turn allow decision makers to modify the very institutions that 
affect decision making. For example, as decision makers engage in cooperation and 
experience successes, they change the underlying informal institutions in such a way as to 
make an area more conducive to cooperation. Conversely, if cooperation is unsuccessful, 
the informal institutions will most likely be affected negatively, contributing to an overall 
regional governance culture that is not very conducive to cooperation. With this 
interpretation, the traditional Marxist understanding of the dominant influence of 
“structure” on actors is expanded to account for the role of human “agency” in shaping 
these very structures. This interpretation also allows for mediation between the 
approaches of rational-choice scholars who impute ex-ante preferences to decision 
makers in a micro analysis, without paying much attention to broader historical-social 
influences; and scholars in the historical and sociological institutionalist traditions who 
treat preferences as primarily derived from macro factors, without paying attention to the 
strategic interactions between decision makers (Hall and Taylor 1996).  
 
For example, ex-ante imputed preferences based on an economic calculus alone would 
have predicted cooperation as the rational final outcome in the Grand Rapids scenario. 
However, this was not the case. In the Grand Rapids case, despite compelling rational 
reasons to cooperate, decision makers chose not to do so. The sociological institutionalist 
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perspective allows for the consideration that not all decisions are rational, and that 
decisions could be informed by historic and cultural factors (e.g., political animosity). In 
other words, I contend that the preferences of decision makers to engage in voluntary 
cooperative behavior are induced not just by situational factors and strategic interactions 
with other decision makers (the calculus approach of weighing benefits and costs), but 
also by the building blocks of preferences such as beliefs, attitudes, and values (the 
cultural approach of using moral justifications). This categorization will help explain how 
and why decision makers behave the way they do, and how institutions affect action.   
 
To further expound on this, I present a diagrammatic representation of the factors 
affecting cooperative action in figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
Environmental conditions 






Planning and land 
use decisions 
Dotted lines represent 
feedback loops, as 
discussed in the text 
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Environmental conditions are the context within which all action arenas are constructed; 
i.e., they constitute the external pressures on decision makers. Environmental conditions 
could refer to a number of variables such as an area’s political environment, socio-
economic conditions, fiscal conditions, and natural conditions. Formal institutions 
constitute the organizational structure, rules, operating procedures, and political 
institutions. Formal institutions are responsive to environmental conditions and could in 
turn modify environmental conditions if they persist and promote collective action. 
Informal institutions are the norms, conventions, informal rules, and informal networks 
within which decision makers operate.  
 
Decision makers make choices to cooperate in an arena defined by environmental 
conditions as well as formal and informal institutions.  Decision makers also have their 
own agendas, characteristics, and preferences by virtue of their personal experiences and 
belief systems. These four factors: formal institutions, environmental conditions, the 
attributes or inner worlds of decision makers, and informal institutions will eventually 
affect behavior regarding regional cooperation (i.e., whether or not to cooperate). The 
ensuing cooperation might be expected to affect land use decision making (e.g., whether 
joint plans are produced, new design guidelines are enacted, or regional strategies are 
developed). The act of cooperating might result in advantages or disadvantages to 
decision makers (feedback to decision makers in positive or negative reinforcement). 
Accordingly, decision makers have the ability to modify the formal and informal 
institutions governing land use in their jurisdictions (feedback in the form of reform), and 
the planning outcomes that cooperation produces might or might not impact the 
  38 
environmental conditions giving rise to cooperation in the first place (feedback 
remedying environmental conditions). I expand on the four factors below. 
. 
2.2.1 Formal Institutions 
Both scholars and practitioners have debated whether policy intervention from the state, 
in the form of creating, maintaining and enforcing institutions, is needed to effect local 
cooperation -- or whether cooperation can voluntarily evolve among local decision 
makers (Olson 1971; Hayek 1973; Axelrod 1984; Taylor 1987; Young 1989; Ostrom 
1990; Axelrod, Riolo and Cohen 2001). As a result, at least three divergent models of 
state-level land use legislation have evolved: 1) states mandating cooperation; 2) states 
offering incentives for cooperation; and 3) states permitting cooperation, but with neither 
sanctions nor incentives (Innes 1992). These represent three alternative models of 
governance. Most arguments against centralized control as seen in states instituting 
cooperation are based on one key issue: the cost of generating compliance. This cost has 
been interpreted as the commitment conundrum (May et al. 1996), the reliable 
information problem (Ostrom 1990), the monitoring and enforcement problem (Lustick 
1980), the problem of social control (Piven and Cloward 1971), the problem of 
legitimacy (Laitin 1986; Alt et al. 1998), the ruling class thesis (Elkin 1985), and the cost 
of maintaining power (Banfield 1961).  
 
Although scholars have questioned whether centralized control (in this case control of 
formal institutions by the state) is needed to effect local cooperation, formal institutions 
themselves have not been discredited, especially if they are maintained and supplied at 
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the local level. In fact, Ostrom’s (1990) accounts of successful and enduring common-
pool-resource systems suggest that formal institutions such as appropriation rules, 
enforcement rules, conflict-management mechanisms, and operational rules provide for 
stable resource management. This is because of the role such institutions play in reducing 
uncertainty and guaranteeing certain types of behaviors among participants (Hall and 
Taylor 1996). Because this study focuses on cooperation only in Michigan, there is no 
variation in formal institutions at the state level. Only regional and local-level variations 
in formal institutions will be considered.  
 
In the early 1900s, practitioners, policy makers and scholars alike were looking for 
solutions to the absence of “coordination and control” over area-wide planning, resource, 
and infrastructure problems (Scott 1969). Because the fragmented structure of municipal 
government seemed resistant to reform, most suggestions centered on establishing 
agencies (not just parks and water and sewer authorities at the county and regional level) 
that would promote cohesion amidst the patchwork quilt of local planning. Created 
amidst excruciating debates about the weaknesses of American city planning, county and 
regional agencies were therefore established primarily to coordinate local planning. For 
example, when current-day SEMCOG was conceived, the idea was to provide a forum or 
an arena for the free exchange of information so that local officials could use ideas and 
relationships forged at these forums to solve regional problems “together.” The idea of 
bringing officials together also reinforced the belief, then current, that such interactions 
would not only make way for innovations in local planning but also inspire regional 
cooperative efforts (Scott 1969). In the absence of area-wide governments, policy makers 
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believed, the only solution to area-wide problems was through voluntary cooperation, and 
the only institutions that could significantly encourage such voluntary cooperation were 
regional and county planning agencies (which were essentially created for that very 
purpose).  
 
Regional and county planning agencies therefore, from the time of their conception, have 
been well suited to provide a variety of services aimed at facilitating local cooperation. 
These services might be in the form of information, resources, leadership, and mediation.  
They can also serve as arenas for the convergence of ideas and determine the direction 
for regional land use policy by setting goals. Through their efforts, such agencies have 
the potential to define the upper and lower limit of cooperation in a region. Through the 
services they provide, county and regional agencies also have the potential to reduce 
uncertainty, provide stability, and mediate the actions or behaviors of cooperating 
entities.  
Hypothesis 1 
The effectiveness of county and regional planning agencies at providing support for local 
cooperation will have a positive impact on municipal cooperation around land use issues. 
 
2.2.2 Environmental conditions 
Scholars have emphasized the influence of environmental factors such as changing 
economic and technological conditions (Huggins 1992), shrinking revenues (Ehrenhalt 
1995), and deterioration of natural resources (Demsetz 1967; Libecap 1989) on decision 
making (Goggin et al.1990). In fact, economists have long suggested that the economic 
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calculus of evaluating benefits and costs is of no value during uncertain times (Lucas 
1981), and that cooperation (no matter the benefits or the costs) is a logical and necessary 
response to turbulent conditions. This is because both perceived and real 
interdependencies among jurisdictions are likely to increase during problematic 
conditions. Helling (1998) extends this to suggest that collaborative efforts organized 
around pressing problems have a greater chance of resulting in action.  
 
Scholars, it seems, have suggested two disparate explanations of how coalitions are 
formed (also see Stevenson et al. 1985; Logan and Molotch 1987; Lindquist 1992). On 
one hand, the advocacy-coalition framework advanced by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1999) suggests that individuals come together to form coalitions when they share 
ideological similarities. Coalitions therefore form on the basis of shared beliefs and 
values, as actors/institutions who share similar perspectives forge relationships with each 
other. On the other hand, Stone (1989) argues that regimes form not around ideological 
similarities but rather around the need for immediate action. Pressing problems, he 
suggests, can bring together disparate individuals with no commonalities and induce them 
to abandon both the quest for ideological homogeneity and rational reasoning in an 
attempt to find immediate solutions to the problem at hand. 
 
It is critical to my analysis therefore, to understand how decision makers internalize 
environmental conditions and perceive them as uncertainties, problems, threats or 
opportunities, and whether elected officials’ perception of environmental conditions 
results in cooperative action. From a land use perspective, several environmental 
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pressures might manifest as uncertainties and induce municipalities to cooperate even 
when the benefits of doing so are not particularly favorable. Among those having the 
most significant impacts on development patterns are arguably the growth pressures a 
municipality faces. When a municipality faces tremendous growth pressure, the status 
quo in the municipality is threatened by the amount of change that comes along with this 
growth. Elected officials might not always have complete information about or 
completely comprehend how this change would impact their municipality. This kind of 
uncertainty might induce local cooperation.  
 
While some environmental conditions manifest primarily as uncertainties, others might 
reveal themselves as the causes of political instability. For example, land use-related 
lawsuits and controversial land use decisions represent environmental conditions of 
enormous pertinence to local planning because they challenge the very institutions that 
govern everyday planning decisions (such as the master plan or zoning ordinance).  
Lawsuits and controversies at the local level also have the potential to cause extensive 
reorganization of the governance structures in a municipality. This is because land use-
related lawsuits and controversies typically result in internal conflict in a municipality 
and eventually in many cases result in political turnovers (see Clingermayer and Feiock 
1997).  In this way, lawsuits and controversial land use decisions stand in direct conflict 
with the extent of local stability needed to forge cooperative relationships among decision 
makers.  
Hypothesis 2 
Growth pressure will have a positive impact on local cooperation. 
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Hypothesis 3 
Land use-related lawsuits will have a negative impact on cooperation. 
Hypothesis 4 
Land use-related controversies will have a negative impact on cooperation. 
 
2.2.3 Informal institutions 
Although the institutional rational-choice framework has dominated most analyses of 
cooperation in the past, there is a greater interest today in integrating other frameworks 
that speak to the effects of “culture” on decision makers’ willingness to cooperate. 
Informal institutions such as norms and conventions contribute to the culture of a 
community or region (North 1990; Putnam, 1993). Informal institutions set the ground 
rules for interactions between groups of decision makers and could make the difference 
between cooperative efforts that are palatable and acceptable and those that are utopian 
and unrealistic in any given locality. Today, informal institutions such as norms, beliefs, 
and culture are being used to explain outcomes that differ substantially from an expected 
equilibrium outcome. The cultural explanation of decision makers’ behavior thus stresses 
that institutions provide not only rules and procedures for operation but also moral and 
cognitive templates for action. That is, decision makers are not always “strategic” in their 
interactions but rather are bound by their world views, which act as filters of 
interpretation. These filters of interpretation offer a new twist on the typical preference 
ordering of local decision makers. Therefore, within this context, decision makers’ 
beliefs, expectations, and the political culture to which they contribute become important 
determinants of cooperation.  
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Land use planning is an inherently political process. Because of this, understanding the 
role of local and regional political cultures in shaping cooperative action is extremely 
important. The political culture of a locality refers to the orientation among decision 
makers (and the public) about the definition of politics, the role of government, and the 
shared meanings of what is acceptable political action and what is not (Elazar 1994, 
Sharkansky 1969, Visser 2002). Political culture might therefore be affected and 
represented by the locality’s political history, its voting history, and the predispositions of 
its decision makers. While there is tremendous debate about how political culture should 
be defined and operationalized, for the purposes of this dissertation, I take a narrow view 
of political culture. Because of this narrow definition of political culture, and in an effort 
to not conflate it with the broader definitions of political culture or regional culture, I 
refer to this idea as the regional governance culture of an area. I define regional 
governance culture as “the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and 
meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying rules and assumptions 
that govern behaviors in the political system” (Pye 1968, p. 218).  
 
Frameworks such as the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993) and Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior highlight the effects of beliefs on 
attitudes, intentions, policy choices, and eventually behavior. These theories help isolate 
the different kinds of beliefs that might matter in creating a culture of cooperation. First 
are decision makers’ beliefs about others (Kelley and Stahelski 1970; Lubell and Scholz 
2001). For example, beliefs about others could be about reciprocity concerns (i.e., 
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whether or not a person would be likely to reciprocate based on past experiences). 
Believing that other stakeholders can be held to their promises (trust) has been shown to 
increase the likelihood of cooperation (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993). At the same time, 
Kelley and Stahelski (1970) demonstrate that the perception of competition alone can 
elicit competitive behavior from the opposing player irrespective of the player’s 
preferences towards cooperation. Because of the importance of “beliefs about others,” 
network and game theorists have paid considerable attention to reciprocity and the 
potential for future interactions among decision makers as instrumental to furthering 
cooperative behavior. In this light, the roles played by coalitions, networks and regimes, 
whether it is fostering informal connections that stabilize over time, norms of reciprocity, 
and/or positive beliefs of others (e.g., dispelling fears and encouraging trust), become 
important variables to consider.  
 
Ajzen (1991) provides us with an important link in his explanation of how “beliefs about 
others” are closely related to the regional governance culture of a region. In his view, 
subjective norms play a role in exerting social pressure on decision makers to perform or 
not perform certain behaviors. That is, when more social pressure to perform certain 
types of behaviors persists, beliefs about how others will react in situations will also 
stabilize, allowing for greater certainty over whether others will respond in kind. This is 
how informal institutions, particularly via coalitions and networks, provide stability over 
the potential behaviors of decision makers, thus creating a particular type of culture more 
suitable to regional cooperation.  
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Second, belief of perceived control of the situation (Ajzen 1991) could impact 
cooperation.  This is because actors will be less likely to cooperate if they view a 
situation as unmanageable and if they perceive themselves as having insufficient control 
over resources to effect action. Because of the importance of this factor, Stone (1989) 
frequently emphasizes how important it is for actors to have access to not only financial 
but also institutional resources.  In Stone’s account, control over resources explains how 
regimes can cause purposive action (also see Sabatier 1988). The capacity to act is an 
important component of how informal institutions facilitate cooperation.  
 
Third, similarity in decision-makers’ beliefs and preferences will increase the likelihood 
of cooperation. Scholars working on collaborative planning models have emphasized the 
importance of common goals for cooperation (Gray 1985; Innes 1993). The growth-
management literature is awash with examples of failed accounts of regional planning 
when municipalities have not been able to converge on common problems and develop 
common goals and common solutions to these problems. The extent to which 
municipalities are able to view similarities across jurisdictional lines and identify points 
of convergence indicates the strength of an area’s informal institutions for cooperation.  
 
Finally, when municipalities have engaged in prior successful cooperation, beliefs about 
others improve, decision makers may perceive a greater ability to generate action by 
virtue of the prior networks and relationships they have forged, and their understanding 
of area-wide issues and others’ issues may have improved. In this manner, antecedent 
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conditions such as prior municipal cooperation around service-related issues might signal 
informal institutions that are very conducive to cooperation.  
Hypothesis 5 
The regionalist culture in an area (combination of several of the beliefs listed in the above 
paragraphs) has a positive impact on cooperation. 
Hypothesis 6 
Cooperation on services will have a positive impact on land use cooperation. 
 
2.2.4 Decision maker attributes 
The kinds of beliefs described above can change depending on the kinds of experiences 
decision makers have had in the past (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). These 
experiences might be interactions with potential collaborators, experiences on the job, or 
training opportunities where decision makers learned about the benefits of cooperation. 
The importance of the first kind of experience gained through interactions with others has 
not gone unnoticed in the cooperation literature (Axelrod 1984; Margerum 2002). 
Networks, which are created through repeated interactions among individuals, have been 
researched for their ability to increase the social, intellectual, and political capital of 
decision makers (Putnam 1993; Gruber 1994). While social and political capital ensure 
future returns in areas where such returns would initially have been impossible, 
intellectual capital in networks evolves through social learning processes and tacit 
understandings. Both individual and shared tacit knowledge attained through 
interpersonal relations have been shown to improve the quality of decision making 
significantly (Brockmann and Anthony 2002). Further, the past experiences of decision 
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makers affect the potential for cooperation by impacting perceptions of others; i.e., the 
legitimacy, personalities, and credibility of other decision makers.  
 
The other components of experience come from knowledge gained on the job and from 
the training that elected officials receive. Knowledge and training have also been 
hypothesized to have positive impacts on decision making in the land use context in 
general. For example, Feiock and Carr (2001) found that expertise in public 
administration, politics, finance, and real estate is likely to prove valuable for decision 
makers advocating local government boundary changes. Similarly, other scholars have 
argued that training received through professional associations can positively affect the 
willingness of decision makers to cooperate (Brown and Potoski 2003; Nalbandian 1989). 
In the land use context, cooperation might be affected by two types of training and 
educational activities offered to elected officials – training on what cooperation is and its 
benefits; and training on growth management (see May et al. 1996).   
Hypothesis 7 
Growth management related training and training on the benefits of cooperation will have 
a positive impact on cooperation. 
 
Belief in the potential of cooperation to produce positive outcomes is important in 
explaining whether decision makers will be committed to cooperation (Gray 1989). There 
are several examples of failed attempts at annexation and consolidation – all of which are 
explained by participants’ somewhat different perceptions of potential outcomes (Feiock 
and Carr 2001). That is, not everyone saw the benefits of engaging in annexation or 
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consolidation, and/or whether these benefits were individual or group benefits. Stone 
(1989), in his account of regime cooperation in Atlanta, explains the longevity of regimes 
as resulting from participants’ desire to obtain results and tangible outcomes even if it 
means that participants had to set their own agendas aside. According to Stone, regime 
members sacrificed individual benefits, at least temporarily, for the sake of group 
benefits. 
 
Decision makers, it seems, typically use two principle approaches to ascertain whether 
there are potential benefits from cooperation: the calculus approach and the cultural 
approach. The calculus approach considers individuals as utility-maximizers, while the 
cultural approach considers individuals as satisficers. On one hand, decision makers 
using a calculus approach to gauge cooperation will evaluate the costs and benefits of 
doing so (see Heckathorn and Maser 1987; Maser 1998). On the other hand, decision 
makers using the cultural approach will employ a cognitive and moral template to justify 
cooperation. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. That is, decision makers 
could use both templates while weighing the decision to cooperate. There are at least five 
different ways of thinking about these two approaches and how cooperative decisions are 
made. First, decision makers using the calculus approach might find that there are truly 
net benefits to the municipality from cooperation. Second, decision makers might 
conflate individual benefits with group benefits. That is, they still use the calculus 
approach to evaluating benefits, but their frame of reference for evaluating these benefits 
is the region and not the individual municipality. In this case, group benefits suffice. 
Third, using the calculus approach, municipalities might realize that there are net costs. 
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However, they might be content to use a moral justification for cooperation (the cultural 
approach) to compensate for those net costs. Fourth, municipalities might realize that 
they experience net costs in the near term but that these costs will be compensated in the 
long run as other participants experience costs themselves. Finally, decision makers 
might not evaluate cooperation by way of benefits or costs. Instead, they use the cultural 
approach to justify cooperation as the right thing to do, since school-district boundaries, 
watersheds, and natural boundaries do not respect individual municipal lines.  
 
Two variables seem pertinent in light of this discussion: the benefits of cooperation and 
extent of support for cooperation. The five considerations outlined above are extremely 
important because not everyone who sees the benefit in cooperation will support it. By 
supporting the idea of cooperation, one increases the feasibility of engaging in 
cooperative action, but support for cooperation is typically informed by its feasibility. 
Further, not everyone supporting cooperation might experience the immediate benefits of 
such support (as in the third and fourth considerations outlined above).  
 
Hypothesis 8 
When decision makers can perceive benefits from cooperation, they will engage in 
cooperation. 
Hypothesis 9 
Support for cooperation positively impacts cooperation. 
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In the above sections, I isolated a number of factors as important predictors of 
cooperation around land use planning issues. Yet perhaps the most difficult task is to find 
a way to define and measure the ensuing cooperation. In the next chapter, I expand on 
how cooperation might be conceived in a land use setting.  
 
 





Cooperation – an examination 
 
When one encounters the term “cooperation,” several questions follow: Cooperation 
between whom? What kind of cooperation? Why cooperate? How does one cooperate? 
These questions are central to my dissertation because they provide the basic template 
upon which I develop my dependent variable. In this chapter, I provide an in-depth 
examination of the term “cooperation” and its different conceptions. I begin by 
classifying the different types of cooperation possible in an intergovernmental setting. I 
then provide some background on why cooperation is regarded as a silver bullet – a 
philosopher’s stone – in land use planning (see Pressman and Wildavsky 1984 for 
discussion of calls for cooperation in governmental agencies). I follow that discussion 
with a section that provides conceptual clarity on the meaning of cooperation with 
insights on how cooperation might be measured in land use settings.  
 
3.1 Types of cooperation 
The institutional structure within which planners and policymakers operate makes 
understanding the problematic of cooperation extremely difficult. This institutional 
structure for land use planning is complicated by the sheer number of entities at the 
different governmental levels (state, county, local) that are involved in creating, 
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regulating, monitoring, and implementing land use policies. The term cooperation could 
therefore be used to describe the relationships between and among several of these 
entities in the intergovernmental system. Before attempting a more substantive discussion 
of what it means to cooperate and the different levels or extents of cooperation in a land 
use setting, it is important to explicate the types of cooperation possible in any given 
intergovernmental system. I will use the beginning portions of this chapter to develop a 
nomenclature of cooperation that can be used to classify the types of cooperation 
occurring among the different players in the intergovernmental system. This 
nomenclature is described below and also presented in figure 3.1. 
3.1.1 Intergovernmental cooperation 
This is the cooperation between the different levels of government: federal, state, 
regional, county, and local. For example, it sometimes includes cooperation between the 
city council at the local level and agencies at the state level. It is primarily concerned 
with vertical linkages.  
3.1.2 Intragovernmental cooperation 
This is the horizontal cooperation between “government” and its agencies. At the city 
level, it could mean the cooperation between city council and the planning department. 
At the state level, it could mean the cooperation between the governor’s office and the 
department of development.  
3.1.3 Interorganization or interagency cooperation 
This is either the horizontal cooperation between two state agencies that share 
responsibility for the administration of a program, such as the cooperation between the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Development in the 
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administration of brownfield programs, or the vertical cooperation among state, regional, 
and county agencies.  
3.1.4 Intraorganizational or intraagency cooperation 
This is the horizontal cooperation between the different programs and functions of 
agencies. It could, for example, entail the cooperation between the land use planning and 
coastal zone management functions of the responsible state agency (such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency or the Department of Community Affairs, depending 
on the state in which the agency is situated).  
3.1.5 Interjursdictional or intermunicipal cooperation 
This represents a horizontal linkage between jurisdictions, whether it is between states, 
between counties, between regions, or between cities, townships, or villages. 
Interjurisdictional cooperation often takes the form of informal or formal cooperation 
agreements pertaining to specific functions, such as police and fire protection at local 
levels.  
3.1.6 Intersectoral cooperation 
This represents both horizontal and vertical linkages between governments, agencies, and 
non-governmental organizations such as citizen action committees, interest groups, and 
non-profit organizations.  
 
Regimes (such as growth-management regimes) typically vary in the number of the 
cooperation types they seek. Some regimes exhort interjusrisdictional cooperation (as in 
Michigan), while others mandate all of the above cooperation types (as in Florida and 
Oregon). Considering the complexity of the framework just outlined, it is only reasonable 
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to expect complicated and extensive institutional arrangements where all of the above 
types of cooperation are desired. For the purposes of this dissertation, I am primarily 
interested in understanding how interjurisdictional or intermunicipal cooperation occurs 
among local governments (cities, villages and townships). Any forthcoming references to 
cooperation will therefore focus on the interjurisdictonal cooperation among cities, 
villages, and townships on land use issues.  
 






















Figure 3.1 Classification of cooperation 
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3.2 Characterizing cooperation 
American city planning has had a long and arduous history with the idea of cooperation. 
The elusive quest for cooperation around land use issues has been one of the most 
debated topics among reformers and philosopher kings alike through much of the 19th and 
20th centuries. This quest to engage in cooperation can be understood through three 
separate but interrelated questions:  Why cooperate? What is cooperation? And how to 
cooperate? 
 
3.2.1 Why cooperate? 
Through history, the ideal of cooperation has been advanced for three key reasons: 
promoting efficiency, investing in good government, and finding lasting solutions to 
area-wide problems. The importance of cooperation (through metropolitanism) was first 
recognized as the need for any great city to expand.  That is, the reach, expanse and 
impact of the metropolitan area of the city far overran its political limits, but the city had 
limited power to control its destiny beyond its political boundaries. As early planning 
reports for the city of Chicago indicated, this made it difficult to find comprehensive 
solutions to metropolitan problems and almost impossible to plan “harmonious, 
connected, and continuous improvements” for the region as a whole.  
 
Early writers who helped to develop the primary motives behind calls for greater 
cooperation in development-management issues made several observations about the 
need for cooperation (see Katz 2000; Stephens and Wikstrom 2000). The administration 
of municipalities needed to be separated from politics so that good government could 
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prevail over parochialism (the reformist argument). Municipalities were intimately 
connected by everything concerning the daily life of residents living within their 
boundaries, but they had no means (barring water supply, sewage, and parks) of 
controlling or improving the metropolitan area or region as a whole (see Scott 1969). The 
municipality as a political boundary was not identical with the metropolitan community 
as a social, economic, and natural fact. And so, like a house divided against itself, the 
metropolitan region found itself obliged to struggle for quality of life amidst the conflicts, 
dissentions, and divergences of its several component jurisdictions (Maxey 1922). The 
social and economic problems of municipalities were for the most part similar in a 
region, and these problems were often magnified by the fact that they arose from the 
entire metropolitan area and not only from a particular locality (Studenski 1930). 
Regional problems like sprawl, pollution, fiscal and social inequity, and resource 
deterioration needed regional solutions. But the fragmented nature of municipalities 
created a structural problem that was very difficult to overcome to bring about concerted 
action and remedy the common problems faced by the metropolitan region (also see 
Wikstrom 2000; Savitch and Vogel 2000; Lowery 2000; Olberding 2002).  
 
Scholars of intergovernmental relations and metropolitan cooperation have made these 
observations for more than a century. These observations necessitate separating the 
question of why the pressing and persistent call for more cooperation exists in the context 
of local planning and development management into two distinct analytical questions: 
First, what substantive policy goals are the various local governments failing to advance 
individually that they would advance (or would be more likely to advance) if they were 
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cooperating with each other? Second, what is it about our institutional structure of state 
and local governance that necessitates cooperation to achieve these goals? Or, to put it 
another way, what makes it difficult for localities to address these goals individually? 
 
First, there are at least three substantive goals to be advanced through increased 
cooperation.  These are increased efficiency in the provision of public services and land 
uses within a regional context, increased administrative efficiency, and more effective 
treatment of the collective regional harms engendered by individual jurisdictions pursing 
their own locally oriented agendas (for example, by engaging in fiscal zoning). Efficient 
provision of services is made possible through economies of scale and cost savings to 
local governments. Efficient land use patterns occur when local governments find the 
best possible and most suitable uses for land. Further, cooperative infrastructure decisions 
that limit growth within regionally determined service and growth boundaries and ensure 
the concurrency of services with growth play a tremendous role in ensuring efficient land 
use patterns. With regard to administrative efficiency, cooperation is sought to remove 
duplication of governmental services and to ensure consistency of governmental policies, 
plans, and regulations across jurisdictional lines. Finally, the two categories of collective 
harms of most concern in planning and development management include the racial and 
socio-economic impacts associated with urban decline and the ongoing loss of natural 
areas and prime farmland to low-density suburban sprawl.  
 
Second, the key institutional attribute that makes it difficult for any given locality to 
address the substantive policy goals associated with these several problems is that the 
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scale of these problems themselves, as well as the institutional capacity needed to address 
them, far exceeds the focus and capacity of a typical local government. That is, the need 
for cooperation in development management is compounded by the multitude of agencies 
involved in planning-related functions; the extent to which knowledge is unequally 
distributed across levels of government, agencies, and officials; the presence of 
overlapping responsibilities; the generally fragmented nature of local governments; the 
multiplicity of interdependencies among the actors involved; the need to manage 
common resources and solve common problems that span many jurisdictions and cross 
jurisdictions lines; and the nature of planning problems in general (such as wicked and 
collective action problems), which makes it almost impossible for the numerous and 
autonomous local jurisdictions to solve problems on their own individual initiative (see 
Jennings, 1996; Malone, 1990; Gross et al, 1998; Xiang, 1993; Zhang et al, 1992, Scott 
1991). 
 
The conditions that necessitate cooperation have been well documented through history 
and hold true in most planning settings today. What constitutes cooperation, however, has 
been harder to define. Further, although the need for cooperation exists in most regions 
around the country, the will to cooperate has been harder to forge. Our understanding of 
cooperation, therefore, has been shaped by how achievable or feasible cooperation 
strategies have been throughout history.5 
                                                 
5 “[A]s a matter of theory, the best results could be achieved through a consolidated . . . 
metropolitan district . . . under a unified municipal administration endowed with the 
broad powers of self-government . . . .  Practically, however . . . it is suggested that a 
permanent commission be created to coordinate city and county planning” (Scott 1969). 
Within this statement is the implicit recognition that any sort of regional or metropolitan 
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3.2.2 What is cooperation? And how does one cooperate? 
Cooperation can be very simply defined as the process of “working together.” The 
artifacts of cooperation (i.e., the procedural evidence of cooperation), which answer the 
question of how to cooperate, take several forms -- all of which will be outlined in the 
next paragraphs. Although the need for cooperation was recognized early in the history of 
American planning, notions of how cooperation might be achieved were transformed 
continually. Among the first realizations was that common problems needed common 
comprehensive solutions and therefore a common / regional / metropolitan plan instead of 
several individual local master plans. In fact, suggestions for regional plans were made in 
the New York and Chicago areas in the early 1900s by individuals like Norton, Burnham, 
and Lewis. The question of how such a plan would be implemented was more 
complicated. Suggestions included establishing regional governments with enforcement 
capabilities; regional agencies that would conduct only functions that cannot be 
efficiently carried out at the local level; regional machinery (e.g., voluntary associations 
like the Councils of Governments) to provide a forum for discussion of regional issues 
and means for concerted action; regional commissions without enforcement capabilities 
that would allow local officials to meet and converse with each other about matters of 
regional significance; and intergovernmental contracts and agreements. The benefits and 
problems associated with each of these cooperation mechanisms and strategies (the “how 
to” of cooperation) have been debated from the early part of the 20th century to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
government would be hard to form and that the more feasible solution would be to form a 
regional commission without enforcement capabilities. Nonetheless, the value of the 
coordination of metropolitan functions and landscapes is more than subtly implied.   
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present. Chief among the debates is the concern about whether all of the above-stated 
cooperation mechanisms are equally capable of producing the substantive benefits that 
planners seek. In other words, can regional plans be implemented without compromising 
local autonomy and without forming a regional entity to supervise implementation? 
Should a regional plan be written in the first place to ensure compatible and 
comprehensive development patterns across jurisdictions, or will local governments be 
able to tackle regional issues through conversations with each other and individual local 
plans? These debates are extremely important in formulating a more complicated and 
sophisticated definition of cooperation for this dissertation.  
 
3.3 Conceptualizing cooperation 
The reason cooperation has been so hard to study is that cooperation is easy to define but 
hard to measure. Further, to measure cooperation one has to understand how cooperation 
can occur in land use settings. To date, scholars who have engaged in empirical studies of 
cooperation have mostly studied economic development partnerships, watershed 
partnerships, and cooperation around services.  They have also for the most part 
considered cooperation as a one-dimensional concept, measuring the mere presence or 
absence of cooperation. Others have attempted a different conceptualization by 
quantifying the cooperative acts that individuals have performed; i.e., counting the 
number of times individuals conversed with others, shared information with others, etc 
(see Bardach’s 1998 and Lubell 2004). Both of these conceptualizations of cooperation 
are problematic for several reasons. First, considering cooperation as a one-dimensional 
concept means that informal conversations among elected officials would not be 
  63 
distinguished from instances when elected officials from multiple local governments 
write a regional plan together or when several local governments decide to merge their 
planning functions into one entity. Second, counting the number of cooperative activities 
that individuals engage in rewards the quantity rather that the quality of the cooperative 
effort. In this scenario, instances in which local officials meet informally several times a 
week and frequently talk on the telephone would be weighed more heavily than a 
situation in which a local government has one intergovernmental contract in place. The 
intergovernmental contract in this case is more formal, harder to enact, and a step further 
into implementation (i.e., action rather than just talk). These popular conceptualizations 
of cooperation penalize entities that participate in limited but more difficult cooperative 
mechanisms, thus rewarding different levels of cooperative mechanisms equally.  
 
In light of this discussion, I suggest that cooperation might be conceptualized in at least 
three ways. Each of these conceptualizations provides insight into a different dimension 
of cooperation. First, cooperation could be simply classified as a binomial variable. When 
defined this way, a “yes” on the binomial variable might be treated as the initial decision 
to engage in cooperation. Second, cooperation could be treated as a continuum, ranging 
from informal to formal cooperative activities. In this way, more formal and more 
difficult-to-implement cooperative mechanisms would be placed higher on the scale. 
Third, cooperation could be defined as a multi-nominal category wherein informal and 
formal cooperation are treated as equally important categories. This definition suggests 
that informal and formal cooperation are categories that cannot be ordered in any 
meaningful way. Since cooperation as a binomial variable is the easiest to conceptualize, 
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in the following sections I will describe in greater detail how cooperation as a continuum 
and cooperation as a multinomial variable might be conceived. 
 
3.4 Cooperation as a continuum 
The fundamental question, then, is whether different cooperative mechanisms such as 
informal conversations, regional plans, and joint planning commissions should be 
considered equal, when arguably these cooperative mechanisms require different levels 
of commitment of resources and time, different levels of loss of autonomy, and different 
levels of formality. An investigation into literature that anticipates some of these nuances 
reveals alternate ways of conceptualizing cooperation. Scholars writing in the policy and 
management sciences have theorized that the term cooperation could be split into three 
component parts: cooperation, coordination and collaboration (Cigler 1992). This 
literature also suggests that the terms cooperation, coordination and collaboration (often 
used interchangeably) could be placed on a continuum based on the extent to which their 
characteristic features are present or absent, with cooperation at the lowest end, and 
collaboration at the highest end. Setting up these three types of cooperation as a 
continuum would imply that the ideal and best possible cooperative outcome is 
collaboration. I provide an interpretation of these three terms using the policy sciences 
literature in the following paragraphs, 
 
Cooperation is the first step in the development of intergovernmental relations. It is the 
least formalized component of managed coordination or negotiated regimes and is 
defined as the deliberate but temporary relations between organizations that are relatively 
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autonomous for the accomplishment of individual organizational goals (Schermerhorn 
1975). It is characterized by informal agreements without clearly delineated goals and 
tasks, with a notable absence of any formal division of labor (Morris 1963; Davidson 
1976). While cooperation represents a deliberate and voluntary decision on the part of 
organizations involved, it is only a step above the unmanaged and unconscious 
coordination attributed to self-governing regimes.  
 
Coordination, on the other hand, is defined as the process by which two or more 
organizations develop shared goals through formalized processes and decision rules 
(Mulford & Rogers 1982). By coordinating, organizations find a way to manage their 
interdependencies (Lindbolm 1965; Malone and Crowston 1994). As one might imagine, 
coordination then involves a substantial loss of organizational autonomy and therefore 
the sacrifice of individual goals for collective ones. Some scholars stop with cooperation 
and coordination and extend the scope of coordination to include joint decision making 
processes and common routes to common outcomes. Others add another layer to this 
continuum and consider collaboration as an extension of both coordination and 
cooperation. 
 
Collaboration is defined as the process by which organizations seek common goals 
through joint processes beyond their own limited means (Gray 1985). Collaboration 
involves considerable dedication of resources and decision rules. The process is 
extremely formalized, and division of labor exists. Collaboration also indicates a 
prolonged timeframe of involvement and a certain degree of permanence in agreements. 
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Collaboration requires joint decision making and often the creation of new forms / 
entities for governance, or the merging of old entities. As one moves from cooperation to 
collaboration, the costs to participants increase, as does the degree of formalization, 
centralization, and levels of interdependence. Consequently, when interdependencies 
increase and one encounters more central control, it might be more plausible to expect 
mechanisms of coordination and collaboration rather than cooperation. (For example, the 
growth-management regimes in Florida and Oregon mandate more formal cooperation; 
i.e., coordination and collaboration.) 
 
The transition from cooperation to coordination and then to collaboration can therefore be 
characterized along three dimensions: structure, formality, and commitment. Structure 
relates to aspects of power and control. The arrangement of organizations and 
governments in hierarchies, networks, or coalitions concentrates, displaces or disperses 
power accordingly. The locus of concentration of power influences the decision rules of 
cooperation and the levels of influence organizations have on each other. This 
concentration of power in turn influences conditions of enforcement, monitoring, 
compliance, and sanctions. At the lower end of the cooperation continuum, power is 
dispersed among cooperating entities as they retain their powers of self government. At 
the higher end of the continuum (which indicates what scholars refer to as collaboration), 
power is often reinterpreted and concentrated in the hands of the newly organized or 
reorganized entities (e.g., a joint planning commission for three local governments 
replacing three separate and individual planning commissions). When decision makers 
move from making decisions autonomously to making decisions jointly (e.g., appointing 
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members to a joint planning commission rather than individual planning commissions), 
they sacrifice an enormous amount of control over decision making and a certain amount 
of control over the outcomes of the decision making process. They have to forge new 
relationships (ties), develop new scales of reciprocity, and realize that trusting others with 
their own affairs does not always mean compromising on the interests of their 
jurisdiction. All of this means that moving up the cooperation continuum results in a loss 
of several elements that contribute to the structure of intergovernmental relationships: 
power, autonomy, and control.  
 
The second dimension, formality, refers to the extent to which rules of conduct, operating 
procedures, norms, and the process itself are codified in terms of defining the 
relationships between the cooperating entities. Formality offers stability and legitimacy to 
a cooperative effort. Formalizing cooperation helps increase trust among participants by 
helping bind promises made during the act of political contracting. It helps preserve 
institutional memory, especially when the local political landscape is characterized by 
turnovers of elected officials and general political instability. Formalizing relationships 
through intergovernmental agreements, for example, ensures that all participants are 
active participants in a process. Formality also infuses a certain level of predictability and 
accountability into the process, its outcomes, and the anticipated behavior of other 
participants. While formality offers benefits to a cooperative process, it also extends 
some disadvantages to participants who are merely contemplating taking the first steps 
towards cooperation. This is because formalizing a cooperative effort demands that 
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participants be very certain about and committed to their involvement in a cooperative 
effort (i.e., they must be past the “testing the waters” stage).  
 
The third dimension of commitment refers to the extent to which participants are invested 
in a process and in the outcomes of the process. Moving up the cooperation scale exacts 
not only a greater commitment of time and resources (endurance over a longer period of 
time), but also a greater need for both calculated and normative commitment from 
participants. In harnessing this level of commitment, participants will be asked to 
overcome tremendous political, practical, and psychological barriers that in most 
development-management scenarios preclude even the most basic commitment to solving 
regional problems (see May et al. 1996). Therefore giving up and/or sharing power, 
losing control and autonomy, formalizing the idea of cooperation, pledging long-term 
commitment to the cooperative process, and committing resources and time to the 
cooperative effort all make moving up the cooperation continuum difficult.  
 
3.5 Substantive benefits of moving up the cooperation continuum  
The difficulty of moving up the continuum, however, is compensated by the substantive 
benefits gained from formal cooperation. Consider this situation: the county has just 
organized a regional collaborative project aimed at a specific area-wide problem (e.g., 
developing sustainable tourism alternatives). During the course of several meetings 
organized for this project, local elected officials from neighboring jurisdictions find 
themselves contemplating development patterns in their region. During the course of 
these conversations, they discover that they are all dealing with very similar problems 
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and that they could benefit from talking with each other on a more regular basis. These 
elected officials now meet every month, and by doing so they have taken a deliberate step 
towards informal cooperation. At the meetings they start talking about how limited 
current efforts and plans to manage growth have been, and they vow to keep 
communication lines open on this issue. They continue talking for several years, and 
these conversations no doubt produce the outcomes that Healey and Innes have 
discovered to be the end product of collaborative processes. These conversations help 
build trust and produce better knowledge of regional issues. The elected officials gain a 
better understanding of each other’s value systems, beliefs, and concerns. Their attitudes 
towards each other change. This increase in comfort level surely sets up a situation 
wherein future cooperation would be easier to forge. At this point, the extent of 
cooperation is still mostly “talk” and no action. Other steps could be taken to direct these 
conversations towards action. Joint agreements could be crafted, and joint plans could be 
written. A further step towards both formalization and action would be setting up a joint 
planning commission. At this point, the member jurisdictions might take additional steps 
to ensure that the joint plan is more than the sum of its parts. They might decide to 
include regional policies (an urban growth boundary) in the joint plan instead of having it 
be just an amalgamation of the individual master plans – a much harder task, albeit much 
truer to regional principles. The best plan, of course, is the plan that comes off the shelf 
and is implemented. To implement the joint master plan, a joint zoning ordinance and 
eventually a joint zoning board might be created. At this point, the elected officials who 
initially met at the county-organized collaborative project have formalized their 
temporary linkages to create permanent institutions to govern regional land use on the 
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ground. They have demonstrated their attitudinal adjustments through behavioral 
changes.  
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, instead of referring to sections of the cooperation 
continuum as cooperation, coordination and collaboration, I will simply call it the 
cooperation continuum, with the understanding that moving up the continuum compels 
changes to the structure of relationships, formality of arrangements, and commitment 
levels of participants. In this redefined continuum, I equate the term “cooperation” with 
informal cooperation and the term “collaboration” with formal cooperation. 
“Coordination” forms the middle portion of the continuum. By considering cooperation 
as a continuum from informal to formal, I am assuming that both informal and formal 
cooperation are dimensions of the same underlying concept. In the following section, I 
discuss how the different mechanisms that local governments employ to cooperate 
around land use issues might be placed on this cooperation continuum. 
 
3.6 Defining the cooperation continuum in land use settings 
The land use scenario provided above offers an example of what moving up the 
continuum of cooperation on land use issues would look like. It also lends some 
credibility to the argument that cooperation is a multidimensional concept, with each 
level of cooperation (from initial talking to establishing the final joint zoning board) 
symbolizing a greater amount of cooperation. As the scenario indicates, cooperation on 
land use issues could occur in a variety of ways, through a range of cooperation 
mechanisms. Local governments could share information and data, organize joint 
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stakeholder-based processes, share planning staff, engage in collaborative projects, form 
joint committees, and converse with planning commissioners and elected officials from 
neighboring jurisdictions. Further, local governments could also cooperate by 
establishing joint programs, writing joint ancillary plans (e.g., resource-management 
plans), crafting joint agreements, writing joint master plans, writing zoning ordinances, 
developing regional land use policies, establishing joint planning commissions, and 
establishing joint zoning boards. The need for cooperation in the realm of land use 
planning is created by the fragmented nature of local governments, the extent to which 
information is dispersed across a patchwork of politically defined local boundaries, 
administrative inefficiencies created by overlapping responsibilities, inconsistent policies 
across jurisdictional lines, inefficient land use and service-delivery patterns, the nature 
and scale of planning problems (which are not confined to political boundaries), and the 
need for collective action to solve them. Therefore, efforts at cooperation and the 
mechanisms used to cooperate must address the problems that give rise to the need for 
cooperation in the first place. Where and how the cooperative mechanisms are placed on 
the cooperation continuum will not only depend on the extent to which employing them 
changes underlying structures, increases formality, increases difficulty, and increases 
commitment, but will also depend on the efficacy of these mechanisms at addressing 
planning problems. I provide an evaluation of the various cooperative mechanisms in 
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Examples Ease of implementation – 
based on extent of needed 
changes to underlying 













Easy: Does not result in loss 
of autonomy; no changes to 
existing governance 
structures; informal – no legal 
or binding obligations; does 














Easy: Do not result in loss of 
autonomy; informal – no legal 
or binding obligations; no 
changes to existing 
governance structures; do not 










staff (e.g., building 
inspector, zoning 
administrator) 
Easy: No loss of control (fear 
of it) and autonomy; no 
changes to existing 
governance structures does not 











projects as needed 
(e.g., transportation 
projects) 
Moderately Easy: Do not 
result in loss of autonomy; no 
changes to existing 
governance structures; need 
certain level of commitment; 














study and propose 
recommendations 
on issues of greater 
than jurisdictional 
impact or common 
problems 
Moderately Easy: Interactions 
occur over longer time period 
than collaborative projects and 
are motivated by broader 
substantive planning concerns; 
need substantial commitment 
of time and resources; limited 



















Difficult: Commitment needs 
to be high, especially to 
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prolonged periods of time. 
Difficult because the meetings 
are not about project or 
problem-specific needs, and 
rewards are not immediately 
apparent. This means there are 
more interpersonal/trust 





focused on more 
general planning 












Difficult: Require high 
commitment levels to meet 
over prolonged periods of time 
– especially because most 
PC’s are not compensated for 
their time.  
Shared knowledge 
– important 




concerns – also 
important because 
PC’s implement 










Difficult: Increasing level of 
formality; joint goals and joint 
decision-making processes – 
but scope of common 
decisions is limited to 
programmatic areas; require a 
certain level of commitment; 
fear of loss of control and 
autonomy; changes to 
decision- making structure 
Collective action 
















Difficult: Larger in scope; 
formality increases; joint 
goals; require high level of 
commitment; long range; 
substantial fear of loss of 
autonomy and control 
Consistency, 
collective action 
on regional issues, 
shared knowledge; 
ancillary impact 







living by design 
guidelines 
Difficult: Require moderate 
level of commitment; informal 
– but more directly connected 
















(e.g., PA 425 
agreement in 
Michigan) 
Very difficult: Extensive 
changes to decision-making 
structures and power 
relationships; joint goals; very 
formal; require extensive 
political will and commitment 
Have tremendous 
implications for 
land use patterns 
and the potential 








Very Difficult: Provide formal 
stable membership; therefore 
required commitment level is 
high; substantial fear of loss of 











plans with a joint 
master plan 
Extremely difficult: 
Tremendous fear of loss of 
autonomy and control; 
commitment level is 






on regional issues; 


















Tremendous loss of autonomy 
and control; extremely high 
commitment required; joint 
decision making; restructuring 
of governance process; 
formal; long term 
Implements the 











regional tax base 
sharing; regional 
TDRs 
Extremely difficult: Require 
tremendous commitment; 
redefine political boundaries; 
extremely difficult because of 




redirect land use at 
a larger scale than 
that of an 
individual political 
boundary – 
potential to truly 
address regional 
issues rather than 
produce a joint 










Extremely difficult: Could still 
be implemented by the 
individual zoning boards – 
Implements the 
joint master plan; 
a joint plan needs 
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individual zoning 
ordinances with a 
joint zoning 
ordinance 
therefore moderate loss of 
autonomy and control when 
compared to joint zoning 
boards; more difficult than 
joint plans and joint PC’s 
because zoning ordinances are 
used to implement plans – i.e., 
collective action and 
implementation 
to be implemented 
through a joint 
zoning ordinance 
so that the regional 
goals are not 
compromised 
through the use of 
independent 
zoning ordinances 
– same benefits 









boards with a joint 
zoning board 
Most difficult: Hardest 
because it shares the 
characteristics of the above 
four categories and includes 
the broadest aspects of 
implementation. Complete 
loss of autonomy and control; 
requires tremendous 













The above evaluation shows how each of the listed cooperative mechanisms changes 
organizational structures, differs in terms of formality, and requires different levels of 
commitment for implementation. The table also offers some insight into the substantive 
impacts of each of the listed cooperative mechanisms. Using this evaluation, I place the 
listed cooperative mechanisms on the cooperation continuum in Figure 3.2 below.  


















































Temporary shared goals for specific 
instances 
Examples: Cost sharing for specific 
development proposals, collaborative 
regional projects as the need arises 
 
Pursuit of individual goals through 
interactions, exchange of ideas, information 
sharing, etc. 
Autonomous organizations but more 
formal rules 
Example: Alliances, Councils of 
Government, coalitions, 
intergovernmental agreements 
Collective and common interagency 
decisions and decision-making bodies and 
processes 
Example: Joint zoning boards, metropolitan 
governments, joint plans 
(Adapted from Oran Young 1989, Nice and Fredericksen 1995 and Rogers 





















Information sharing  
Joint stakeholder processes 
Collaborative projects 
Joint committees 
Informal meetings – elected officials 
Joint programs 
Joint resource-management plans 
Joint agreements 
Planning agreements  
Joint master plans 
Joint planning commissions 
Informal meetings – planning commissioners 
Joint zoning ordinances 
Joint zoning boards 
Regional policies 
Shared planning staff 
Joint design guidelines 
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3.7 An Alternative interpretation of cooperation: Cooperation as a multinomial 
categorical variable 
 
Looking at cooperation through a new lens allows us to question whether formal 
cooperation constitutes “more cooperation” as the continuum above indicates. An 
alternative interpretation of the cooperation continuum would take into account the 
arguments put forth by the communicative and collaborative planning scholars in 
considering informal cooperation just as important as formal cooperation (i.e., informal 
and formal cooperation as nominal rather than ordinal categories). If understood this way, 
informal and formal cooperation would be considered completely different concepts, 
similar to how unilateral action and cooperation (even in its most informal sense) might 
be considered completely different actions. This conceptualization would allow us to 
distinguish between informal and formal cooperation without succumbing to rating one 
as more important than the other (as a ranked scale implies), and/or treating them as the 
same (as a dummy cooperation variable implies). These differences between informal and 
formal cooperation are easy to highlight. While informal cooperation is characterized by 
temporary linkages among participants, formal cooperation is achieved by legally binding 
permanent linkages. While informal cooperation helps achieve individual goals or 
situational shared goals at best, formal cooperation aims at fulfilling common goals 
through collective decisions and shared decision-making processes. This means that 
formal cooperation requires an entirely different level of commitment from participants 
than informal cooperation. Similarly, formal cooperation requires thinking about changes 
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to the decision-making structure, power relations, and organizational autonomy in a 
completely different way than one thinks about informal cooperation. 
 
Considering informal and formal cooperation as distinct nominal categories would also 
imply that both informal and formal cooperation could be considered ends in and of 
themselves. Further, the choice of informal or formal cooperation is motivated by 
different concerns, and made possible by different mindsets and mentalities.  Informal 
cooperation might occur when participants seek social learning, which is a form of tacit, 
informal learning that occurs through mutual adjustment and mutual learning. Social 
learning changes the participants’ problem-solving strategies, norms, theories of reality, 
values, and beliefs. Therefore, participants seek informal cooperation to improve their 
social, political, and intellectual capital; to build trust; explore the idea of cooperation; to 
educate others and be educated about unfamiliar issues; and to build relationships with 
others (see Friedmann 1987; Gray 1985). While there are limited pre-conditions to 
exploring informal cooperation, participants seek formal cooperation only when there is 
some certainty that such cooperation will be feasible in the first place (e.g., when the 
participants at least have working relationships, or when benefits significantly outweigh 
costs). Although formal cooperation produces many of the benefits that informal 
cooperation provides (e.g., building trust through continued interactions), it is not sought 
for that purpose. In other words, when the objective is to build trust and promote 
learning, one looks to informal and not formal processes. Formal cooperation is sought 
for a different set of benefits: legitimacy, credibility, legality, institutional memory, 
accountability, and predictability of future behavior.  
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In this conceptualization of cooperation, the various mechanisms used for cooperation are 
classified as formal or informal based on their characteristic features (similar to how the 
mechanisms were ranked). In a land use setting, informal cooperation occurs when local 
governments share data and information, organize joint stakeholder-based processes, 
share planning staff, engage in collaborate projects, form joint committees, and converse 
with planning commissioners and elected officials from neighboring jurisdictions. These 
activities are considered informal partly because they do not symbolize relationships that 
are “written in stone,” and partly because they involve a limited loss of autonomy, limited 
long-term commitment from participants, a lack of stable and long-term interactions, and 
mostly tacit, intangible and narrower (often project- or problem-specific) substantive 
benefits.  The cooperative activities or mechanisms that are considered more formal 
include establishing joint programs, writing joint ancillary plans, crafting joint 
agreements, writing joint master plans and zoning ordinances, developing regional land 
use policies, and establishing joint planning commissions and joint zoning boards. These 
mechanisms are considered formal because they provide tangible outcomes that are more 
generally applicable to the larger scope of master planning.  




































Figure 3.3 Explication of cooperation as a multinomial variable 
 
On the whole, this discussion suggests that there may be several ways of conceptualizing 
what constitutes cooperation. First, cooperation could be simply defined as “working 
together” but this definition overlooks the nuances of the different levels of “working 
together.” This means that the various types of cooperation (e.g., informal and formal) 
Information sharing  
Joint stakeholder processes 
Collaborative projects 
Joint committees 
Informal meetings – elected officials 
Joint programs 
Joint resource-management plans 
Joint agreements 
Planning agreements  
Joint master plans 
Joint planning commissions 
Informal meetings – planning commissioners 
Joint zoning ordinances 
Joint zoning boards 
Regional policies 
Shared planning staff 
Joint regional design guidelines 
Formal cooperation 
 Policies are formalized  
 Closer to producing action 
on land use issues. That is, 
implementation potential 
is high and tangible 
collective action outcomes 
can be produced  
 More difficult to achieve 
because of costs to 
participants such as loss of 
autonomy and control
Informal cooperation 
 Most interactions and the 
products of these 
interactions are informal 
(unwritten agreements) 
 Produces intangible 
benefits – increased trust, 
tacit learning 
 Easier to achieve because 
of limited costs to 
participants  
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would not be differentiated from each other. Second, cooperation could be treated as a 
more dynamic concept by dividing it into two separate categories: informal and formal 
cooperation. By doing so, we would assume that informal and formal cooperation are 
dissimilar but equally important concepts. Finally, cooperation could be considered as a 
continuum ranging from informal to formal cooperation. Here formal cooperation is 
ranked more highly than informal cooperation because it produces more substantive 
collective action and joint decision making, is more difficult to achieve, and requires 
greater commitment from participants.  
 









Research design and methodology 
 
 
In this chapter, I provide an account of the methodology used for this dissertation.  
 
The research design for this study was structured to allow multiple stages of data 
collection. The data were collected in three different stages. The first stage was an 
exploratory effort and involved multiple open-ended telephone conversations with 
elected officials, policy makers, and planners in Michigan. The purpose of these initial 
phone conversations was to both refine the conceptual models by grounding them in the 
institutional realities of Michigan, and hone the survey instruments to make them both 
user-friendly and substantively relevant. Based on this effort, the second stage of data 
collection was conducted. This stage involved administering the surveys employed for 
this study. This stage provided the quantitative data for this study and also provided 
preliminary information that aided in the selection of the case study sites. Finally, the 
third stage consisted of actually conducting the case study. The material from the case 
study is primarily used as supportive material to the overall quantitative results 
throughout this dissertation. 
 
4.1 Unit of analysis 
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The unit of analysis for this study is the “municipality”. That said, for survey purposes 
neither the municipality as an entity nor the entire elected board could be surveyed for 
practical reasons. My survey therefore, was primarily directed to the chief elected official 
of a municipality. In responding to questions that made references to a municipality’s 
decision to cooperate for example, these chief elected officials were asked to characterize 
the local elected board’s collective decision. This seemed to be a reasonable option given 
that local elected boards act collectively, the chief elected official has the closest working 
relationship with each of the board members individually, and the chief elected official 
also sits on the planning commission and has a more intimate knowledge of the 
municipality’s planning activities. 
 
4.2 Data collection 
Data were collected from several sources for this study, including interviews, mail and 
web surveys, and a variety of miscellaneous data sources. 
 
4.2.1 Mail and Web Surveys 
The principal data source for determining the extent of municipal cooperation on land use 
issues, as well as the variety of anticipated explanatory variables, was a 45 item long 
survey instrument. This survey instrument is appended to the end of this dissertation. 
Michigan has a total of 1776 municipalities. Out of these, 69% are townships (1241), 
14% are villages (262), and 15% are cities (273). Because cooperation typically involves 
a cluster of communities, I employed a cluster sampling technique to draw my sample. 
Substantively, much of the justification for regional cooperation comes from the need to 
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maintain the urban cores and protect the rural peripheries. Therefore cities and villages, 
in their capacity as urban cores, were used as the center of the clusters. This cluster 
sampling was done in two stages. To draw my sample, I first chose a random sample of 
136 cities (50% of total Michigan cities) and 131 villages (50% of total Michigan 
villages). I then selected all the townships bordering or containing these chosen cities and 
villages. This yielded a total of 333 townships providing a total sample frame of 600 
municipalities. Of these 600 municipalities, 192 responded to the survey. This constitutes 
a response rate of 32%. Of the 192 municipalities that responded, 69% were townships, 
9% were villages and 21% were cities. This indicates that there is a slight over-
representation of cities and under-representation of villages in my sample when 
compared with the actual proportions of cities and villages in Michigan. To ensure that 
the resulting sample of municipalities was geographically representative, I compiled 
several maps using Geographic Information Systems. A visible inspection of the maps 
showed that the constructed sample was representative in terms of the geographic 
distribution of municipalities. This ensures that the findings and conclusions reached 
through this study can be reasonably extrapolated to the entire state of Michigan 
 
Because of the centrality of formal institutions to my study, I also surveyed county and 
regional planning agencies to ascertain their perspective on land use cooperation and 
more importantly to understand these agencies’ role in facilitating local cooperation. The 
principal data source for determining county and regional agency perspectives on local 
cooperation was a 26 item survey. This survey is appended to the end of this dissertation 
as well. I sent mail and web versions of this survey to a census of county (83) and 
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regional planning agencies (14) in Michigan. Of the counties and regional planning 
agencies receiving the survey, 25% of counties and 50% of regional planning agencies 
responded. All surveys were pre-tested using both planners and elected officials before 
they were sent out. 
 
4.2.2 Case studies 
I also conducted two case studies for this dissertation. I selected the case study sites after 
receiving the completed mail and web surveys back from the municipalities. Using these 
completed surveys I conducted some preliminary data analysis to identify the case study 
sites that varied on the key independent variables that were theoretically determined and 
confirmed through analysis. Preliminary results revealed that the level of internal support 
for cooperation in a municipality, whether municipalities perceived benefits from 
cooperation, and the extent of perceived growth pressure in a municipality were 
important variables in terms of contributing to an understanding of the evolution of 
municipal cooperation. I then looked through the survey results to find clusters of 
municipalities for comparison that varied on these key independent variables. My survey 
results yielded several candidate municipalities that could have been compared for case 
study purposes. I conducted an initial round of telephone interviews with both policy 
makers, and planners in these municipalities, and researched archival material such as 
newspaper editorials to narrow the results. Finally, two municipality clusters were chosen 
for further analysis. 
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Both of these clusters of municipalities are located in Washtenaw County. The first 
cluster is the Chelsea area municipalities and the second, the Manchester area 
municipalities. Using these two case study sites offers several benefits. They are located 
within 10 miles of each other. This geographic proximity provides these two clusters with 
several commonalities. Both Chelsea area and Manchester area municipalities face 
several similar problems, they have similar amounts of farmland and natural resources, 
they are both located in the western part of Washtenaw county, their developmental 
histories are similar, they share the same general political persuasion, and have racial, 
social, and other demographic similarities in the make up of their general population. By 
being located in Washtenaw county, and consequently SEMCOG, these two sets of 
municipalities are also governed by the same formal institutions. Further, both clusters 
were pre-defined by the municipalities themselves and endorsed by the county as 
“Chelsea area” and “Manchester area” communities. The pre-defined Chelsea and 
Manchester areas also consist of the same number of municipalities and similar 
jurisdiction types – with one difference – Chelsea used to be a village and only recently 
became a city. They however differ in the three independent variables chosen for further 
examination in the following ways. 
 
Table 4.1 Case study comparison 
 
Chelsea area municipalities (consisting 
of Sylvan township, City of Chelsea, 
Lyndon township and Dexter township) 
 
 
Low perceived growth pressure 
 
Manchester are municipalities 
(consisting of the Village of Manchester, 
Manchester township, Freedom 
township and Bridgewater township) 
 
High perceived growth pressure 
 
Low perceived benefit from cooperation 
 
High perceived benefit from cooperation 
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Low internal support for cooperation High internal support for cooperation 
 
Once these two areas in Washtenaw County were chosen, several steps were taken to 
gather the data needed for further analysis. I conducted several interviews of the chief 
elected officials in all of the municipalities in the Chelsea and Manchester areas.  In total, 
I interviewed thirteen elected officials multiple times for a total of about 52 hrs. These 
were structured interviews guided by an interview protocol. I also interviewed several 
Washtenaw county planners, read internal meeting minutes from each municipality’s 
planning commission and elected board meetings, and researched newspaper editorials. 
Finally, I attended public meetings in these two areas including planning commission 
meetings and area officials’ meetings for almost a year from August of 2007 to June of 
2008.  
 
Apart from these structured in-person interviews aimed at gathering information on the 
case study sites, I also conducted telephone interviews of several Michigan policymakers. 
The purpose of these telephone interviews was to gather background information, clarify 
regression and other results from the analysis, formulate survey questions, and interpret 
results.  
 
4.3 Variable constructs 
Dependent variable: cooperation 
In chapter 3, I outlined three different ways of conceptualizing cooperation. The variable 
constructs for each of these three conceptions of cooperation are discussed in this section 
and provided in table 4.2.  
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Cooperation: The measurement of the initial act of cooperation is based on a single 
question asked in the mail and web based surveys of municipalities. This is treated as a 
dummy variable. 
 
Extent of formal cooperation: This variable was calculated out of a series of questions 
that were posed in the mail and web based surveys of municipalities. This is treated as a 
continuous variable.  
 
Informal cooperation and formal cooperation: This separation of informal cooperation 
and formal cooperation was offered to suggest that informal cooperation need not always 
be regarded as leading up to formal cooperation but rather that informal cooperation 
could serve as an end in itself. Whether a municipality engages in informal or formal 
cooperation was also calculated out of a series of questions that were posed to 
municipalities in the mail and web based surveys. This is treated as a nominal variable. 
 





Dummy variable: coded 0 or 1 
Frequency of 0 = 95 
Frequency of 1 = 92 
Measurement: Chief elected official was posed the following question 
Does your jurisdiction currently cooperate on land use planning and zoning issues with 
neighboring jurisdictions?  
 
 
Extent of formality 
 
Range: 0-13        
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Measurement: Chief elected officials were asked to indicate whether they used several of the 
listed cooperation mechanisms. These cooperation mechanisms were listed in chapter 3 along 
with the conceptualization of cooperation. The listed cooperation mechanisms were not mutually 
exclusive – i.e. elected officials could select multiple listed cooperative mechanisms. Based on 
the theoretical explanations provided in chapter 3 and after asking a group of elected officials and 
planners to rank the listed mechanisms in the order of formality, these cooperation mechanisms 
were ranked from 0-13. There were more than 13 listed mechanisms but some of these 
mechanisms were not being used in Michigan. The mechanisms that were not being used were 
removed from the ranking. The municipality’s most formal cooperative effort was then selected 
and this was given the pre-determined rank.  
 
1. Collaborative projects 
2. Joint committees 
3. Elected officials informal but organized meetings 
4. PCs meeting 
5. Joint programs 
6. Joint resource management plans 
7. Joint design guidelines 
8. Joint agreements 
9. Planning agreements 
10. Joint master plans 
11. JPC 
12. Regional level policies 
13. JZO 
 
Informal cooperation; Formal cooperation 
 
Frequency of no cooperation: 92 
Frequency of informal cooperation: 25 
Frequency of formal cooperation: 70 
 
Measurement 1: If the most formal effort of a municipality was still informal, a code of “1” was 
assigned 
If the most formal cooperation effort of a municipality was formal, a code of “2” was assigned. 
Municipalities that did not cooperate were assigned a score of “0” 
Measurement 2: No cooperation was coded as “0”; Informal cooperation based on figure 3.3 was 
coded as “1”; Formal cooperation based on the classification in figure 3.3 was coded as “2”. 
Municipalities with both informal and formal cooperative efforts in place were classified based 
on whether a “majority” of their cooperative efforts were informal or formal. Municipalities with 
an equal number of informal and formal cooperative efforts in place were coded as “3”. 
 
4.4  Independent variables 
Table 4.3 provides all the independent variables used in the regression models. All the 
independent variables used are drawn from the web and mail surveys of municipalities 
and were operationalized based on the conceptual framework provided in chapter 2. 
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Environmental Factors 
These factors provide the background conditions for planning in a municipality. 
Cooperative efforts are often forged as a direct reaction to changes in these 
environmental conditions. The environmental conditions that are particularly important in 
a land use setting are those that induce tremendous uncertainty into the planning process. 
In most municipalities, growth pressures, and other threats to local institutions such as 
lawsuits and controversial land use decisions, constitute the most concerning 
environmental conditions with direct impacts on planning decision making. The capacity 
of a municipality – particularly the amount of full time staff dedicated to executing a 
municipality’s planning function is also considered an environmental factor with the 
potential to impact local cooperation. These four variables are measured using four 
straightforward questions in the survey.  
 
Formal institutions 
The only formal institutions included in this study, are those provided at the county and 
regional level. This is measured by asking municipalities to gauge the effectiveness of 
county and regional agencies at performing a variety of supporting functions aiding local 
cooperation. These supporting functions are listed in the table. The variable itself is 




  91 
Informal institutions help determine the ideas that a palatable in region. Two variables 
measuring informal institutions are included in this study. This first is a measure of the 
extent of a “regional governance culture” in an area. This variable measures whether a 
cooperation-conducive regionalist environment exits in an area. This variable is 
constructed out of several questions in the survey. Conversely, the inverse of this variable 
would measure the extent of needed cooperation in an area. The second informal 
institutional variable measures antecedent conditions for cooperation. This variable 
measures the extent of cooperation on a variety of listed services.  
  
Decision maker related characteristics  
Four different variables help measure decision maker related factors that make the 
decision makers of a jurisdiction more receptive to the idea of cooperation. Two of these 
variables are related to education. The first education related variable measures whether 
elected officials and planning commissioners in a municipality have undergone training 
on the benefits of cooperation on land use issues. The second variable measures whether 
elected officials and planning commissioners have undergone training on growth 
management principles and concepts in general. The third variable in this category 
measures the extent of internal support in a municipality for the idea of cooperation. Data 
for this variable were compiled from the survey as a composite of the extent to which 
planning staff, elected officials and planning commissioners in a municipality support 
cooperation. The fourth and final variable measures whether elected officials in a 
municipality anticipate benefits from cooperation on land use issues. This was a 
straightforward question on the survey. 
  92 
 
Table 4.3 Independent variable measurements 
Independent 






Range: 10- 50 








Strong leadership from public officials  
Scale 1-5   
  
Competition among local governments for 
growth and development 
Reversed 
Scale 1-5   
  
History of political conflict among 
jurisdictions 
Reversed 
Scale 1-5   
  
Strong regional institutions  
Scale 1-5   
  
Agreement on regional land use problems  
Scale 1-5   
  
Access to the financial, technical, 
institutional networks and resources needed 
to forge cooperative alliances  
Scale 1-5 
 
   
  
 
History of good working relationships with 
our neighboring jurisdictions  
Scale 1-5 
   
  
Similarity of land use problems in the region Scale 1-5 
   
 Realization of interjurisdictional impacts of 





training of LEB and 
PC  














Extent to which PCs, staff and LEB support 













Providing technical assistance and staff 









Providing technical assistance and staff 




   
  
Providing opportunities for interactions 
among decision makers 
Scale 1-5 
 
   
  
Playing a mediation role among local 
decision makers 
Scale 1-5 
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Providing a forum for regional /countywide 
problem solving 
Scale 1-5   
  
Providing leadership for cooperative 
planning efforts Scale 1-5   
  
Providing “fair” representation of the range 
of regional /countywide interests  
Scale 1-5   
  
Setting regional /countywide land use 
priorities and goals 
Scale 1-5 
   
Full time staff 

















Information services (e.g. GIS) Yes/No 
   
  
Building regulation (e.g. enforcement)  Yes/No 
   
  
Police (e.g. patrol, crime lab) Yes/No 
   
  
Fire (e.g. inspection, ambulance) Yes/No 
   
  
Refuse collection (e.g. solid waste, 
recycling) 
Yes/No 
   
  
Water and sewer (e.g. collection, treatment) Yes/No 
   
  
Transit (e.g. public bus) Yes/No 
   
  
Parks and recreation (e.g. senior centers, 
trails) 
Yes/No 
   
  
Cultural services (e.g. museums, zoos) Yes/No 
   
  
Environmental services (e.g. water quality, 
erosion) 
Yes/No 
   
  
Roads and bridges (e.g. construction) Yes/No 
   
Cooperation training 
Training particularly on cooperation LEB 
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Unsuccessful 
cooperation 















Controversial land use decisions  
Yes/No 
Environmental 











4.5 Regression Models 
The regression models were primarily constructed to understand the factors that predict 
cooperation on land use issues. All three regression models used for this dissertation use 
“cooperation” as the dependent variable. 
 
4.5.1 Model One 
Dependent variable: Cooperation (dummy variable) 
In this model, I develop an understanding of the factors that predict the initial cooperation 
among municipalities. Although a municipality’s capacity, measured through the full 
time staff dedicated to planning and zoning activities is included as a variable in the 
models predicting the formality of cooperative efforts, and both informal and formal 
cooperation, it is omitted from this model. Preliminary interviews with both elected 
officials and planners revealed that capacity related concerns do not play a role in 
determining whether a municipality decides to engage in cooperation. Interviewees 
explained that capacity related concerns are brought to the table mostly while 
contemplating questions of how much cooperation rather than questions about whether a 
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municipality should cooperate. Further, elected officials also indicated that general 
training on growth management principles do not play a role in the decision to cooperate. 
Rather such training plays a larger role in determining the kinds of cooperative 
mechanisms that elected officials chose to employ to address different land use problems. 
In keeping with this initial finding, the variable measuring training on growth 
management issues was also removed from this model. Finally, several respondents to the 
survey had indicated that their municipality had been involved in unsuccessful 
cooperative attempts. Such prior attempts at cooperation, several elected officials 
explained affect their perception of whether it is “worth it” to a municipality to engage in 
another cooperative effort. Prior unsuccessful cooperation is an antecedent condition that 
contributes to the informal institutions in an area. It was therefore included in this model. 
The predictors used in this model are outlined in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Regression Model 1 
Environmental 
factors 














county and regional 





Extent of regional 
governance culture 



















4.5.2 Model two 
 
Dependent variable: Extent of formality  
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I construct this model to develop an understanding of the factors that affect the extent to 
which elected officials formalize their cooperative efforts. Table 4.5 provides a synthesis 




Table 4.5 Regression models 2 and 3 
Environmental 
factors 
















county and regional 





Extent of regional 
governance culture 
























4.5.3 Model three 
Dependent variable: Informal cooperation; Formal cooperation 
This model is a multinomial regression model and therefore is divided into two 
components: one predicting informal cooperation and the other predicting formal 
cooperation. Although two separate binomial logistic regressions could have been 
conducted separately for informal and formal cooperation, they have been combined here 
in one multinomial regression model to increase the efficiency of the model and reduce 
the amount of error. All predictors from model two and their hypothesized effects are 
retained for this model and provided in table 4.5.  Another variation of this multinomial 
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regression model is also used. The predictors remain the same in this second model. The 
dependent variable however is operationalized in a different manner as described in Table 
4.4. This second version of the multinomial model has three components: these three 
parts of the model predict informal cooperation, formal cooperation, and both informal 
and formal cooperation. 
 
In addition to satisfying regression assumptions in general, several other checks were 
made to ensure that the regression models met all the commonly accepted standards. 
Rules of thumb for regression analysis state that at least 30 observations need to be 
included for central limit theorem to operate. Further, there need to be at least five 
observations for each parameter specified in the model (Allison 1999). For logistic 
regression models, there need to be at least ten observations for each parameter included 
in the model. This rule of thumb helps ensure the power of the regression model and 
helps avoid what Goggin (1986) refers to as the problem of too many variables and too 
view cases or overdetermination. All three regression models specified in this study 
contain 192 observations, with about ten or eleven independent variables.  The specified 
models therefore have sufficient explanatory power. Also, all the general diagnostic tests 
such plotting the studentized residuals against the predicted values to check for 
heteroskedasticity, checking component plus plots of variables for linearity, and 
determining variable inflation factor scores for multicollinearity and leverage values for 
outliers and influential cases were conducted.  
 
Other issues of concern 
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One potential problematic issue with this research is that there might be endogeneity 
problems in terms of how the variables informal institutions and informal cooperation 
were constructed. This problem of endogeneity might manifest itself in two ways:  first, 
there is the issue of temporal priority or causal order and second the question of 
measurement validity. The temporal priority of the causal variables (factors) is at issue 
when the factors that are supposed to affect a particular outcome, themselves depend on 
that outcome. For example, the regional governance culture, which is hypothesized as an 
informal institution affecting the extent of land use cooperation, might itself depend on 
the land use cooperation in an area. Testing for such chicken and egg kinds of problems 
while dealing with cross-sectional data is extremely difficult.  However, a remedy might 
be for future research on land use cooperation to use structural equation modeling, and 
variants such as path analysis as data analysis techniques. Such an extended analysis of 
cooperation using path analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Using path 
analysis and other modeling techniques would allow the researcher to determine 
exogenous and endogenous variables by reversing the specified causal order. This 
problem of temporal priority is of lesser concern to this research than the problem of 
measurement validity. 
Measurement validity raises questions about the degree to which a measurement actually 
measures what it purports to. Framed another way, in the context of this research, the 
problem of measurement validity relates to whether the variables regional governance 
culture and informal cooperation have been defined, operationalized and measured in 
conceptually and analytically distinct ways.  
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The variable regional governance culture captures the general attitudes, beliefs and 
culture underlying political behavior in an area. The variable informal cooperation 
measures the particular cooperative behaviors that elected officials engage in. Regional 
governance culture was measured as a rather “diffuse” concept by examining whether 
elected officials acknowledged that municipalities in their region faced similar land use 
problems, whether they agreed on common regional problems; whether the political 
environment was characterized by conflict and competition; whether municipalities had 
good working relationships with each other; and whether the municipalities recognized 
the extra-jurisdictional impacts of their land use policies.  Cooperation (the dependent 
variable) in general and informal cooperation (a component of cooperation) in particular 
were measured by asking elected officials to indicate whether they were engaged in very 
specific land use related cooperative activities such as informal conversations among 
elected officials, joint committees to explore land use related issues, and collaborative 
land use projects among municipalities. Elected officials were also asked to name the 
municipalities they cooperated with. These two variables are conceptually distinct in the 
same manner that attitudes are generally regarded as distinct from behavior. That said, 
there is always the possibility that elected officials used their cooperative behavior to 
inform their assessment of regional governance culture. To avoid this problem, the set of 
questions evaluating the governance culture of an area were placed early in the survey 
and questions about cooperative activities were asked later in the survey. It is also 
conceivable that the assessment of regional governance culture could be based on factors 
other than whether a municipality is engaged in a cooperative effort. Finally, if elected 
officials had used their cooperative activities to assess the governance culture, one would 
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expect these two variables to be highly correlated. The pairwise correlation between 
elected officials’ assessment of regional governance culture and informal cooperation 
was .043 with a significance level of .616 indicating no significant relationship between 
the two variables and highlighting the lack of strong evidence to suggest that elected 
officials confounded the region’s governance culture with their cooperative activities.  
 
4.6 Qualitative information 
The first aim of this dissertation was to develop an empirical understanding of the factors 
predicting cooperation on land use issues. This was primarily accomplished using the 
quantitative data in the regression models and substantiating the quantitative data with 
excerpts from the case studies. The second aim was to understand the limits to 
cooperation. The data presented to address this second aim are primarily qualitative data. 
These qualitative data were obtained from both the surveys of elected officials and the 
case studies. There were two questions on the mail survey that addressed the limits to 
cooperation. The first question asked non-cooperating elected officials for a written 
account of why they chose not to cooperate on land use issues. The second question 
asked for an account of whether the municipality in question had been a part of an 
unsuccessful cooperation attempt and if so, an explanation of why the effort was 
unsuccessful. Elected officials also had the opportunity to record other thoughts on 
cooperation in general in the final “comments” part of the survey. In the following 
chapter, I present my analysis of the limits to cooperation. This chapter is followed by 
two other chapters that provide the results pertaining to the factors predicting 
cooperation.  





Impediments to cooperation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3, I outlined a long list of reasons why local governments should cooperate 
with each other on land use planning issues. However, given that the norm in permissive 
states is to make independent rather than joint cooperative decisions, the next question to 
ask is: What factors stand in the way of municipalities voluntarily cooperating in their 
planning and development management efforts in order to yield multi-jurisdictional 
solutions to those multi-jurisdictional problems? The difficulties of achieving such 
voluntary cooperation have been studied extensively and are often explained as resulting 
from many combined factors. These include basic ideological differences, the authority 
of one or more stakeholders to take unilateral action, constitutional issues and precedents, 
a history of unsuccessful decision-making efforts and conflict, and the uneven 
distribution of power among stakeholders (Gray 1989, Selin and Chavez 1995). Further, 
formal and informal institutional constraints such as the home rule tradition, lack of trust, 
fear of loss of autonomy, lack of information, historic conflicts, and rivalries have also 
proved to be impediments to local land use cooperation (Rogers and Whetten 1982; Nice 
and Fredericksen 1995; CLOSUP 2005).  
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On the whole, this body of work suggests that localities fail to cooperate for any one (or 
more) of several fundamental reasons. Specifically, they do not cooperate because they 
never have in the past (i.e., simple inertia); they see no pressing reason to do so now (e.g., 
the problem is a state or regional problem, not a local problem); they fear cooperating 
(e.g., because it might threaten their autonomy or alter power relationships); they see 
cooperation as detrimental to their own interests (e.g., they perceive themselves as 
competing with neighboring jurisdictions for residents or desirable development); they 
simply do not get along with neighboring officials or trust their sincerity for some reason; 
or, while they see some benefits to cooperation, they place higher priority on other 
concerns (e.g., maintaining autonomy), they are stymied by institutional hurdles (e.g., 
lack of clear legal authority to do so), or they lack the administrative capacity, 
knowledge, or skills needed to do so.  
 
This literature has no doubt made tremendous progress in helping scholars of 
intergovernmental relations understand why cooperation is both the most sought-after and 
the most elusive aspect of intergovernmental decision making. But how do the reasons 
for non-cooperation outlined above translate to planning and development management 
settings? In other words, what does it mean in a planning setting to say that local 
governments do not want to give up control and hence do not cooperate? Do the reasons 
for non-cooperation differ depending on whether local officials are trying to get to the 
table (initiating cooperation) or stay at the table (sustaining participation after having 
made the initial decision to cooperate)? Also, are there certain obstacles to cooperation 
that quite simply cannot be overcome? In this chapter, I will elaborate on the answers to 
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several of these questions and present results from both the mail surveys and in-person 
interviews of local elected officials in Michigan.  
 
Local elected officials encounter obstacles to cooperation in a variety of situations. These 
obstacles might prevent elected officials from generating the initial interest needed to 
engage in cooperation, stall efforts to sustain interactions and conversations among 
elected officials during the course of a cooperative effort, hinder both informal and 
formal cooperative efforts, and prevent informal conversations from materializing into 
formal agreements with a substantive impact on local land use policy. My research 
reveals that the obstacles to land use related cooperation fall into two categories: 
obstacles that prevent local elected officials from initiating cooperation, and obstacles 
that hinder cooperation during the negotiating process. I elaborate on these two sets of 
obstacles in the following sections. 
 





Figure 5.1 Obstacles to initial cooperation 
5.2.1 Status quo 
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"That's the way we have always done it."6 
The “protecting the status quo” argument plays out in two separate but interconnected 
ways at the municipality level. The first relates to the destiny of local governments (i.e., 
autonomy and independence of government at the local level), and the second relates to 
policy outcomes and governmental operations at the local level. The principles of 
sovereign government and municipal independence have always provided meaning to and 
the foundation on which municipalities were first created in the United States. And it is 
this independence and authority, as Tocqueville rightly observed, that provide meaning to 
municipal governance even today. To most local officials, this independence defines 
municipal government and sets it apart from the centralization and bureaucracy of the rest 
of the political system. In fact, independence alone gives municipalities their importance. 
In Michigan, local elected officials truly believe and are invested in this system of 
municipal independence. Any change, in their eyes, would drastically alter something 
that isn’t really broken. As they see it, mandated or exhorted cooperation would threaten 
the very essence of this system of municipal independence. This status quo is important 
to elected officials, because reproducing it confers upon them certain benefits (e.g., 
autonomy) that unfortunately stand in direct contrast to a more social purposive model of 
governance.   
 
Independence, elected officials explain, is manifested first and foremost in the ability of 
elected officials to make independent decisions for their jurisdiction. Local officials 
reinforce their independence when they reproduce the existing governance structures. 
Further, local independence helps elected officials maintain two kinds of power that seem 
                                                 
6 Both quotes are survey responses 
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central to our understanding of autonomy, control, and turf in municipal government (see 
Stone 1989). Systemic power is derived from the social structure that accords power in 
certain ways (e.g., the tradition of home rule, and the presence of township governments 
in Michigan). Pre-emptive power is the capacity to use the strategic position that 
systematic power provides (e.g., independent decision making). The realization of 
systemic power occurs through pre-emptive power. Within these two conceptions of 
power are multiple dimensions of power: “power to” and “power over.” An elected 
official explains how “power to” and “power over” are realized in a land use setting:  
 
Let’s say I ran the township so when I say jump everybody jumps. When I say 
sign this agreement, people don’t read it, they just raise their hands. And there are 
many townships like that. So suddenly you have taken a very comfortable 
arrangement where someone can go to your planning commission and if you 
don’t like him you can tell your members of the PC, “That ain’t going nowhere - 
screw him.” Or conversely overlook things to help him out. This land division 
comes in and the developer needs a few extra land divisions and you just give it to 
him. You can do that when you have things under your control. Suddenly you go 
into a Joint Planning Commission situation in which – wait a minute, those 
people are elected from another city or township and I can’t control them and they 
can’t control me. What happens to my power now when someone comes and says 
they want to put a gas station in? I didn’t like them and in the previous 
arrangement I can say “Screw you.”  Unfortunately that is what much of politics 
at the local level comes down to – do I like you enough? Am I going to screw you 
or not? It boggles my mind. At least that’s they way it has been practiced in my 
township.  So a traditionalist is giving up a lot of his or her power once we 
expand the boundaries, once they expand the governmental units to people they 
no longer directly control.  Because as supervisor you appoint the members of the 
planning commission with the board’s consent – that is your one appointment 
solely that you have.  Suddenly you are not appointing all the members of the 
joint planning commission anymore, are you? So I would think that you would 
find quite a few traditionalists who would not want to give up what has been, you 
know, little fiefdoms – this is his kingdom here . . . mine here . . . hers there . . . .7 
 
                                                 
7 Local elected official, personal communication, October 22, 2007 
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In this situation, elected officials use their power over planning commissioners to achieve 
the planning outputs they desire. Possessing these two aspects of power helps elected 
officials assert their independence. Cooperation on regional issues would require elected 
officials to share this decision-making power with neighboring entities or to completely 
cede it to the state as in the growth-management states. 
 
Discussions during a Joint Planning Commission meeting in the Manchester area in 
Washtenaw County confirm the elected official’s concern about losing control over Joint 
Planning Commission members from other jurisdictions. A joint planning commissioner 
warns the group during its preliminary discussions: 
We should make decisions not because Uncle Charlie who we have coffee with is 
a good guy and we like him enough, but because we want the future of our 
community to be a certain way. We should use this regional planning process to 
figure out what this future should be for us. So then we can justify our plans 
based on the vision we have for this region as a whole.8  
 
This single remark confirms elected officials’ worst fears of losing control. It is this 
inability to control other decision makers, the decision-making process, and the outcomes 
of the planning process that elected officials anticipate losing through cooperation.  
 
Further, officials seek cooperation in land use settings to manage the interdependencies 
among local governments. But the locally crafted argument for independence runs 
completely counter to the notion of regionally interdependent communities that do not 
follow political boundaries. Ironically, at the local level the most visible boundary is the 
political one.  
 
                                                 
8 Joint Planning Commission meeting, December 12, 2007 
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This understanding of local boundaries and local independence has several implications 
that concern planners and policy makers: First, it creates an “us versus them” mentality of 
divisiveness rather than commonality. Second, it completely alters the perception of 
whether regional problems have impacts at the local scale. This in turn affects the 
perceived need for cooperation negatively; i.e., some elected officials say, “Regional 
issues are not our problem, we do not have any problems in our jurisdiction, and 
therefore we do not see a need for cooperation.”9 Those who defend this perspective 
indicate that well-defined boundaries allow local governments to be responsible for their 
own issues. That is, transparent boundaries reduce accountability. One official remarks, 
“Our problems are of our own making and we will fix them.” He continues, “More fluid 
regional boundaries remove accountability from elected officials – they can quickly 
blame everybody else for their problems and not act on them because nobody else is 
cooperating with them to solve their issues.”10 When confronted with this statement, 
however, elected officials who are currently engaged in cooperative efforts respond: 
 
Right – but the point is that within your local political boundary the problems that 
you create are more apparent – But outside your boundaries, because you think 
you are independent politically and otherwise from neighboring jurisdictions, you 
assume that your policies and decisions have no impacts – but the truth is that 
they do have impacts on the regional community. These impacts might be 
secondary impacts that are much more implied. For example, suburban 
municipalities developing rapidly helped cause the demise of the center city – a 
secondary impact – but it takes a non-parochial individual to realize this, and 
much more important, acknowledge it and do something about it.11 
 
Local officials who indicate that they would prefer not to deviate from existing land use 
policies and regulations explain further that their tried and tested policies work well 
                                                 
9 Survey response 
10 Local elected official, personal communication, October 24, 2007 
11 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 
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within local boundaries. Further, if a problem were isolated, they would know best how 
to modify their internal regulations to fix the problem. This argument is related to another 
key reason that local elected officials resist cooperating with their neighbors: They feel 
that their primary responsibility is to their constituents, who after all are the people they 
know best. 
 
That said, the social forces that created the 6x6 township government as we know it have 
shifted, and the fundamental nature of independent governmental units has changed. 
Today most jurisdictions are not as self sufficient as they used to be (and as Tocqueville 
observed them to be). Jobs in a municipality typically do not pay for its housing stock. 
Bed-and-a-job communities have been transformed to more elastic bed-for-me, job-for-
you communities. This alone affirms the extent to which jurisdictions are interdependent. 
Some elected officials recognize this and understand that the term ‘quality of life,’ which 
is so often used locally to justify planning activities, includes the entire live-work 
experience even if residents are not both living and working within the same political 
boundary. Others would rather parse these roles and be responsible only for the role they 
play in creating and sustaining this experience.  
 
5.2.2 Local knows local best 
“Smaller township governments know what is best for their 
community.” 
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“We believe that our local interests are best served by 
maintaining local control.”12 
 
The existence of municipalities in Michigan has long been justified by Jeffersonian 
notions of direct democracy and the desirability of situating government as close as 
possible to its people. Although municipalities today do not function the way their 
creators envisioned – direct citizen involvement has been over time replaced by 
representative government through elected boards - this ideal of the municipality persists 
even now. With this ideal comes the understanding that local officials not only 
understand their citizens’ preferences better, but also understand the key issues of the 
municipality much better than anybody else can. The only way to preserve their 
individuality and the local character, several officials say, is to maintain local control of 
land use policies. As one official remarks, “To make all decisions the same [regional] 
would result in a "faceless" citizenry.”13 Another official adds, “Each jurisdiction has its 
own character, which supports the local feelings of community.”14 Implicit in these 
comments are two assumptions: First, that regional policies would sacrifice individualism 
for uniformity; and second, that the absence of a regional constituency will result in a 
black box in place of the citizens for whom government exists in the first place.  
 
At its most basic level, this argument is tied to the question of both constituencies and 
interests. Local officials pragmatically explain that there is no regional constituency, 
since local officials are accountable to their own residents and not to residents from other 
                                                 
12 Both quotes are survey responses 
13 Survey response 
14 Survey response 
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jurisdictions. Therefore, they feel that their interests (and those of their jurisdiction and 
citizens) would be compromised if they engaged in cooperation. They complain that any 
semblance of personal contact would be lost to bureaucracy. This was apparent as I 
interviewed a village president in the coffee store that she owns, which is located in a 
renovated historic building in the heart of her village’s downtown.  The Village President 
is interrupted three times in five minutes. Residents casually converse with her about 
topics ranging from invitations to barn dances to water and sewer issues, and even the 
village’s latest joint planning efforts. She says, “Small government is good government. I 
am very accessible – if there is a water or sewer problem, I am the first to hear about it 
right here in my coffee store. I understand the local economy very well. I understand the 
struggles that our main street faces and I am there struggling with them.”15  
 
The idea of a regional entity that is removed from the day-to-day functioning of the local 
government troubles local officials for several reasons. First, regional decision making 
would take away from the benefits of small government and its constituency; second, 
local officials are unsure whether their interests would be served; and third, they do not 
want to compromise the quality of their local decision making by cooperating with their 
neighbors. The final assessment is explicated in the following section.  
 
5.2.3 I don’t like what my neighbor is doing  
“[The] township next door is trying to keep growth to only 
agricultural and sprawled homes.” 
“Both townships are very lax in zoning and enforcement.” 
                                                 
15 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
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“They are developing rapidly without public utilities.”16 
 
These statements are often followed by stories of the substandard quality of planning 
decisions, zoning enforcement, and land use patterns in surrounding municipalities. 
Respondents then look incredulous as they contemplate cooperating with a neighbor 
whose quality of work they do not quite approve of. These elected officials explain the 
fear of having part of their decision making relinquished to individuals who cannot make 
good decisions for their own jurisdictions. Most growth management regimes appease 
this fear by instituting a neutral organization (i.e., neutral with regard to local politics and 
concerns) to monitor and ensure the quality of local plans, or by establishing minimum 
standards and content of master plans at the state level. In the absence of such 
institutions, to ensure at least a basic quality of land use decisions local officials have to 
factor the fear of compromising the quality of decision making into their calculus when 
confronted with an opportunity to cooperate with their neighbors. The underlying theme 
here is “mistrust,” which manifests itself in three ways. Local officials cannot trust their 
neighbors to look out for their interests, represent them well, and produce quality work. 
This lack of trust presents a tremendous impediment to initiating cooperation.  
 
5.2.4 Why cooperate in the absence of a need for cooperation? 
“[There are] no compelling local issues to force 
cooperation.” 
“A need has not been present.” 
                                                 
16 All three quotes are survey responses. Echoed by J. Local elected official, personal communication, 
October 24, 2007 
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“We will cooperate when needed and stay out of each 
other’s way when NOT.”17 
 
The question of “need” seems central to any discussion of cooperation. This assessment 
of need has two dimensions: objective need and perceived need. The objective need for 
cooperation exists at all times because of the fundamental nature of land use planning. 
The perceived need for cooperation is affected by several considerations: whether elected 
officials consider themselves interdependent with their neighboring jurisdictions and 
therefore feel connected to regional issues as a whole, even in the absence of pressing 
concerns in their own jurisdiction; whether elected officials anticipate benefits accruing 
to their own jurisdiction from cooperation; and whether local governments as a general 
philosophy believe in a more reactionary or proactive approach to both local and regional 
problems. This last consideration seems especially important. Some officials attribute 
their lack of cooperation to the lack of a pressing need for it: “Things are slow now. More 
developmental pressure would promote more regional planning.”18  This statement 
implies that they are simply waiting until the time is right. Others candidly observe, 
“Looking at the surrounding areas and how they have grown over the past years, there is 
a real fear that we will lose our identity like them when growth comes our way. The 
economy is slow now and it gives us time to consider our options and plan, so that we 
will be prepared when growth comes our way in the future.”19 In other words, some 
officials take a reactionary approach, waiting until a tangible problem presents a clear 
need for cooperation.  Others, however, link problems like sprawling development 
                                                 
17 All three quotes are survey responses 
18 Survey response 
19 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
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patterns to independent decision making and view proactive cooperation as the first line 
of defense against them.  To the extent that local officials take a response-oriented 
approach to assessing the need for cooperation, they actually create obstacles to 
cooperation.   
 
This discussion exemplifies how important it is for scholars to understand the calculus 
decision makers use in assessing the need for cooperation. The following set of 
statements made by several elected officials during the course of interviews and/or 
through survey responses sheds some light on this issue.  
 
“We are an inner city that doesn't have a lot of demand for a varied 
number of land uses that have not already been used – so we do 
not need to cooperate.” 
“We are a built-up suburb with very little undeveloped land. It is 
more likely that your question will apply more to the outer limits 
of urban sprawl.” 
“We have 100% rural ag land – why cooperate?”20 
 
From the inner city and the suburb’s perspective, cooperation is not needed because they 
do not encounter many planning and zoning changes and decisions on a daily basis. From 
the rural township’s perspective cooperation is not needed because they do not anticipate 
developing in the future. This is indicative of both the myopic lens through which local 
                                                 
20 All three quotes are survey responses 
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officials view their problems and their narrow-minded approach to thinking about the 
need for cooperation.  
A broader perspective might suggest something quite different. For the city and the 
suburb, cooperation with the neighboring townships might provide the motivation for 
surrounding rural areas to want to maintain the city as their vital urban core rather than 
compete for commercial development with the city. Further, for landlocked and built-out 
cities seeking elastic boundaries, cooperation might help open up dialogue with 
neighboring townships around annexation issues. For a completely rural jurisdiction, the 
development threat to agricultural land could be averted by cooperation with their more 
developed counterparts. Cooperation with surrounding rural townships could produce 
contiguously and consistently protected agricultural land. This entire discussion suggests 
that local officials might not recognize the need for cooperation because they lack a 
complete understanding of the issues and how cooperation might help solve these issues, 
or that they understand the issues but are not willing to act on them unless and until their 
hand is forced. This lack of perceived need for cooperation serves as a severe impediment 
to cooperation.  
 
5.2.5 We have irreconcilable differences – we want different things 
“Rural townships don't have the same problems that we 
do.” 
“We have very dissimilar problems.” 
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“[The] neighboring city has different zoning issues and 
neighboring townships have expressed different zoning 
priorities.”21 
Scholars contributing to the literature on intergovernmental cooperation have suggested 
that homogenous communities are better able to cooperate than heterogeneous 
communities. This is because homogeneous communities can more easily identify 
commonalities on which to base their cooperative efforts. With heterogeneity come 
differences that are hard for most jurisdictions to overcome. My research indicates that 
the differences that make it difficult for elected officials to cooperate with each other fall 
into three categories: the personalities, priorities, and preferences of elected officials; the 
structural and policy differences (i.e., cities, villages and townships) among 
municipalities; and the problems that these municipalities face.  
 
Personality differences hinder local officials from working together effectively. One local 
official explains: 
We are all friends and neighbors but there are obviously differences in 
personalities. It amazes me – there are some really strong personalities. 
Ultimately you agree basically on everything, but then if there is a personality 
conflict you have a real challenge to come forward with your agreement and get it 
moving, because you have different styles of working together.22  
 
While several other aspects of the cooperative process are typically open to compromise, 
the personalities that participants bring to the table are not. These personalities are also 
reflected in the roles that participants play in cooperative processes (whether they are the 
aggressive leaders, the pacifiers, the logical thinkers, mediators and so on), thus 
                                                 
21 All three quotes are survey responses 
22 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
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contributing to the intra-group dynamics of an effort. In the absence of formal conflict 
management and negotiation processes, strong leaders seem to be able to push group 
processes along and use these intra-group dynamics for the benefit of the process (see 
Hershberg et al. 1992; Grell and Gappert 1993; Schneider et al. 1995; Mintrom 2000). In 
the absence of leaders who can effectively tap into these dynamics to conjure momentum 
for cooperative effort, personality differences seem hard to overcome. 
 
The differences in elected officials’ preferences, types of local government, and 
municipal problems seem to be inter-related. One elected official explains:   
We are different, yes – we are a village and we are cooperating with townships. 
The village does have different needs from the township, and so I think it is 
important that we do acknowledge and work within those guidelines. So I am not 
sure those political boundaries should ever be erased completely. BUT among 
those differences we also have commonalities – that we together encompass a 
community. Obviously your unit of government is your first priority – its 
problems shape your preferences. We [the village] want a vital downtown and 
they [the township] want to stay rural. But we also want to preserve their rural 
space and they want to preserve our downtown. It is in all our best interests to do 
that.23  
 
This local elected official suggests two things: First, joint goals will suffice where 
common goals do not exist. The difference is that joint goals can be cultivated from two 
complementary and even disparate needs, while common goals are best arrived at by 
identifying commonalities. For example, when cities and townships cooperate, there are 
usually more differences than commonalities. As per this elected official’s insight, it 
might be foolhardy to base cooperation across jurisdiction types on commonalities. Local 
officials might be better served by looking for complementary land use problems (such as 
protecting farmland and investing in downtowns) as the foundation for their efforts.  
                                                 
23 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
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Second, the problem of differences exists only when locally drawn political boundaries 
define jurisdictional problems. If the city and the township redefined their individual 
boundaries so that they saw themselves as part of a common region, then the goals of 
revitalizing urban cores and protecting farmland would be common to both the township 
and city residents.  In other words, instead of differences between the two jurisdictions, 
there would be common problems of the region as a whole. To the extent that local 
officials take issue with the personalities of their counterparts and see more differences 
than commonalities, they create tremendous obstacles to cooperation.  
 
5.2.6 False ceiling 
“We make sure our zoning districts are compatible at our 
boundaries.” 
“We comment on each other’s plans.”24 
Local officials have different ideas of what constitutes cooperation. These preconceived 
notions, which provide the standards against which they gauge their own efforts at 
cooperation, develop in a variety of ways. Local officials are typically members of their 
local government’s lobbying and representative organizations. In Michigan most 
township officials are members of the Michigan Township Association, and most city 
officials are members of the Michigan Municipal League. In this capacity, some elected 
officials regularly attend land use conferences and workshops where they are exposed to 
new academic material and practical examples of land use planning innovations in 
Michigan and other parts of the country. Further, professional planning organizations, 
                                                 
24 Both quotes are survey responses 
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county planning agencies and regional organizations also convene such forums where 
local officials interact with each other, planning practitioners, policymakers, and 
academics. These interactions facilitate learning, and learning has the potential to alter 
preconceived notions. Not all elected officials attend such events, however. Local 
officials might also develop notions of what constitutes cooperation by weighing the 
information they have about cooperation against what is feasible or achievable in their 
own jurisdictions. The extent of the knowledge that elected officials accumulate thus 
defines the range of cooperative arrangements that exist and are possible in their 
universe.  Furthermore, officials often conflate the cooperative arrangements that are 
possible with those that are probable.  When they do so, their universe of cooperation 
shrinks and becomes limited to only those cooperative strategies that are probable in their 
jurisdiction. In this way local officials define the upper limit of cooperation, and in many 
cases this upper limit is lower than what cooperation by definition demands at its most 
basic level. In other words, local officials seem to create and be satisfied with a false 
ceiling (a false upper limit) of cooperation.  
 
The idea of what constitutes cooperation is also defined by the minimum standards set by 
the state. In Michigan, the Coordinated Planning legislation of 2001 mandates that local 
governments comment on their neighboring jurisdiction’s master plans during plan 
making and plan update processes. For some localities, this constitutes their entire realm 
of cooperation around land use issues. Also, although Michigan law does not mandate it, 
ensuring the compatibility of boundary land uses is one of the most basic actions that 
local governments can undertake to ensure minimal land use conflicts in their 
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jurisdiction. Several jurisdictions fail to do even this, so jurisdictions that undertake this 
activity voluntarily deserve credit for it. But neither commenting on the neighbor’s 
master plan nor ensuring land use compatibility requires any level of substantial 
interaction among elected officials. Yet several elected officials were quick to point out 
that they cooperate with their neighbors by engaging in the above two tasks. The question 
is not whether these two tasks constitute cooperation. Rather the problem is that several 
elected officials are complacent about how much they have accomplished and not really 
aware of how more could be done. This false ceiling serves as a tremendous impediment 
to cooperation. 
 
5.2.7 History of political conflict – your past will always catch up with you 
“We do not cooperate because we have a history of conflict 
between jurisdictions.” 
“50 years of non-cooperation will do it to you.”25 
The memory of intergovernmental politics and conflict at the local level seems to be a 
lasting one. This memory of past conflicts is a tremendous impediment to cooperation 
because it informs what will be feasible in a particular locality. This rationality in 
thinking stands in direct contrast to the larger purposive vision needed to engage in 
cooperation. Hence the circular relationship between the vision of cooperation and its 
feasibility – the more people invest in a vision, the more feasible it will be — but people 
invest only in visions that seem feasible. In this way the history of political conflict 
among jurisdictions injects doubt into the initiation of any cooperative process.  
 
                                                 
25 Both quotes are survey responses 
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During an evening’s conversation, elected officials in Washtenaw County likened this 
problem to a situation in Saul Bellow’s novel Henderson the Rain King.  Eugene 
Henderson, a troubled middle-aged man, goes to Africa. While living with some of the 
local tribes he finds himself taking part in a sort of rain festival. For the ceremony to go 
on as planned, a big statue must be moved to a different location. The local “big man” of 
the village tries to move it, but he can’t. Henderson then tries to move the statue and 
accomplishes what everyone deemed impossible. The native (who was no doubt big 
enough to move the statue) could not move it because the memory of past defeat 
precluded his success. The elected officials explain why they relate to the story: “You 
have to get by the memory of past defeat, and that is what I think we are doing and that is 
what cooperation helps you do. It helps you begin to build trust and will help you 
overcome the memory of past defeat, because every time you tried to work with the 
village in the past it has ended up rancorous. Why will it be any different now?”26 This 
memory of past defeat seems to define the realm of possibilities and impede cooperation 
in the universe of local planning and development management. Overcoming this barrier 
requires strong leadership and officials who are willing to roll the dice and take a chance.  
 
One of the largest contributors to this history of past conflict is annexation. The issue of 
annexation has defined the relationships between cities and townships for more than a 
century. In Michigan this relationship is characterized by antagonism, with townships 
fearing that they would be reduced to mere appendages due to the city’s desire to engulf 
its neighbors, and cities dreading that their future growth lies in the hands of their rural 
counterparts. Both cities and townships in Michigan express dissent over Michigan’s 
                                                 
26 Local elected official, personal communication, October 22, 2007 
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annexation laws. Each side accuses the other of having a more advantageous position. In 
fact, Michigan’s laws today allow for a push-pull relationship among cities and 
townships, with cities pushing for annexation and townships resisting losing their land.  
“Townships limit our growth and this hurts our local 
economies.” 
“Lack of cooperation from [the township] - refusing 
annexation - attempting to develop without public utilities”  
“The city is run, in my opinion, by greedy individuals, who 
would like to take away what we have.”27 
These statements express the sentiments of most city and township officials. Cities find 
that they are land locked. Their economies depend on the renewal and expansion of their 
tax base. City officials read academic research making claims such as the following: 
“When a city stops growing, it starts shrinking.” “Economically robust cities are elastic 
cities.” “Elastic cities have lower racial segregation and social inequalities.”  City 
officials then conclude that the economic and social future of their city is in jeopardy. 
The most rational option is to expand city borders, and city officials and residents in 
Michigan feel that they have the inherent right to do so. 
 
Townships, on the other hand, are in a bind. They can direct development towards the 
city to establish a population of at least 100 in areas contiguous to the city, which would 
ensure that the city cannot unilaterally annex their land.  In doing so, however, they are 
setting themselves up to lose development and revenue at their outer limits should a city’s 
annexation attempt succeed – that is, if they are unable to force a referendum or unable to 
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get the votes necessary to turn down the annexation attempt. They also have an incentive 
to make sure that such development is of higher density so they can reach the 100-person 
mark more easily. However, the higher the density of development becomes, the greater 
is the chance that they would require the city to extend water and sewer to this 
development. Most Michigan cities are wary of expanding utilities to the surrounding 
townships without annexing the land served by utility expansion. Added to this, township 
officials are extremely suspicious of the role developers play in annexation attempts and 
report that they have to monitor [them?] constantly to ensure that developers do not 
petition the city to have the property annexed.  
 
Annexation woes make for good storytelling, and this research unearthed several 
narratives of annexation battles gone wrong. In the late 1990s Sylvan Township, in a 
proactive attempt to guard against annexation by the Village of Chelsea, commissioned 
its own water and sewer plant without paying any attention to the extent of the growth 
needed to sustain such a plant. This move not only reinforced the historically negative 
relationships between the two jurisdictions but also created uncertainty regarding the 
future of the relationship. The Sylvan township supervisor explains: 
We are looking at cooperation now as the first step towards repairing what were 
some very very rocky relations between the township and the then village and 
now the city of Chelsea [the village of Chelsea just recently became a city]. Ten 
years ago we had a township supervisor and a village president who could not get 
along.  The upshot of that was just awful land use planning. The upshot of that 
was that our supervisor at that time consulted a law firm up in Lansing to ask, 
“What can we do to prevent annexation?” etc., etc. The lawyer said, “Why don’t 
you have your own sewer and water system?” So the supervisor went out and 
created a sewer and water district. He went out and floated bonds. Now we have a 
water plant and a sewer district. Those bonds are in desperate shape. We did not 
get the anticipated growth. They said, “Well how are we going to prevent 
annexation from the city of Chelsea?” Real land use issue right? “We are going to 
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set our own sewer and water district.” Because that is a real defense against it. 
You [the city] can provide municipal water and sewer service. Now we [the 
township] can provide municipal water and sewer service. They didn’t take a look 
at the land to see how many homes it would have and everything. They simply 
said, “What do we need? Oh, we need a thousand REU’s [residential equivalent 
units] to make it work. So we are going to say there is a thousand REU’s out 
there.” Well, there is not.  It turns out there is room for 600 homes. Oops.28 
 
After erecting the water and sewer plant to avoid annexation, experiencing less than the 
desired amount of growth, running the plant at a loss for 10 years, and facing the 
possibility of having to raise a general tax in a rural township to pay off the plant, Sylvan 
Township is now trying to sell the plant to the City of Chelsea. They hope a franchise 
agreement would provide a win-win situation for both the city and the township and 
reflect a renewed and invigorated relationship for the next decade – a relationship based 
on joint and not unilateral action. Incidents such as the one described above create 
additional pressure on newly elected officials, who have the onerous task of not only 
repairing old relationships but also forging new ones.  
 
This is because when cities use their power over townships to unilaterally annex 
township land, they reinforce both their systemic and pre-emptive powers, which are 
safeguarded by the local government structure and institutions in Michigan. Any 
agreements reached over annexation would challenge the systemic forces that have 
created the current structure of local government in Michigan. Therefore such agreements 
are hard to reach. Today, however, several local jurisdictions realize that annexation 
serves as the first and foremost impediment to cooperation and view annexation 
agreements as the first step towards future cooperation. When cities make unilateral 
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moves to expand their boundaries, the townships typically respond with equal hostility by 
undertaking actions that would help protect them against annexation – even though such 
responses might be irrational and might end up costing rather than benefiting the 
townships. The issue of annexation plays the largest role in determining whether political 
relationships among municipalities are tumultuous or tempered.  
 
5.2.8 Internal conflict: United we stand; divided we… 
 
“When cooperation between townships was suggested by 
the supervisor, [the] board voted no.” 
“Our neighboring boards have too much turmoil.” 
“Cooperation will be a new endeavor for our township. The 
new elected board is receptive to the idea; they encouraged 
it. This was not true in the past.” 
“My council is not strongly supportive. The change of one 
council seat could end [the] attempt [to cooperate].” 
“How in God's name can we become adept at cooperation 
externally when we cannot accomplish it internally?”29 
 
Internal conflicts in local governments stifle governmental innovations. Such conflicts 
are of several varieties. Sometimes conflicts arise between the chief elected official and 
his or her board. At times the conflict is within the board itself, among several of its 
elected members. The relationship between the planning commission and the elected 
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board, planning staff and the elected board could also be characterized by conflict. These 
conflicts might emerge from a variety of factors such as personality clashes, local 
politics, and disagreement on key issues. As Leo Tolstoy writes in Anna Karenina, 
“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”  
Similarly, every dysfunctional local government has its own particular tale of woe.  
 
In Dexter Township in Washtenaw County, the internal conflict is between the Chief 
Elected Official (CEO) and the township board. An elected official from a neighboring 
jurisdiction observes, “The CEO in this township cannot even get her board to do their 
homework and read their materials before attending board meetings.” Further, the one 
board member who does his homework is an 84-year-old farmer who does not care too 
much for planning and zoning. This CEO describes the conflict within her board as 
follows:  
Carl [the farmer] is vocal about his opinions, and it is hard to compromise with 
him. He is just a grumpy old stubborn jerk. He is a character. I love him for his 
work ethic. But he would be happy if there [were] no such thing as a zoned 
community, or a planning commission. Then again, I have trustees that open their 
work packet on the way to the board meeting. That drives me mad. I never agree 
with Carl but at least he is there ready to present his case.30  
 
For this supervisor, the juggling act of balancing conflicting personalities in her board 
seems to detract from all of the things the board could accomplish together for the 
township as a whole.  
 
In Sylvan Township, there is tremendous conflict between the elected board and the 
CEO. Before becoming CEO, he served as the editor of a newsletter that critically 
                                                 
30 Local elected official, personal communication, November 28, 2007 
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evaluated the township board’s activities. When election time came, the editor, along 
with several other township residents, decided to run against all of the township board’s 
incumbents on a reform platform. Only two of the reform-minded challengers were 
elected – the editor to the position of CEO, and one of his fellow challengers to the board. 
The CEO explains:  
 
I was elected on a platform really of “the good old boys have not done really 
well.” Now unfortunately I took to the board in a minority position, which has 
made my life grievously hell for the last 2 years. They [the board] have tried to 
marginalize me over the last 2 years. They have kept me off from all the things 
they consider important committees. All of the other township supervisors around 
me sit on the Chelsea Area Fire Authority – I don’t. All of the other supervisors 
sit on the water and sewer authority – I don’t. They don’t let me. The township 
clerk shows up at all the other committee meetings where I am a representative 
member to show where the power really is. She is bad at her job because she is 
too busy doing mine.31  
 
Internal harmony within the governing ranks of local governments is important for a 
variety of reasons. CEOs cannot make unilateral decisions; rather, they need the majority 
support of their elected board. Further, CEOs typically interact much more with other 
local elected officials than do other board members. In so doing, CEOs have many more 
opportunities to learn. The logic of action in local government, however, suggests that no 
matter how much CEOs learn, they still need the support of their elected boards to act on 
what they have learned. Similarly, although planning commissions are appointed by 
CEOs and confirmed by the board, they are considered the gatekeepers of the 
comprehensive plan. Changes to the plan, zoning ordinance, or the function of either 
document require the planning commission’s buy in, so that they are not enforcing a plan 
pro forma but because they are committed to its cause. The relationships among the 
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planning staff, planning commissioners, and the elected board therefore need to be non-
adversarial to open channels for the discussion of new ideas and to promote learning.  
 
As discussed above, conflicts manifest in a variety of ways, and dysfunctional 
government is created by a variety of factors. When conflicts emerge from personality 
clashes and local politics, they are hard to remedy.  Conflicts arising from disagreement 
on issues, however, can be compromised on and remedied. Elected officials insist that the 
only way to remedy disagreements on issues is to ensure communication. In the 
following excerpts, CEOs talk about how important it is to communicate with their 
elected boards, planning commissions, and planning staff to minimize conflicts and 
generate support when it comes time to vote on an idea or implement it. When asked if it 
took a lot of convincing to get her board to support the idea of a joint planning 
commission, one elected official explains: 
I do give the board monthly updates [and] keep the board updated at all times so 
they feel invested in my thought process and I in theirs. I also attend the PC 
meetings and keep them updated. So they have been very aware as have also been 
the rest of the boards of the townships involved in this cooperative effort. I tell 
them about the discussions we have had and the process that we have been going 
through. So it was not a surprise to any of them, so they were comfortable voting 
for it.32  
 
Another elected official who is a part of the same joint planning commission takes the 
discussion a step further:  
I don’t want buy in from the individual jurisdictions’ PCs . . . . This is not our 
plan.  It has to work the other way around – the plan has to be the PCs’ plan . . . .  
They have to be involved in this from the ground up . . . .  They are not agreeing 
to our plan – that has to be clear. Although it seems as if the joint planning 
commission is driving the regional planning processes, we need the support of the 
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existing individual planning commissions.  If not, this effort will not go 
anywhere.33 
 
During a joint planning commission meeting, others add to this assessment:  
It is very important that our planning consultants are involved in this right from 
the beginning and that they feel invited to this process. Planning consultants 
typically have a good working relationship with the individual planning 
commissions and the individual boards. They should play an important role in this 
so that when it comes time to adopt this regional plan and enforce it, there is 
complete agreement among the board members, planning consultants, and the 
planning commission members that this is the right thing to do for our region. So 
we need to make sure that our planning commission members, board members, 
and planning consultants either come to these joint planning commission 
meetings or are informed about what goes on at these meetings. That way if there 
are any objections, they will be heard during our regional planning process and 
there will be no surprises in the end. 34 
 
This discussion shows that internal conflicts impact planning processes in several ways. 
Conflicts can create hostile working environments and produce stalemates when it comes 
to making planning decisions. Conflicts can render planning processes ineffective and 
remove a sense of legitimacy from planning outcomes. A divided government also seems 
to create divided factions among the electorate, thus reducing the overall support in a 
jurisdiction for its planning efforts. All of these concerns affect plan implementation. 
Some conflicts seem irreparable (unless a turnover of the elected board produces different 
outcomes), while other conflicts can be remedied through constant information sharing 
and communication among the governing ranks of local governments.  
 
5.2.9 Absence of leadership 
“[There’s] no local champion for planning.” 
“[There’s] no leadership at the city government level.” 
                                                 
33 Joint Planning Commission meeting, Januray 16, 2008 
34 Joint Planning Commission meeting, December 12, 2007 
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“Cooperation requires that someone assume a leadership 
role. We have not had such a person or people assume the 
role.” 
“[There’s] no overall county leadership.”35 
 
The absence of leadership impedes cooperation tremendously and is apparent at several 
levels of the intergovernmental system. At each level the lack of leadership creates the 
conspicuous absence of the following:  a sense of direction of where the state, region, 
county or municipality is headed; a voice representing the entity and its plans for the 
future; a strong commitment to the issues at hand; commitment to getting others involved 
in these issues; and forums for concerns to be resolved. For example, lack of leadership at 
the state level means that the state government is slow to pass enabling legislation to aid 
the cause of local planning, fails to provide incentives or mandates to promote local 
cooperation, and fails to set at least minimum standards or agendas in for cooperation at 
the local level. In Michigan, local officials blame weak state-level leadership for the lack 
of comprehensive state land use policies and reform, as well as the notable absence of 
state funding opportunities, recognition, and incentives for cooperative efforts. For 
example, Michigan passed the Joint Municipal Planning legislation in 2003. This 
legislation allows localities to establish joint planning commissions instead of operating 
under several individual planning commissions. Several localities have established such 
joint planning commissions (JPC) and consequently joint master plans. Many of the 
localities with JPCs include combinations of a city and several townships or a village and 
several townships; i.e., joint planning between urban and rural areas. In most such 
                                                 
35 All four quotes are from survey responses 
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instances, the objective seems to be to protect rural areas and invest in the urban core – a 
laudable goal but one that would be hard to achieve without the appropriate 
implementation tools. Michigan municipalities are not enabled to transfer development 
rights regionally; even when many municipalities implement a joint master plan, 
municipalities cannot transfer rights across political boundaries. Michigan municipalities 
are frustrated at this piecemeal approach to land use reform. They see it as an indication 
of the lack of leadership at the state level.  
 
At the regional level, the lack of leadership is apparent when regional planning agencies 
do not proactively organize workshops and information sessions for local officials, do not 
prepare regional plans or set regional land use goals, and do not organize collaborative 
projects for local officials around regional issues. At the county level, the dearth of 
leadership is felt when the county does not prepare an agenda-setting county plan, 
organize forums for local interaction, provide the latest and most updated information to 
local officials, or provide staff support to local cooperative efforts. At the local level, the 
lack of leadership is reflected in the absence of the following: communication channels to 
interact with neighboring officials, a conduit for information from the external world and 
a means of expressing local needs at larger forums, an individual to spearhead regional 
planning and eliminate the effects of history and politics, and a trusted mediator to 
facilitate cooperative processes. The lack of any of these types of leadership impedes the 
initiation of cooperation at the local level.  
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5.3 Impediments to cooperation at the negotiating table 
Although initiating cooperation might be one of the most difficult tasks to accomplish, 
sustaining a cooperative effort at the negotiating table and during discussions is equally 
arduous. Obstacles to sustained cooperation manifest themselves when elected officials 
make that first decision to cooperate, get to the table, and then find after minimal 
interaction that they face insurmountable obstacles. My results indicate that these 
obstacles fall into several categories. Elected officials might find that their differences are 
irreconcilable.  For example, they have completely different goals, they are unable to 
compromise, they are haunted by historic conflicts and annexation issues, they are faced 
with internal conflict within their own jurisdictions, they lack leadership, or they face 
tremendous capacity problems. In the following sections, I will examine these issues in 








Figure 5.2 Obstacles to sustained cooperation 
5.3.1 Different goals and needs 
“We thought they would come around – but realized they 
didn’t care about anything environmental.”  
Unilateral action 
(no cooperation) 
At the negotiating 
table / starting 
conversations 
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“They did not want to compromise.”36 
 
When elected officials initiate conversations with their neighbors, they might do so with 
several considerations in mind: they might not know their neighbors’ goals or needs but 
might be willing to find out; they might already know that localities in their area have 
similar or at least compatible needs; they might know that their needs are different but 
hope they can compromise. At the table, however, they often find that several of their 
initial premises were miscalculated.  
 
First, elected officials might come to negotiations without understanding each other’s 
needs and realize at the table that they have irreconcilable differences. Second, they 
might discover that having similar goals and needs does not always mean that 
cooperation will ensue; they soon find that they do not agree on processes to implement 
to resolve these needs, or they find they do not have the necessary commitment to follow 
through with the cooperative effort. Third, elected officials might find that they have 
compatible goals but too weak of a foundation on which to build a cooperative effort. 
Finally, elected officials might realize they have different goals and priorities, but also 
conclude that an unacceptable compromise would have to be reached to satisfy everyone.  
 
Elected officials might draw these conclusions at the table for a variety of reasons. I 
would like to focus on the last two of the above-mentioned possibilities. Several years 
ago Mumford recognized the role of education, adjustments, and flexibility in the 
formulation of regional plans. He warned, “Regional plans are instruments of communal 
                                                 
36 Both quotes are from survey responses 
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education, and without this education, they can look forward only to partial adjustment. 
Failing intelligent participation from the smallest unit up . . . and failing adjustments, the 
plan does not leave a way that is open to change . . . renewal and flexibility . . . .” (Scott 
1969). Highlighted in this statement is the importance of learning in cooperative 
processes. When elected officials encounter compatible rather than common goals, they 
face a few difficulties.  As one elected official explains:  
When we have compatible goals we find that we have to educate the other party 
on our issues and needs because they have not experienced them, and they find it 
hard at times to off the bat understand why we are so worried about what we 
worried about.  The burden is on us to inform them and similarly be open to 
learning about their issues.37 
  
This is because learning in political life is rooted for the most part in the pragmatic; the 
concrete everyday experiences of elected officials in their local surroundings form the 
basis of their actions. When elected officials do not experience a deteriorating downtown, 
or a loss of agricultural land, they are not acquainted firsthand with either the 
implications of these problems or the urgency of the actions that are needed to rectify 
them. Where shared experiences do not exist, local officials have to rely on two types of 
learning to occur at the table so that compatible can form the basis of cooperation.   In the 
first type of learning, local officials must at least be open to changing their preconceived 
notions of how to approach a problem, and therefore the strategies that might be required 
to solve the problem. This might not necessarily mean compromising on their own goals 
and needs, but rather understanding that strategies that run counter to what they initially 
anticipated might have to be employed to provide mutual benefits. For example, a 
common goal of farmland protection might be realized simply by providing large acre 
                                                 
37 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
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agricultural zoning. Compatible goals of farmland protection and urban core investment 
might mean that rural townships agree not to seek commercial growth and to direct 
development towards the city.  For its part, the city might agree to serve township 
development at its outskirts and not to annex township land.  The first type of learning is 
called single loop learning.  
 “Very large cities always want it their way - very 
unwilling to change.” 
“[We] could not reach an agreement – no compromise.” 
“They didn't want what we did.”38 
 
When elected officials realize that they have different goals for their individual 
jurisdictions and for the region as a whole, they have to compromise to come to an 
agreement at the table. Whether such a compromise can be achieved depends on several 
factors. First, because compromises mean weighing different policy alternatives, most 
compromises require elected officials to alter, reshape, and restructure their basic 
ideologies, norms, value systems and priorities, all of which play a role in how elected 
officials weight policy options. For this restructuring to occur, elected officials have to 
engage in learning that could potentially alter their underlying goals, incompatible norms, 
and theories of reality. This second type of learning is called double loop learning. 
Double loop learning is difficult because this kind of fundamental re-education and 
change is painful for most decision makers.  
 
                                                 
38 All three quotes are from survey responses 
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Second, compromises reflect a policy change, and this change occurs through policy-
oriented learning. Policy learning refers to relatively enduring alterations of the 
behavioral intentions that result from experience. Policy learning might occur because of 
changes to the perception of several external dynamics or an increased knowledge about 
the problem at hand. In this way, policy learning transforms core belief systems and 
allows members of a coalition to form ideological similarities. Ideological similarities in 
turn allow coalition members (in this case, elected officials) to converge on certain policy 
options. Soon a compromise ensues. Such a cooperative process, in which similar 
ideologies drive compromises, is fundamentally organized around a logic of thinking 
(Friedmann 1987). 
 
Third, differences in goals and needs often stymie a policy process, resulting in all talk 
and no action (a common criticism of the collaborative process). While double loop 
learning and policy learning both reflect fundamental changes to an individual’s belief 
system and can be extremely enduring, they take a long time to develop. Further, 
coalitions and cooperative processes are not always held together by learning and 
ideological similarities. Sometimes coalitions of individuals who drastically differ from 
each other can develop and be sustained through time if such coalitions are organized for 
their potential to generate action (Stone 1989). In other words, when pressing issues are 
at hand, individuals would rather compromise to get things done than hold up the entire 
policy process. When such compromises are made to hurry action, elected officials hope 
that the incremental nature of policy processes in general will give them the opportunity 
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to seek reciprocity at a future date. A cooperative process aimed at producing results is 
fundamentally organized around a logic of action (Friedmann 1987). 
 
One elected official explains why several attempts at cooperation fail. Very often elected 
officials start interactions with each other hoping for an uneven playing field – one that 
would benefit them. In such situations, compromises are impossible to achieve.  Ideally, 
officials would come to negotiations with the following attitude: 
“I am not going to come into this negotiation looking to get the better of you and 
you are not going to come into this negotiation looking to get the better of me. 
We are going to lay our problems out on the table and try to find good mutual 
solutions to them.” But that is not the spirit in a lot of communities. Somebody 
thinks someone else owes them something because of some incident that 
happened several years ago. They still think that they are still locked in the 
memory of past defeats but they are creating present ones to overcome in the 
future.39  
 
5.3.2 Internal conflict 
Scholars of communication realize that one of the fundamental rules of a collaborative 
process is ensuring that information is relayed back and forth between the negotiating 
table and the constituents. The literature indicates that this is the only way to generate 
buy in from the constituents – in this case, the rest of the governing board, staff, and 
citizens of a locality. When elected officials are at the negotiating table, they play the role 
of policy brokers. In this capacity, elected officials broker compromises both at the table 
with the other members of the cooperative effort and back home with their constituents. 
The primary goal of a policy broker therefore is to minimize conflict, particularly internal 
conflict within his or her jurisdiction. Elected officials in the Manchester area joint 
planning process in Washtenaw County strongly emphasize the importance of 
                                                 
39 Local elected official, personal communication, October 22, 2007 
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communication at every meeting. When asked why they consider it to be of utmost 
importance in their cooperative process, they point to internal conflict that could have 
been eased had effective communication been the norm.  
 
The Village of Manchester and neighboring Manchester, Bridgewater, Sharon, and 
Freedom Townships originally intended to form the Manchester Area Joint Planning 
Commission. Although Sharon Township had participated in informal cooperative efforts 
with the other Manchester area localities for more than 10 years, when it came time to 
formally endorse the process, quite suddenly, Sharon Township bowed out. According to 
Gary Blades, Sharon Township’s supervisor, his board of trustees never even voted on 
the measure. "The direction [the vote] would have gone is very obvious," said Mr. 
Blades. "Rather than have them vote ‘no,’ I chose not to take a vote."40 Elected officials 
from other Manchester area localities say that this internal conflict was caused primarily 
by a lack of communication and information sharing on the part of the Sharon Township 
officials at both ends (i.e. CEO to the elected board and vice versa). One elected official 
explains, “Historically Sharon Township has always participated but has also maintained 
some independence. This is part of their complication – that they couldn’t come to a 
compromise over how much to participate and how much independence to maintain and 
their internal conflict over this issue was never remedied.”41 
Finally, ongoing cooperative processes come to a complete halt when leadership is absent 
and when the capacity to sustain a cooperative effort is weak.  
                                                 
40 Rudolph, Stephanie. 2007. As Sprawl Looms, Wary Townships Try Joint Planning. Michigan Land use 
Institute http://www.mlui.org/growthmanagement/fullarticle.asp?fileid=17197. 
41 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 
  138 
Table 5.1 A comparison of the obstacles to initiating and sustaining cooperation 
 
Obstacles to initiating cooperation Obstacles to sustaining cooperation  
Status quo  
Local knows local best  
I don’t like what my neighbor is doing  
Why cooperate when there is no need?  
We have irreconcilable differences We have irreconcilable differences 
False ceiling  
History of political conflict (annexation) History of political conflict (annexation) 
Internal conflict Internal conflict 
Leadership Leadership 
 Inability to compromise 
 Capacity 
 
Table 5.1 above compares the obstacles to initiating cooperation and the obstacles 
encountered at the table. My results indicate that some obstacles prevent elected officials 
from getting to the negotiating table but do not play a role in hindering cooperation at the 
table. These include protecting the status quo (not wanting change), seeing no need for 
cooperation, operating under the idea that local officials know how best to solve their 
own problems, thinking they have achieved their maximum cooperative potential (i.e., 
believing they are doing enough already), and questioning their neighbor’s judgment. By 
getting to the negotiating table or by starting conversations with neighboring localities, 
elected officials acknowledge that they are willing to deviate from the status quo of 
independent decision making. By starting conversations with their neighbors, elected 
officials also acknowledge that there is a need for cooperation and “greater than local 
action” to solve land use problems, that they trust their neighbor enough to explore 
cooperation, and that they have not reached their maximum cooperative potential on land 
use issues. The obstacles common to both initiating and sustaining cooperation are the 
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differences in goals and needs of localities, the history of political conflict and annexation 
issues, internal conflict within the localities, and the absence of leadership to initiate and 
sustain an effort. The obstacles precluding only sustained cooperation include the 
inability of elected officials to come to an agreement or compromise while negotiating, 
and the lack of capacity to sustain cooperation.  
 
In conclusion, elected officials have to overcome several obstacles to initiate and sustain 
a cooperative effort. Annexation issues and historic political conflict seem to be 
particularly difficult to overcome. One elected official observes, “A million years ago 
someone from township A did something to someone from township B.  It never seems to 
go away. Institutional memory is long lasting when it comes to those kinds of things. You 
know and then it gets to the point where people don’t even know why they are upset 
anymore, but they are.”42 Not surprisingly, when asked what caused the failure of prior 
cooperation attempts, several respondents to the survey said that they didn’t know. When 
will annexation issues go away? Local elected officials in Michigan speculate that such 
issues are relegated to the back burner when elected officials seek solutions to pressing 
issues or when they encounter leadership changes and turnovers in their elected board. 
Some officials advise slowly building up trust again through small cooperative endeavors 
and small successes. Obstacles to cooperation are the hardest to overcome, however, 
when they are implicit and when elected officials encounter several obstacles at the same 
time. Given this daunting list of reasons that elected officials do not cooperate with each 
other, the next question I ask is: What factors might nonetheless lead to inter-
jurisdictional cooperation of local planning and development management efforts? 
                                                 
42 Local elected official, personal communication, November 28, 2007 







Before proceeding to the chapter with the regression results, which explains the factors 
predicting cooperation, I provide descriptive results from the survey data analysis in this 
chapter. The descriptive data are organized based on the key independent and dependent 
variables used in the regression models. The results presented in this chapter are drawn 
from the municipality, RPA and county planning agency surveys.  
 
6.1 Dependent variable 
6.1.1 Cooperation on land use issues 
About 49% of municipalities indicated some level of cooperation around land use 
planning activities. When analyzed by jurisdiction type, 51% of responding townships, 
61% of responding villages and 41% of responding cities indicate that they cooperate on 
land use planning and zoning issues (see figure 6.1). Analysis of Variances (ANOVA’s) 
show that there are no significant differences in the either the decision to cooperate [F 
(2,182) = 679, p = 509] or the extent of formal cooperation across jurisdiction types [F 
(2,184) = 703, p = 497]. Among the several impediments to cooperation are those that are 
induced structurally, created institutionally, and/or shaped through preference structures. 
Structural impediments to cooperation might exist in different ways: home rule structure 
  141 
of a state; and the distribution of power across different levels of government (e.g. state, 
regions, counties, and municipalities). One type of manifestation of the structural 
impediment to cooperation might be through the existence of different types of 
jurisdictions (e.g. townships, cities and villages) in a state. These types of governments 
are very different from each other in terms of organization and administration, and often 
have different needs. By virtue of the powers they possess (typically attributed to cities) 
and / or the independence they seek (typically attributed to townships), it has been 
suggested that one of these municipality types could be the bottleneck for land use 
cooperation.43 This research shows that cities, villages, and townships in Michigan do not 
differ in terms of how much they cooperate or whether they cooperate at all on land use 
issues. For example, annexation problems, which seem to be a tremendous impediment to 
cooperation, are borne equally by all of these municipality types (explained in greater 
detail in chapter 5). 
 
















Figure 6.1 Extent of land use cooperation by jurisdiction type 
 
                                                 
43 Several survey respondents indicated that the “cities” or the “townships” in Michigan never contemplated 
the idea of cooperation because of what they represented as political jurisdictions. Several city officials 
noted that townships were managed by individuals who sought independence and autonomy and several 
township officials noted that the cities were never willing to cooperate because they were self-sufficient.  
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The cooperation mechanisms used ranged from a continuum of informal talks and 
meetings among planning commission members, to more formal means such as 
establishing joint plans and ordinances and forming Joint Planning Commissions. The 
percentage of respondents indicating the use of these mechanisms is depicted in Figure 
6.2.  
 










































































































































































Figure 6.2 Types of mechanisms used for land use cooperation  
 
As the figure indicates, a Conditional Land Transfer Agreement or PA 425 agreement 
(used by 51% of cooperating municipalities) is the most commonly used cooperative 
mechanism for land use planning purposes followed by informal cooperation (45%) 
among local decision makers. Analysis suggests that about 21% of municipalities have 
written joint master plans and 14% reported considering, discussing, or having 
established joint planning commissions. Further, about 11% of municipalities indicated 
using regional land use policies (e.g. urban growth boundaries) and developing joint 
regional design guidelines. The most informal mechanism used for cooperation in 
Michigan is collaborative projects among municipalities and the most formal mechanism 
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used for cooperation is a joint zoning ordinance. Michigan municipalities on average 
received a formality score of 4 with a standard deviation of 1.5.  
 
On average Michigan municipalities use any “one” of these mechanisms to engage in 
cooperation, with some municipalities using as many as ten of the listed cooperative 
mechanisms. Also, analysis indicates that 70% of the municipalities engaging in formal 
cooperation also engage in informal cooperation, while 30% engage in only formal 
cooperation. Of all the municipalities that engage in land use related cooperation, 21% 
cooperate only informally, 24% cooperate only formally, and 55% of municipalities 
cooperate both formally and informally. This finding confirms the two alternate ways of 
conceptualizing cooperation (apart from the binomial conceptualization) that were 
outlined in chapter 3. That is, cooperation might be conceived as a scale with informal 
cooperation leading up to formal cooperation, and cooperation might also be conceived 
as a nominal scale where informal and formal cooperation are considered distinct 
categories.44  
 
6.2 Independent variables 
6.2.1 Formal institutions 
County role  
                                                 
44 There is the chance of course that those selecting the formal mechanisms might not have checked any of 
the informal cooperation categories assuming that informal cooperation is implicitly a part formal 
cooperation. That is, the sense that to engage in formal cooperation one has to converse with elected 
officials in other jurisdictions, which is a form of informal cooperation. However, in the survey, I provided 
no indication of how the listed mechanisms would be later coded so as to not bias respondents towards 
picking the more formal categories or somehow think that some mechanisms were more important or 
would be ranked higher than the others. There is also the chance that those engaging in informal 
cooperation now will solidify their efforts and formalize them in the future.  
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Counties in Michigan do not have regulatory authority over local plans, ordinances or 
local planning processes. Counties typically play an advisory role in the planning process, 
providing numerous forms of assistance to local governments.  Results from the survey of 
county planning agencies in Michigan indicate that 90% of counties comment on local 
master plans. This however, is the only consistent function that counties in Michigan 
perform. County role with regard to general planning and zoning seems to be widely 
dispersed - 20% of counties reported that they plan and zone for local governments; 30% 
of counties assist local governments with master plan preparation; 35% of counties 
indicated that they provide technical assistance to local governments while 55% reported 
that they provide data for plan preparation.  
Regional role 
Regional Planning Agencies (RPAs - also referred to as the State Planning and 
Development Districts) in Michigan, like the counties, do not have regulatory authority 
over local planning processes and plans. However, while 90% of counties report having a 
countywide land use plan, only 40% of regional agencies have regional plans in place. 
Results from the survey of regional planning agencies in Michigan indicate that RPAs 
perform a range of functions with about 70% reporting that they comment on master 
plans and assist with local plan preparation and 90% reporting that they provide technical 
assistance and data to municipalities. These statistics when compared with county 
statistics reveal that county planning departments and RPAs are performing many 
duplicative roles. Figure 6.3 depicts both the county and RPA role in facilitating general 
local planning.  
  145 

























Figure 6.3 County and RPA role: General Planning 
 
In addition to their role in the general planning process, counties and regional planning 
agencies perform several functions that are aimed at facilitating cooperation among 
municipalities in the county. These functions range from providing technical and 
financial assistance for local cooperative efforts, to providing several opportunities for 
local elected officials and planning staff to interact. The county and regional role in 
facilitating local cooperation was examined using both surveys of officials from 
municipalities and surveys of county and regional officials.  
 
Respondents from municipalities were asked to rate the effectiveness of the county 
planning department and regional planning agency at performing several functions that 
are important for facilitating cooperation (see figure 6.4). On a scale of 1 (extremely 
ineffective) to 5 (extremely effective), municipalities indicated that county and regional 
planning agencies were moderately effective (median of 3) at providing technical 
assistance for cooperation, providing a forum for problem solving, providing leadership, 
providing a fair representation of area-wide interests, and setting area-wide priorities and 
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goals. Most importantly, county and regional planning agencies were rated as ineffective 
in providing mediation support (median of 2) and extremely ineffective in providing 
financial incentives (median of 1) for local cooperation on planning and zoning issues.  
 
The formal institutional variable that is used for regression purposes is one that combines 
the several functions on which municipalities evaluated the effectiveness of the RPAs and 
county planning agencies. This composite variable has an observed range of 18 – 88 out 
of a possible range of 18 - 90, with a mean of 44 and a standard deviation of 16. This 
suggests that there is tremendous variation in how effective county and regional planning 
agencies are at providing support for local cooperation.  
 
 
























































































































Figure 6.4 Municipalities’ assessment of County and RPA effectiveness 
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In a separate survey, county and regional officials were asked to prioritize the same list of 
functions that municipalities previously evaluated. Results are shown in figure 6.5. Two 
results are important: on average, county and regional agencies consider providing 
financial incentives for local cooperation and mediation services for local governments as 
their lowest priorities. This assessment is consistent with how effective municipalities 
thought county and regional planning departments were at providing mediation support 
and financial incentives. 
 
The survey of county officials also revealed additional information on how county 
planning departments impact local cooperation. Some counties are more proactive than 
others at providing opportunities for local elected officials and planners to interact 
through workshops, conferences, committees, and working groups. This is important 
because analysis of the data from the county planning agency survey (based on simple 
pairwise correlation) indicates that the number of forums counties provide for interaction 
among local decision makers was significantly correlated with the extent of local 
cooperation around planning and zoning issues within the county (r=.84, p<.01). The 
analysis also shows that the ability of counties to organize forums for municipalities is 
dependent on the resources available at the county level. In fact, the number of county 
organized forums for local interaction was significantly correlated with the number of 
staff in the county planning department (r=.57, p<.05). This finding highlights the 
importance of strengthening the resources of county planning departments, as not all 
counties have the capacity to actively engage municipalities in cooperative planning 
processes.  
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Figure 6.5 County and RPA priorities 
 
These data provide valuable information on those county and regional roles that need to 
be emphasized to increase cooperation among municipalities.  
 
First, when municipalities were asked to offer suggestions on incentives that could be 
provided to better facilitate cooperation, most respondents indicated the need for 
“carrots” such as financial incentives, awards, and recognition for cooperating 
municipalities. Yet, counties and RPAs list providing financial incentives for cooperation 
as one of their least priorities. Second, several municipalities indicated the lack of 
agreement on core regional issues and problems, inability to reach agreements at the 
table, the lack of communication among participants, and unwillingness of participants to 
compromise as key impediments to cooperation. Prior academic research suggests that 
these issues can be resolved if professional mediation, conflict management, and 
negotiation opportunities are available to local decision makers. Yet, both counties, and 
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regional agencies list providing mediation services for cooperative efforts as one of their 
least priorities. 
 
6.2.2 Informal institutions: 
Extent of cooperation on services 
As anticipated, a vast majority (94.5%) of respondents indicated that their jurisdiction 
cooperated with other municipalities on service delivery (see figure 6.6). Transit (23%), 
Police (31%), Parks (36%), Water and Sewer (51%), and Fire (76%) are services that are 
most commonly addressed through cooperative arrangements. Michigan municipalities 
on average engage in about 4 services arrangements with a standard deviation of 2. Some 
municipalities operate without a single service related contract while others partake in as 
many as 10 service related contracts.  
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Extent of regional governance culture 
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Figure 6.7 Municipality, county and RPA assessment of regional governance culture 
 
Municipalities, counties and regional agencies were also asked for their assessment of 
several informal institutional factors thought to affect cooperation. The results are 
provided in figure 6.7. Several results are worth noting. First, municipal, county, and 
regional decision makers on average agreed that they shared good relationships with 
decision makers from surrounding municipalities. Second, all three types of decision 
makers on average agreed that there was an absence of strong regional institutions that 
fostered cooperation in their regions. Third, with the exception of regional decision 
makers, both county and municipal decision makers on average indicated that they had 
limited access to the financial, technical, institutional networks, and resources needed to 
forge cooperative alliances among elected officials on land use issues. Finally, while all 
three types of decision makers indicated that most municipalities in their region faced 
similar problems, they all also indicated that municipalities in their regions did not agree 
on what the problems were and how to solve them. This last finding relates back to the 
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importance of providing mediation and consensus building services for municipalities 
through county planning departments or RPAs.  
 
All these informal institutions together inform the extent to which an area has regionalist 
tendencies. This composite variable, called extent of regional governance culture in an 
area, was compiled by adding all the listed informal institutional categories, and it is 
included in the regression models as previously explained in chapter 4. This extent of 
regional governance culture variable has an observed range of 22 – 49, out of a possible 
range of 10 – 50. The average value is 34 with a standard deviation of 5.  
 
Unsuccessful cooperation 
Twenty three percent of respondents indicated that their jurisdiction was involved in an 
unsuccessful attempt to cooperate on planning and zoning issues. The common 
impediments to cooperation were discussed in detail in chapter 5.  Out of those 
municipalities that have engaged in unsuccessful cooperative efforts, 41% report no 
cooperation on land use issues. 48% however, have proceeded to give cooperation a 
second chance and have ended up formalizing their cooperative effort. 11% indicate that 
they are attempting to cooperate again but at an informal level. This finding also provides 
some credibility to a new understanding of how informal institutions affect cooperation 
(explained in detail in chapter 7). That is, evidence suggests that when municipalities 
become a part of cooperative efforts that have somehow failed to materialize they do not 
completely give up. 59% of municipalities with failed cooperative attempts have gone on 
to cooperate again on land use activities. 80% of those cooperating after the unsuccessful 
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attempt have formalized their cooperative effort. This perhaps indicates a heightened 
need for formality when prior cooperative efforts have failed. This formality seems to 
protect municipalities from reneging partners, unstable relationships, and non-binding 
contracts – all of which they might have experienced during their unsuccessful attempt at 
cooperation.    
 
6.2.3 Decision maker related characteristics 





















Figure 6.8 Extent of support for cooperation on planning and zoning efforts 
 
Municipalities were asked to rate the extent to which certain individuals and groups 
supported the idea of cooperation on planning and zoning issues on a scale of 1 (very low 
support) to 5 (very high support). The results are shown in figure 6.8. Support for 
cooperation ranged from moderate to high levels of support. Respondents indicated on 
average that planning commissions and staff showed high levels (median of 4) of support 
for cooperation. The average internal support of planning staff, planning commissions 
and local elected boards combined in Michigan is 3 with a standard deviation of .9. The 
range of observed values was from 1-5.  
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Training 
64% of municipalities responded that they had received training on the benefits of 
cooperation on planning and zoning issues. At least 32% of municipalities indicated that 
neither the members of the planning commission nor the members of their local elected 
boards had undergone land use planning related training. Further, about 38% of 
municipalities indicated that neither their elected board members nor their planning 
commission members had received training on growth management techniques.  
 
6.2.4 Environmental factors 
Growth Trends 
Municipalities were asked to provide an assessment of the extent of past and future 
anticipated growth pressure (see figure 6.9). More than 62% of municipalities indicated 
that they anticipated facing moderate growth pressure in their jurisdictions. When 
analyzed by jurisdiction type, townships seem to be anticipating the most growth over the 
next 5 years, with about 12% of townships indicating tremendous anticipated future 
growth pressure compared to no villages and 3% of cities indicating the same amount of 
growth over the next 5 years. This finding emphasizes perhaps the need for regional 
cooperation in terms of dealing with this amount of anticipated growth. An elected 
official from one of the case study municipalities observes, “if we don’t plan ahead for 
growth, the only thing we can do when growth comes our way is to spread it out. That is 
the only way townships can handle the growth. You see we rely on septic tanks. We 
cannot increase density when we have septic tank systems. We need certain setbacks to 
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make septic tanks work. The other option is to provide water and sewer. But that will 
only encourage more growth. That is why you see so much development is spread out. It 






















Figure 6.9 Growth trends by jurisdiction type 
Political conflicts 
Municipalities were also asked if they had faced land use related lawsuits, and 
experienced controversial land use decisions (see figure 6.10). 30% of responding 
municipalities indicated that they had experienced land use related lawsuits over the past 
5 years. 51% of responding municipalities indicated controversial land use decisions in 
the same time period.  


















Figure 6.10 Assessment of political conflict 
                                                 
45 Local elected official, personal communication, October 24, 2007 
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6.3 Capacity and the role of planning consultants 
Interviews revealed that most municipalities and counties in Michigan lack adequate 
resources to plan, zone, and enforce land use policies effectively. Only 34% of Michigan 
municipalities indicated that they employed full time staff for planning and zoning 
purposes. About 54% of municipalities indicated that they employed part time staff. Of 
the responding counties, 50% indicated that they employed full time staff and 50% 
indicated that they employed part time staff. Although regional agencies seem to be doing 
better in terms of capacity than counties and municipalities, the distribution of staff 
across regional agencies is highly varied with a range of 3-80 staff members per agency.  


















Figure 6.11 Primary assistance for local master plan preparation 
 
Given this assessment it is not surprising to note that over 73% of local master plans are 
prepared by planning consultants (see figure 6.11). Less that 10% of respondents 
indicated that they used their county and regional planning agencies for plan preparation. 
Several municipalities indicated that planning consultants are more likely to provide 
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unbiased advice on what municipalities “ought” to do in terms of planning and zoning. 
This places planning consultants in the unique position of having the opportunity to 
provide both assistance and information on cooperation to decision makers at the local 
level -especially when adjacent local governments hire the same consultant 
independently.  
 
6.4 Motivations for cooperation 
When asked why municipalities should cooperate with each other on land use issues, 
most decision makers indicated that cooperation was important to ensure the 
compatibility of land uses and development patterns, and the consistency of land use 
policies and decisions across jurisdictional lines. Decision makers were not convinced 
that a number of the land use challenges faced by municipalities could not be solved 
exclusively at the local level or that some problems relating to land use planning, social 
equity, and environmental protection might be better solved at a metropolitan or regional 
level. Similarly, decision makers on average were tentative about justifying cooperation 
on land use issues using arguments of sustainable land use patterns. These observations 
might be indicative of at least two contrasting phenomena.  
 
First, these results might be indicative of a more individualistic way of thinking. That is, 
elected officials might find it easier to think about benefits from cooperation to their 
individual municipalities when cooperation on land use issues is justified using 
arguments of compatible and consistent land use patterns. Second, elected officials might 
find it easier to serve as proponents of cooperation, if they couch their arguments for 
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cooperation in terms of achieving consistent and compatible land use patterns. Ensuring 
consistency through cooperation does not entail relinquishing authority or independence. 
This might be an easier argument to see in terms of initiating cooperation. The questions 
that remain, however, are whether cooperation that is aimed at achieving consistency and 
compatibility can serve as the vehicle through which more substantive cooperation can be 
sought and whether this transition will be able to produce the kinds of distributional 
equities that planners seek.  
  
6.5 Incentives for cooperation 
Although 9% of the respondents from municipalities indicated that the state should not 
intervene in local planning processes even if the intervention is through the provision of 
incentives, there seems to be considerable interest in state sponsored incentives for 
cooperation from the other respondents. About 30% of respondents indicated the need for 
financial incentives for cooperation. This is not surprising considering that only 20% of 
municipalities that are currently cooperating have received grants to further their 
cooperative efforts. Other suggestions included more education and training for 
cooperation, making cooperation mandatory, establishing state level guidelines for 
cooperation, streamlining of administrative requirements for land use planning, policy 
based incentives (e.g. tax base sharing, revenue sharing, and priority funding), and more 
recognition and awards for cooperating communities. These suggestions are not 
surprising either. The responses also suggest that only 16% of municipalities that are 
currently cooperating have received recognition for their cooperative efforts and that not 
many decision makers have received training on basic land use principles or specialized 
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growth management techniques. Further, several respondents expressed frustration that 
leadership on regional cooperation from the state was notably absent.  
 
6.6 Conclusions 
Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from this descriptive part of the data 
analysis. First, despite obstacles, constraints and the lack of many incentives to cooperate, 
municipalities in Michigan are cooperating to some extent on planning and zoning issues. 
These cooperative efforts range from informal conversations among municipalities to 
more formal joint plans and joint planning commissions being established among 
multiple local government units. Apart from the conditional land transfer agreements, 
most of the ensuing land use cooperation is through informal mechanisms such as 
collaborative projects, meetings and handshakes among local staff and elected officials. 
The formation of joint planning commissions, regional policies, joint plans and 
ordinances are still in their infancy in Michigan.  
 
Second, the analysis indicates that county and RPAs have the basic infrastructure in place 
to play a larger and clearer role in facilitating local cooperation. Several roles played by 
county planning departments and RPAs significantly impact the extent of local 
cooperation on planning and zoning issues in Michigan (as will be detailed in chapter 7). 
County and regional agencies also provide many similar services to municipalities. 
Division of labor between these two agencies would help direct some valuable and much 
needed resources more efficiently. 
 
  159 
Third, respondents indicated the need for financial incentives and mediation services to 
alleviate the impediments to cooperation and to get decision makers to both come to the 
table and stay there. Yet, both county planning agencies and RPAs indicate that providing 
financial incentives and mediation services are their lowest priorities. Municipalities 
agree, indicating that counties and RPAs are extremely ineffective at performing these 
two services.  
 
Finally, municipalities are facing severe financial constraints and these constraints are 
reflected in the resources they have available for planning and zoning purposes. This 
implies that planning consultants have more of a niche in developing local master plans 
and advising joint planning efforts. Little is known academically about the role planning 
consultants play in shaping land use and regional outcomes. More investigation is needed 
in this area. 
 





Factors predicting cooperation 
 
The descriptive data for all the variables included in the regression models were 
presented in the previous chapter. As discussed earlier in chapters 3 and 4, the dependent 
variable “cooperation on land use issues” could be operationalized in different ways, and 
each operationalization captures a different aspect of the variable. The conceptualizations 
behind the different operationalizations were explained in the previous chapters. In this 
chapter, I present results from all three regression models, with each regression 
constructed around a different conceptualization of the dependent variable. There are 
several significant results, all of which prove to be interesting. I also weave in results 
from the interviews of planners and elected officials from the case-study sites as part of 
the explanation of the significant findings. I begin the chapter by discussing the first 
regression model, which contemplates the extent of formality of cooperative efforts.  In 
the next section, I discuss the second regression model, which predicts cooperation.  
Finally, I present results from the multinomial regression model, which explains informal 
and formal cooperation. The regression outputs are summarized in table 7.1. 
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7.1 Regression model 1: Factors affecting extent of formal cooperation on the 
cooperation continuum 
In this regression model, I hypothesized that the extent of formal cooperation on land use 
issues is affected by four key factors: formal institutions, informal institutions, 
environmental factors, and decision maker-related factors. These factors were then 
operationalized into several variables and included in the model. The following figure 7.1 
depicts these variables and highlights the ones that proved to be significant. The 




























Figure 7.1 Findings from regression model predicting cooperation on the continuum 
 
Formal institutions 
1. Regional and county 
effectiveness at 
facilitating cooperation 
(significant + effect) 
Informal institutions 
1. Extent of regionalism 
in an area (significant 
- effect) 
2. Cooperation on 
services (significant - 
effect) 
Environmental factors 
1. Future growth pressure 
2. Lawsuits 







1. Perceived benefit 
from cooperation 
(significant + effect) 
2. PC, LEB, and staff 
support (significant 
+ effect) 




Extent of formal 
cooperation (R2 = 
.550)
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Regression results indicate that five variables from the conceptual model have significant 
effects on the extent of formal cooperation. These variables have the following impacts. 
The effectiveness of county and regional institutions at supporting cooperative efforts is a 
measure of formal institutions in an area. This variable has a significant positive impact 
on the extent of formal cooperation.  The level of internal support for cooperation in a 
municipality (i.e., the support of local elected boards, planning consultants, and planning 
staff) and the extent to which elected officials perceive benefits from cooperation are 
both measures of the receptivity to cooperation of the governing ranks in a municipality. 
Both variables have positive impacts on the extent of formal cooperation. Two other 
variables were included as measures of decision-maker receptivity to cooperation: 
cooperation-specific training and growth management-related training. Neither of these 
training-related variables was significant.  The extent of local cooperation on services and 
the extent of regional governance culture in an area were both used as measures of the 
informal institutions in an area. Both variables had significant negative impacts on the 
extent of formal cooperation. None of the environmental variables are significant 
predictors of the extent of formal cooperation. In the following sections, I elaborate on 
and offer possible explanations for the significant relationships mentioned above.  
 
7.1.1 Internal support for cooperation 
Internal support is treated as a composite of the extent to which the elected board as a 
whole, the planning commission as a whole, and the planning staff all support 
cooperation on land use activities. Together these three groups of individuals, from the 
perspective of local governance, make the most significant land use planning decisions. 
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Together they also present a unified vision of the scope of land use planning in a locality. 
Finally, these three groups of local actors collectively represent the intra-local dynamics 
of cooperation (i.e., the political receptivity for cooperation) and have the ability to create 
a cohesive political environment for the implementation of cooperative efforts. This 
composite “internal support” variable has a positive impact on the formality of 
cooperative efforts. I explain this finding by first establishing the reasons that the support 
of each of these three key local actors for local cooperative efforts is important.  
 
As the formality of cooperative mechanisms increases, localities experience tremendous 
changes to their existing governing structures. Elected boards will no longer have 
complete control over the composition of their planning commissions and their planning 
and zoning regulations. Individual planning commissions will be dismantled for the most 
formal cooperative effort (e.g., if a joint planning commission is formed) or at the very 
least will have to share control with planning commissioners from other jurisdictions. 
Planning commissioners and planning staff also risk losing the following: control over 
and access to planning-related information; a certain position in the internal command 
structure of a jurisdiction; credibility, legitimacy, and certain established trust levels with 
governing members of a locality; rapport and working relationships that have developed 
over the years within a jurisdiction; and familiarity with how things are done within a 
locality. These changes would alter their job descriptions tremendously. These three 
groups of actors stand to lose a great deal from engaging in more formal cooperation (the 
status quo, familiarity, control), so as formality increases, internal support for cooperation 
often dwindles. The irony, however, is that internal support is most needed as the 
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formality of cooperation increases, and the extent of support for cooperation determines 
the formality of cooperative efforts in a locality. 
 
Regression results show that the extent of internal support for cooperation in a 
jurisdiction has a positive impact on the extent of formality of cooperative efforts. To 
understand the positive nature of this relationship (i.e., why the support of planning 
commissions, planners and elected boards is important in predicting the extent of formal 
cooperation), one has to delve more deeply into the roles these actors play in local 
planning processes. The elected board has the final authority in determining whether a 
locality will engage in a cooperative effort. This authority is more apparent in formal 
cooperative efforts because such efforts typically require the vote of the elected board. 
Unless the support of the elected officials is expressed formally through a majority vote, 
more formal cooperative mechanisms cannot be instituted. That is, as the formality of a 
cooperative effort increases, so does the need for a municipality’s elected board to 
reinforce its support for the cooperative effort or endorse it formally (i.e., through written 
agreements). Therefore when the board’s support is only tentative, cooperative 
arrangements tend to be more informal, since the tendency is to explore cooperation 
rather than to implement cooperative strategies that will alter the landscape of planning in 
a jurisdiction. With one vote the elected board can make or break a cooperative effort. 
Therefore their support is tantamount to ensuring that formal cooperation occurs. 
 
My case study analysis and subsequent interpretation of the elected official interviews in 
both the Chelsea and Manchester areas, suggests that although planning commissions 
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have only an advisory role in local planning and development management, they are 
considered the bastions of local planning. Since they are charged with the mission and 
responsibility of writing and implementing the master plan and its ordinances, the 
planning commission is considered the guardian or gatekeeper of local planning 
regulations. Some elected officials assign ownership to planning commissions in the way 
they speak of the master plan, referring to it as “their” (i.e., the planning commission’s) 
plan. Elected officials consider planning commissions to be much more knowledgeable 
about the intricacies of everyday planning and zoning and see themselves as a little more 
removed from the “implementation” of local planning ordinances and everyday planning 
issues. This naturally increases the stake of planning commissioners when it comes to 
making any decisions about joint planning. Because of the key role elected officials 
attribute to planning commissions, elected officials warn that the idea of joint planning 
should not be a top-down idea emanating from the elected board, but rather a bottom-up 
idea evolving from the planning staff and planning commission all the way to the elected 
board. This view provides some information about the roles that different actors are 
expected to play in the planning process.   
 
In Michigan, most jurisdictions are financially strapped and do not employ planning staff; 
only 30% of respondents say their jurisdiction employs full-time staff for planning 
purposes. Further, 77% of respondents indicate that they use planning consultants for 
master plan preparation.  Most localities in Michigan therefore consider planning 
consultants as part of their planning staff. Planning staff are viewed as liaisons not only 
between the general public and the government, but also between the different actors in 
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the local planning system. The planning staff have their fingers on the pulse of the 
general public and its needs, and their primary responsibility is to inform government of 
the citizens’ views on major planning undertakings. Similarly, planning staff are expected 
to gauge the credibility of planning tools and the applicability of these tools in the 
locality they serve. Elected officials also seem to trust their planning staff much more 
than they do the county and regional planners. This is because of the sense that planning 
staff are under contract with the locality and therefore should have the locality’s best 
interests at heart. They are therefore expected to provide a fair evaluation of whether the 
locality would be well advised to pursue a particular activity. This in turn means that if 
planning staff are skeptical about the idea of joint planning, it could stymie attempts to 
formalize an effort (i.e., increase the risk factor).  Elected officials explain that because of 
the level of trust and assumption of credibility that typically exist among planning staff, 
planning commissions and elected officials; the planning staff’s lack of support for 
cooperation would cast doubt on joint cooperation as a good idea for a particular locality.  
 
In the planning process, elected officials rely on planning staff to do research, provide 
assistance, generate ideas to spur the joint effort forward, facilitate joint meetings, 
educate elected officials on regional tools and policy options, and in general provide 
information pertinent to the plan or effort at hand. In this way, planning staff catalyze 
cooperative efforts by providing new ideas for elected officials to think about and by 
providing a direction in which to move. When planning staff do not support cooperative 
efforts, it not only raises questions about whether joint planning should be on the local 
agenda, but also reduces the constant influx of information and ideas that seems 
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necessary to move cooperation towards implementation (i.e., towards formality). For 
example, the planners for the Manchester-area joint planning effort constantly encourage 
elected officials to take steps toward establishing a joint planning commission, all the 
while providing information about other communities in Michigan that have undertaken 
such a task. Being privy to this information alleviates some of the fears that elected 
officials bring to the table and makes the formalizing process smoother.   
 
Finally, most elected officials are wary of joint planning – especially formalizing an 
effort, since formal cooperation typically requires long-term commitment. The internal 
conflict that is created when not all three sets of actors support cooperation increases the 
risk of committing to more formal cooperation and focuses the risk only on the few 
individuals driving the effort forward. A unified front assuages doubts about whether 
joint planning is an ideal for which a particular locality should strive. One elected official 
observes that as the cooperative mechanisms become more formal, “there needs to be 
complete agreement among the board members, planning staff, and the planning 
commission members right from the outset, else nothing is going to get enforced or 
implemented.”46 
 
My assessment of the roles that these three actors play in local planning (based on case 
study interviews) indicates that elected officials expect planners to be idealists and think 
the way urban planners think – by viewing the world through a normative lens. They 
expect planning commissioners to be both independent from politics and connected to it, 
so they can be grounded in the pragmatic, but remain receptive to ideas from the planning 
                                                 
46 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 
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staff. Being grounded means evaluating whether the tools that the planners offer provide 
benefits to their locality (of course with planners under the commission’s mandate 
assisting with this evaluation). Finally, they expect themselves as elected officials to 
think the way politicians do and evaluate whether the ideas brought to the table are 
feasible politically.47 Considering the different worlds in which these actors operate, 
unified support for cooperation covers all the bases (the credibility of an idea, its 
applicability to a given locality, and its political feasibility) and provides the cushion that 
elected officials need to make decisions that will lead them towards formalizing their 
cooperative efforts.  
 
7.1.2 The county and regional role in local cooperation 
Results indicate a positive relationship between county and regional planning agencies’ 
effectiveness at providing support for local cooperative efforts, and the extent of 
formality of cooperative efforts. This can be expected for several reasons. Counties and 
regional agencies provide several services to local governments that have impacts on the 
extent to which localities can formalize their cooperative activities. These services 
include providing technical assistance for local cooperative efforts, providing 
opportunities for local elected officials to interact, playing a mediation role during such 
interactions among elected officials (thus facilitating cooperative processes), providing 
financial incentives for cooperation, establishing forums for regional problem solving, 
serving as leaders and champions of local cooperative efforts, providing a fair 
representation of area-wide interests, and setting land use priorities and goals for 
localities to follow. The variable “effectiveness of county and regional planning 
                                                 
47 Local elected official, personal communication, October 22, 2007 
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agencies” is a composite of the effectiveness of county and regional planning agencies at 
performing the above-mentioned services. I therefore explain the positive relationship 
between the overall effectiveness of county and regional planning agencies and the 
formality of cooperative efforts by explaining how the effectiveness of county and 
regional agencies at performing each of these services individually affects the formality 
of cooperative efforts positively.  
 
Since the early 1940s, after the failure of numerous attempts to create regional 
governments, most states witnessed a proliferation of regional councils, which promoted 
voluntary cooperation among municipalities and other planning entities. The role of 
county and regional planning agencies since then has been focused on gathering, 
analyzing, and providing information to municipalities. Counties and regional planning 
agencies are now regarded primarily as technical agencies with the expertise to advise 
localities on how to solve their local and regional problems, develop comprehensive 
plans, and educate elected officials on the impacts of their plans. The distinction between 
such agencies and local (municipal) planning commissions is often made clear: county 
and regional agencies function as “planning groups,” whereas local planning 
commissions constitute the “action groups” where plans and ideas can become a reality. 
Elected officials in Michigan regard county and regional agencies as exactly that – 
agencies with the experts who in turn have access to information. Most municipalities in 
Michigan do not have full-time planning staff. Several elected officials also indicate that 
they do not have the financial resources needed to hire planning consultants or other staff 
to provide the necessary technical assistance needed for cooperation. By technical 
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assistance, local elected officials mean assistance interpreting state-level legislation and 
statutes, outlining legal cooperative arrangements possible in Michigan, providing 
examples of communities that have succeeded at forging cooperative arrangements, 
identifying funding sources and opportunities for municipalities wanting to pursue 
cooperation, and explicating both policies and outcomes that cooperative efforts should 
consider as part of their policy process. One component of the county and regional 
agencies’ role in promoting local cooperation is to fill in the gaps created by the lack of 
permanent, local-level staff dedicated to providing technical support for cooperative 
efforts.  
 
Scholars writing about cooperation emphasize the importance of repeated interactions 
among actors for cooperation to evolve voluntarily. Considering the lack of mandates for 
cooperation in Michigan, voluntary cooperation is the only kind that can occur. Elected 
officials indicate that forums and collaborative projects organized by the county provide at 
least three key benefits: opportunities for substantive interaction with other elected 
officials, opportunities to build relationships with other officials, and opportunities to 
learn. In the same vein, county and regional agencies, through the area-wide projects they 
organize, also create opportunities for local elected officials to foray into joint decision 
making. These projects (e.g., the Washtenaw Area Transportation Study) provide elected 
officials with a sample of cooperation that progresses from formulating an idea to 
developing policy options and eventually to thinking through the possibility of 
implementation. If implemented, these small projects provide elected officials with 
successes. These successes represent incremental steps that can then provide the 
  171 
foundation on which elected officials can build their future cooperative efforts. One 
elected official explains:  
 
You know, you slowly take an advocate like me that goes into the lion’s den – 
that is, our CEO meetings. I slowly introduce ideas to the CEOs and we talk about 
successes achieved together at these other forums. You know, I say “We made 
this work.” That is why I am so excited about making the other thing work – if we 
can make that work, it will be a model for everybody else. At the end of the day, 
is that particular old agreement the be-all and end-all? No! The agreement formed 
at those forums organized by the region and the county is the starting point. It 
makes sense to do that.48  
 
Twenty-three percent of survey respondents indicate that their locality has been involved 
in at least one unsuccessful cooperative effort. When asked why the cooperative effort 
failed, 38% of these respondents explain that the participants could not compromise at the 
table. The collaboration literature stresses the important role that mediators or facilitators 
play in cooperative efforts, but Michigan municipalities do not have the resources to 
independently hire such facilitators. Further, Michigan, unlike growth-management states 
(e.g., Florida), does not have state-designated dispute-resolution and mediation agencies 
to facilitate local land use-related cooperative processes. In this setting, to the extent that 
county and regional agencies can staff local cooperative efforts, they can expect to affect 
the formalization of cooperative efforts positively. One elected official evaluates the role 
played by county staff in their local cooperative effort: “They have moved us along, no 
doubt. Our effort would not have gone at the speed that it has without the county’s 
facilitation.”49 
 
                                                 
48 Local elected official, personal communication, November 28, 2007 
 
49 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
  172 
County and regional planning agencies can also encourage municipalities to formalize 
their cooperative efforts by providing financial support. When elected officials begin to 
formalize their cooperative efforts, they seek financial support for a variety of reasons. 
For example, when elected officials explore the possibility of a joint master plan, they 
typically require money to pay for training, to hire a planning consultant to study the 
individual master plans and write drafts of the joint master plan, to hire experts to provide 
information about potential policy options for the joint plan, to hold public visioning 
sessions and stakeholder meetings, and to hire facilitators for these visioning sessions. 
Typically, localities fall short of the budget needed to accomplish these various activities. 
Elected officials explain that some of the most challenging discussions they have while 
considering formalizing their cooperative effort focus on the financial feasibility of the 
effort. They explain:  
The concerns initially were about just how we were going to be able to achieve it 
[a joint master plan]. Are we really going to be able to get the resources?  And 
most of these resources are time commitment and financial commitment. The 
commitment from the county through staff time and money is a big help in 
making this possible. I don’t think we would do this without the county. We just 
don’t have the financial resources to do it.50  
Others add:  
[The] staff time provided by the county, [the] assistance provided by the county . . 
. [and] the resources that we are getting from the county are critical. They are not 
only helping us with doing research but just the mere getting documents together, 
making copies, getting things out to us, doing some mailings, helping us put 
together informational brochures, helping plan visioning sessions. All this takes 
time and money. Those are the kinds of resources that make a formal cooperative 
effort work. Without the county, we probably [would] not be able to do this.51 
 
                                                 
50 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
51 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 and Local elected official, personal 
communication, January 17, 2008 
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The politics at the county and regional levels alter the relationships between 
municipalities and the county and regional planning agencies. Much of the politics is 
focused on the notion of representation. As early as 1950, the politics surrounding 
regional planning in southeast Michigan predominantly reflected the minimal 
representation for Detroit and its special districts in the Supervisors Inter-County 
Committee (now SEMCOG). The same brand of representational politics continues 
today. In Washtenaw County, the urban-rural disconnect alters representation at the 
County Board of Commissioners. There are 28 municipalities in Washtenaw County, of 
which 16 are located to the west of Ann Arbor and therefore regarded as the western part 
of the county. There are 11 commissioners at the county level. Of these 11, only 2 
commissioners serve the 16 western municipalities (because of the “one person one vote” 
philosophy), while 9 commissioners represent the 13 eastern municipalities (see figure 
7.2). The dynamics of representation based on population create tremendous political 
clashes between the county and the municipalities.  An official in Washtenaw County 
observes, “You know we were actually called ‘out-county’ for a while. We find it very 
upsetting to be called ‘out-county,’ you know. We are as important to the county because 
we are trying to protect our farmland and our open spaces, and that is very very important 
to the overall culture of Washtenaw County.”52 Another explains:  
People think there is big old bad Ann Arbor that steers the ship, and our 
commissioners cannot get a majority vote because the needs of the eastern side 
are different from the western side and they have the numbers. So there is some 
natural tension that is unavoidable. The farmers in the western part think the 
county is going to turn us into some socialist haven and they are going to prevent 
it.53  
 
                                                 
52 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
 
53 Local elected official, personal communication, November 28, 2007 
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Another official adds that over the past few decades, the county has become more 
Democratic. The only two Republicans on the county board of commissioners are the two 
commissioners representing the 16 western municipalities. The sense is that when push 
comes to shove, when there is a need for action on policies that have a bigger impact on 
the rural than the urban areas of the county, the rural areas simply do not have the 
representation. This arrangement therefore reinforces the systemic distribution of political 
power at the county level and highlights both the power of eastern municipalities over the 
western municipalities, and the power of the eastern municipalities to produce political 
action in their favor.  
 
As this discussion suggests, the animosity between county and regional governments and 
municipalities is often deep rooted and long lasting. Planning departments at the county 
and regional level are often subject to the same skepticism by virtue of association with 
the larger politics of government at this level.  To the extent that planning departments 
can remain independent from such politics and assist localities in their jurisdiction 
uniformly and fairly, they can alter perceptions, repair trust, and build credibility. As 
elected officials formalize their cooperative efforts, they often worry that they might get 
locked into a system that they have to depend on (such as the assistance of the county), a 
system that fundamentally disfavors them.  Alleviating such fears of unfair representation 
at the departmental level seems to affect local cooperation positively 
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Figure 7.2 Representation on the Washtenaw County Board of Commissioners 
 
The extent to which county and regional agencies emphasize cooperation as part of their 
working agenda is part of the package of activities that county and regional planning 
agencies perform to induce local cooperation on regional issues. Although county and 
regional planning agencies in Michigan do not have the authority to implement master 
plans and zoning ordinances, they can play an active role in setting the direction and 
priorities for planning in a region. When county and regional agencies prioritize certain 
land use policies, much-needed county and regional resources are directed to developing 
and implementing these policies. For example, when county and regional planning 
agencies prioritize their coordinating role (i.e., encourage local cooperation on regional 
issues), they undertake several activities that reflect this priority. They often direct more 
resources towards coordinating local planning, including greater county and regional 
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involvement in local and area-wide master-plan preparation, more organized forums for 
local interaction, increased financial support for local cooperative initiatives, and, most 
importantly, allocated staff time for cooperative endeavors. In the following sections, I 
provide contrasting accounts of two Michigan counties’ land use priorities and how these 
priorities affect local cooperation.  
 
Washtenaw County planners explain that regional planning has been a priority for the 
county for several years. Consequently, the Washtenaw County Planning Department 
engages municipalities tremendously in the preparation of the county master plan, and it 
staffs municipal master planning efforts even when such efforts are driven by local 
planning consultants. One planner explains:  
It is very important for us to maintain good relationships with planning 
consultants and be involved in local master planning processes even if we are not 
hired to do so. When we engage in local planning processes in this manner, we 
can ensure that municipalities consider what would be appropriate for the larger 
landscape. When we have good relationships with the planning consultants, we 
can encourage them to think regionally. We can also then encourage planning 
consultants to push their clients [municipalities] to think regionally, consult the 
county master plan, check for consistency of local preferences with area-wide 
priorities, and still not have consultants feel like we are infringing on their 
process.54 
 
 There are currently five regional planning groups functioning in Washtenaw County. 
These regional groups together comprise 23 of the county’s municipalities. The 
Washtenaw County Planning Commission (renamed the Planning Advisory Board) 
recently amended its bylaws to include members from these six regional planning groups. 
The intention behind this structural change was to ensure that the county provides a voice 
for regional planning within its governing ranks, so that county policies and plans can be 
                                                 
54 Local Planner, personal communication, March 19, 2008 
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better directed to encourage regionalism.55 Planners in Washtenaw County believe that 
making regional planning a priority and involving municipalities in county-level policies 
is the only means, aside from planning authority at the county level, by which the county 
can influence local governments to think regionally. By virtue of emphasizing regional 
planning at the county level, Washtenaw County has instituted several mechanisms 
through which municipalities can be induced to cooperate on land use issues. 
 
In contrast, an Oakland County planner provides a different perspective on county-level 
priorities:  
In Oakland County, we have not emphasized regional land use planning. We also 
simply do not write master plans for municipalities anymore, or assist them 
directly with that process. It is simply not a county priority. We cannot compete 
with planning consultants in Oakland County in terms of assisting with municipal 
planning and do not have a desire to. We have a different kind of relationship 
with our localities. We provide a lot of technical assistance and information, and a 
lot of assistance and incentives for economic development.56  
 
When asked about the prospects for joint land use planning in Oakland County, she 
responds with skepticism that most Oakland County communities are built-out with few 
opportunities for joint planning. The Oakland County tactic has therefore been to 
emphasize economic development at the county planning department level. In 1994, the 
Oakland County Planning Department merged with the Economic Development Division. 
Oakland County does not have a county-level master plan, and the only targeted planning 
and zoning services the planning department offers are the recently mandated municipal 
master plan reviews, and land use inventories. Research indicates that there are no 
                                                 
55 Explained by Local Planner,  personal communication, April 15, 2008 
56 Local Planner, personal communication, January 25, 2007 
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regional planning efforts underway in Oakland County. Further, there is a notable 
absence of county-instituted mechanisms for municipal cooperation.  
 
Finally, leadership from the county and regional level plays an important role in enabling 
localities to move towards formalizing their cooperative efforts. Such leadership is 
reflected in the ability of county and regional planning agencies to stay informed of and 
to inform local efforts, insulate municipalities from the larger aspects of county and 
regional politics, and refocus attention on the regional land use issues at hand. When 
there is leadership, county and regional planning agencies make good-faith efforts to 
understand local needs, increase trust through personal contacts and interactions with 
elected officials, and provide credibility and legitimacy to the role they play in assisting 
local planning efforts.  
 
Together, all of the functions that county and regional agencies perform constitute the 
institutional support structure for local cooperation in an area. The effectiveness of 
county and regional planning agencies at performing these functions affects the formality 
of local cooperative efforts positively.  
 
7.1.3 Cooperation on services 
Contrary to my expectation, the extent of cooperation on services has a negative impact 
on the extent of formal cooperation on land use issues. My original expectation was 
based on the idea of using cooperation on services as a proxy for “prior cooperation,” 
with the understanding that such prior cooperation on services (which is typically easier 
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to fathom) would create a more conducive setting for cooperation to occur on land use 
issues (which is typically more difficult to accomplish). Results, however, show that 
when the number of service-related contracts among municipalities increases, the 
formality of cooperation of land use issues decreases. After contemplating this negative 
impact, I offer some possible explanations. The notion of motivations and commitment 
are central to understanding this inverse relationship between cooperation on services and 
the formality of cooperation on land use issues. The first explanation I offer is that the 
proliferation of service agreements in an area is an indication of economically driven 
motivations for cooperation, which stand in contrast to what typically stimulates 
cooperation on land use issues.  
 
Cooperation around land use issues, as discussed in the previous chapters, requires a 
tremendous amount of commitment from elected officials. As cooperation on land use 
issues becomes more formal, the extent of needed commitment increases tremendously 
because of the short-term sacrifices (of autonomy and control) that elected officials need 
to make to reap the long-term benefits (better land use patterns). Further, cooperation 
around land use issues is typically not motivated by financial needs.  Granted, there may 
be secondary financial benefits in the long run, but elected officials typically do not write 
joint master plans to save costs. In fact, if elected officials wanted financial efficiency, 
they would look to cooperative service arrangements for answers. When municipalities 
undergo severe economic hardships, it is even more difficult to garner the commitment 
needed to engage in cooperation around land use issues. Therefore it is conceivable that 
the greater the economically driven motivations for cooperation, the less likely elected 
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officials are to enter into formal land use agreements that will neither save money nor be 
easy to execute. The greater the economic benefits they seek, the more elected officials 
might deviate away from cooperating on land use issues (which are typically considered a 
resource drain) and move towards more cooperative service arrangements. In this 
manner, as elected officials become a part of a large number of service arrangements, 
they might be less likely to digress from that path of tangible benefits to explore 
cooperation on land use issues. Eventually, instead of contributing to a comprehensive 
package of land use reform, cooperative service arrangements might become ends in 
themselves. As service-related cooperative arrangements become “ends,” elected officials 
might feel as if they are doing enough to cooperate. In other words, they might develop a 
false ceiling of cooperation on land use issues. These explanations are conceivable for 
several reasons.  
 
In institutional settings like Michigan that lack a strong mandate for local cooperation, 
there is often a notable lack of state legislation establishing statewide goals for 
cooperation, best management practices, minimum standards for what constitutes 
cooperation on land use issues, and assessments or examples of outcomes that ought to be 
produced through cooperation. In the absence of such guidelines, elected officials 
themselves determine justifications for engaging in cooperation and develop their own 
expectations of cooperation. That is, elected officials define cooperation differently and 
expect varying outcomes from it. Consequently, the regionalist vision of cooperation as 
the means to ends of regional equity, resource protection, and efficient development 
patterns might not be one that is commonly shared by all of the state’s municipalities (pro 
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forma or through local commitment). In fact, the only problem that seems visibly 
common to all Michigan municipalities is the current state of Michigan’s economy. One 
official asks:  
What are most supervisors and elected officials going to say when you ask about 
the fundamental problems in Michigan?  A lot of fundamental problems 
supervisors are going to say right now is economics. It’s impacting our local 
budgets and we are getting less state revenue sharing than we might anticipate. It 
is impacting our tax base. So our main problem people will say is economics, and 
what really can [we] as supervisors do about economics? That is the question we 
ask. It impacts our budgets. It impacts our all of our citizens.57 
 
Most policy makers in Michigan have also focused on finding solutions to this economic 
problem. Rather than emphasizing cooperation to achieve regional fiscal and racial 
equity, environmental protection, infrastructure efficiency, and land use sustainability, 
calls for cooperation in Michigan have been directed at finding solutions to economic 
hardships. Municipal cooperation in Michigan has been encouraged primarily to help 
municipalities achieve efficiencies, economies of scale, and cost savings.  
 
During her State of the State address in 2004 (and again in the 2007 address), Michigan’s 
Governor Jennifer Granholm called on localities to think regionally:  
So now is the time for quiet courageous local leadership to get beyond turf and 
politics to promote efficiency and stretch dollars to maximize services to the 
public  … to consider new partnerships with one another: pooling resources, 
sharing services, technology, office space, even employees. I applaud those local 
units of government who have torn up turf and replaced it with creativity and 
collaboration.58  
 
                                                 
57 Local elected official, personal communication, October 22, 2007 
58 Granholm, 2004. State of the State address. Our Determination, Our Destination: A 21st Century 
Economy. 
 In her State of the State address in 2007, titled Our Moment, Our Choice: Investing in Michigan's People, 
Governor Granholm suggested that the state would provide incentives for consolidated or shared services 
by increasing revening sharing to the cooperating municipalities.  
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In Governor Granholm’s statement as well as many other calls for cooperation, much of 
the focus in Michigan has been to urge municipalities to cooperate around services.  
No one draws a direct connection between cooperating on services and cooperating on 
land use issues. Further, localities are not being challenged to think about the larger 
regionalist vision behind cooperation. With most of the emphasis on services, it is quite 
conceivable that municipalities think about cooperation purely from an economic 
standpoint without considering linking shared services to a more comprehensive 
managed-growth strategy. When the ultimate goal of cooperation is to reduce costs, the 
priority becomes sharing more services rather than finding a way to use shared services 
as a means of enacting shared regional policies. That is, the more elected officials 
cooperate to achieve costs savings and administrative efficiencies, the more cooperation 
around services becomes an end in and of itself. The more accustomed elected officials 
become to the predominant economic calculus used to make service-related cooperation 
decisions, the less appealing cooperation on land use issues seems. Finally, the more 
elected officials become a part of tangible and near-term win-win situations (likely with 
service-delivery cooperation) the less likely they are to accept win-loss or loss-loss 
scenarios (likely in the near term with land use cooperation). This is especially true when 
such scenarios are characterized by tremendous uncertainty about both the benefits and 
costs to municipalities and the timeline during which these costs and benefits will begin 
to accrue. 
 
The Chelsea-area communities in Washtenaw County have several service-related 
cooperative efforts in place. Incidentally, elected officials in this area have also been part 
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of an informal land use alliance called the Chelsea Area Planning Team (CAPT) for the 
past 18 years. This alliance, which coexists with at least six formal service agreements, is 
the only cooperative effort directly focused on land use planning in this area. When asked 
about cooperation around land use issues in the area, Chelsea-area elected officials refer 
first and foremost to their service arrangements, not the CAPT. Most of the discussion at 
the CAPT meetings focuses on budgets and fiscal issues, with land use concerns 
receiving only fleeting mention. Economic and service issues take precedence, and a 
tremendous amount of energy is directed towards creating new service authorities for 
other service areas. The most urgent policy efforts seem directed at using current 
cooperative service arrangements and establishing new ones to maintain the area’s self-
sufficiency and independence from other Washtenaw County localities. Some elected 
officials in this area criticize key leaders as being empire builders – creating large service 
authorities with motives other than that of coordinated land use policy. One elected 
official from CAPT explains:  
When you have intangible benefits versus tangible costs, as with land use 
planning situations – duh. Even a far-sighted person like me can see the 
difficulties in selling that politically. Most service agreements we seek provide us 
with win-win settings, and that is tangible – that is immediate. I mean, for all of 
our CAPT and our joint meetings every month, what I have been saying is that I 
still perceive each of us participant jurisdictions as attending primarily to our 
parochial needs. And as we continue to do that we are fine with adding to our 
service arrangements to tell ourselves that we are cooperating and [to] gloss over 
the parochialism – when technically we are not really addressing land use 
issues.59 
 
Further, elected officials explain that the need to provide services more efficiently was 
the primary motive behind initial efforts to cooperate in the Chelsea area. One official 
elaborates:  
                                                 
59 Local elected official, personal communication, October 22, 2007 
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We have transplants to our townships, as all townships do, people who have 
located here from urban areas, and they expect the same high level of service. It is 
an extreme challenge. To me the only way to provide any services at all other 
than what is statutorily required is through collaboration, because of the costs of 
providing these services independently.60 
 
As Chelsea-area jurisdictions were negotiating several joint service authorities, they 
recognized the need for an informal forum for discussing general planning concerns in 
the Chelsea area – hence CAPT was created. A Chelsea area official observes, “I don’t 
think the idea behind CAPT was to create a group that would come up with a regional 
vision for the Chelsea area. I don’t think the idea of municipal cooperation was floated as 
the sine qua non to have this group.”61  
 
In other words, as the primary motivations for cooperation tend towards establishing 
service arrangements, the focus on cooperating formally around land use issues seems to 
decrease. Further, because most service contracts allow municipalities to retain individual 
autonomy and control, it seems difficult for municipalities that employ a number of such 
service contracts to restructure their thinking to reflect what formal joint planning 
requires: an emphasis on regional rather than individual benefits. In such cases, more 
informal land use cooperation that does not require municipalities to sacrifice local 
autonomy and control seems to be the more accessible option.  
 
My interview with an elected official from the Chelsea area supports this finding. 
Regarding joint master planning and whether the Chelsea-area communities would 
consider such an idea, this official remarks, “I find it incredibly stupid that in Michigan 
                                                 
60 Local elected official, personal communication, November 29, 2007 
61 Local elected official, personal communication, October 22, 2007 
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every single township should provide every single available land use. If we engage in 
regional planning, then we don’t have to provide for every single land use in our 
jurisdiction because we can justify that this land use exists in the larger region.”62 
Another official adds, “Why should we provide for mobile home parks in all our 
municipalities when the demand is not there and when there is a mobile home park just 
next door?”63 Some Chelsea-area officials are cynical about this kind of reasoning and 
imply that the Chelsea-area municipalities at best would use regional planning as a fig 
leaf for preserving the status quo in their own municipalities, and at worst would continue 
to engage in informal cooperation. These officials question whether joint planning can 
truly occur if municipalities are primarily concerned about their individual benefits, and 
they explain the lack of formal land use agreements as a result of such thinking. These 
officials also point to the regional plan that CAPT produced several years ago as evidence 
of a mindset that is not favorable to joint planning.64 Although the regional plan was only 
an amalgamation of the individual master plans, when the time came to adopt this 
regional plan, several participant municipalities declined to do so. CAPT has not 
produced much since then, apart from remaining an informal forum for elected officials 
to converse.  
 
Across I-94W and 10 miles south on M-52 are the Manchester area communities. At 
about the same time that CAPT was created, in the early 1990’s, the municipalities in the 
Manchester area created their own informal land use alliance called the Southwest 
                                                 
62 Local elected official, personal communication, November 29, 2007 
63 Local elected official, personal communication, October 24, 2007 
64 Local Planner,  personal communication, March 14, 2008, Local elected official, personal 
communication, October 22, 2007 and Local elected official, personal communication, November 28, 2007 
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Washtenaw Council of Governments (SWWCOG). Although the SWWCOG 
communities also have some cooperative service arrangements in place, the primary 
motivation for the formation of SWWCOG, which has today evolved into the Manchester 
Area Joint Planning Commission, was not to explore means of sharing services 
efficiently. Rather, SWWCOG was established because the Manchester-area 
communities recognized that land use issues fundamentally transcended local political 
boundaries. The service arrangements came later, as these elected officials realized that 
achieving small successes would help propel their planning efforts further, while 
providing other tangible benefits. They seemed to have understood from the outset that 
the Manchester area was going to experience growth in the next few years, so elected 
officials needed to find a way to proactively deal with it.   
 
An elected official from the Manchester area explains:  
No, you do not get cost savings typically from doing joint planning – not in the 
way you save costs by cooperating around services. But when you do joint 
planning, you have the ability to jointly decide what is best for an entire area, to 
control growth on an area-wide basis, and to protect the quality of life and 
community character that way. To do this you have to completely change your 
mindset from that of simply contracting for services – you have to realize you 
cannot operate in a vacuum.65  
 
In the Manchester area, the joint planning commission is currently working on a regional 
plan that will direct development towards the village and protect rural areas in the 
surrounding townships. Today, the win-loss equation seems to be weighted equally. The 
townships will agree to stay rural and not compete with the village for development. 
Dense development will be directed towards the village, which will prevent the 
                                                 
65 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 
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townships relying on septic tank systems from spreading the development out. The 
village will guarantee that they have no plans to become a city or annex township land, 
will agree to maintain the local character of the access routes to the Manchester area, and 
will provide the primary community, commercial, and recreational infrastructure for the 
township residents.  
 
What happens if the win-loss equation changes?  What will become of this effort if in 
five years the village residents realize that the idea of greater density around the village 
has decreased their quality of life?  One elected official addresses this issue:  
If that would happen, someone -- SWWCOG, village leadership, township 
leadership --  will not have been doing their job, because it is not enough to just 
go ahead and create the structure, organization, and outcome that we think is 
going to work best. It has to be continually looked at to make sure that it is the 
best and we have to keep on communicating that to the residents. There’s got to 
be a balance between the rights of the public and the rights of the individuals. We 
have to find a way to locate that balance and educate the public continually about 
it. In fact, we should be educating them about that now – so that nobody thinks 
they are the winners or the losers. We are a regional community. If we reframe 
things that way then we are all winners.  Everything is shared equally – good and 
bad.66  
 
In Michigan, cooperation around service provision typically involves contracts among 
municipalities that do not produce substantive changes to land use patterns. At its most 
basic level, it is an economic exchange in the marketplace among participating 
municipalities. Of course, it is not always that easy, especially if municipalities are trying 
to use infrastructure decisions to solve annexation issues. Even with that caveat in mind, 
most service contracts (e.g., water and sewer authorities) created at the local level do not 
aim to redirect growth to urban areas, limit expansion outside, or ensure concurrency of 
                                                 
66 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 
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infrastructure with growth.  Moreover, they do not imply the creation of designated urban 
service districts. More formal cooperative efforts mean that elected officials must 
contemplate the above-mentioned substantive growth-management strategies. The 
evaluation of the Chelsea-area and Manchester-area cooperative efforts indicates that 
cooperation on infrastructure and cooperation on land use issues are fundamentally 
different. They require different intentions and different mindsets.  Municipalities enter 
service contracts by evaluating them using an economic calculus. Engaging in such 
service-related cooperation seems to provide immediate noticeable benefits – such as 
greater police patrol in neighborhoods and more streamlined building permit application 
processes – all of which seem to satisfy constituent demands for greater services and 
budgetary cost-saving necessities. At the same time, elected officials retain autonomy, 
control and independence. All these considerations make it easier to add more service 
contracts to previously existing ones to carry the momentum forward. Proposals to 
deviate from this path of increasing returns to cooperate on land use issues are therefore 
met with reluctance and resistance. What seems more acceptable are informal cooperative 
arrangements around land use issues (e.g., sharing data), which are much more 
comparable to service agreements, provide the same kinds of benefits and few costs, and 
do not deviate much from the path to which elected officials have become accustomed. 
The more elected officials cooperate on services, the less willing they seem to be to make 
fundamental changes to the way they think and evaluate cooperation – something that the 
Chelsea- and Manchester-area case studies indicate is necessary to formalize cooperation 
on land use issues. When elected officials engage in a large number of service 
agreements, they also seem to regard such service-related cooperation as an end in itself 
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and seem to perceive themselves as undertaking substantial efforts (doing enough) to 
solve cross-boundary issues.  
 
7.1.4 Informal institutions 
Informal institutions typically provide the background conditions within which 
cooperative efforts are framed. Results indicate a negative relationship between informal 
institutions for regionalism (regional governance culture) in an area on one hand, and the 
extent of formal cooperation, on the other. Several analyses were performed to evaluate 
this divergent finding. First, the variable “regional governance culture,” which is a 
composite of several survey questions, was deconstructed into its component parts. This 
was done to understand whether the negative effect of regional governance culture on the 
formality of cooperative efforts was an artifact of variable aggregation. Several 
regression analyses were subsequently run including, first, using only the direct survey 
questions measuring governance culture and, second, using several different 
combinations of the survey questions used to measure “regional governance culture.” 
None of these regressions produced coefficients substantially different from the original 
operationalization used for this variable, and the analyses thus substantiate the original 
finding.  
 
Second, several analyses were performed to understand whether latent variables or 
subpopulations within the sample might be driving the results. At least three variables 
were isolated as potential latent variables that might render the relationship between 
regional governance culture and formality of cooperation spurious. These include 
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regional/geographic differences within the sample, jurisdiction type, and population. 
Geographic Information System based analyses were used to ascertain whether regional 
differences existed within the sample. Visual inspection of the resulting maps did not 
produce any cause for concern. Difference of means tests, and ANOVAs were used to 
test the relationship between regional governance culture and both jurisdiction type and 
population. Neither of these tests indicated that jurisdiction type and population were 
latent variables of concern. The caveat with these tests is that it is entirely up to the 
researcher to identify the variables that were not included in the regression model and 
eliminate them as threats to the validity of the regression model. Identifying and 
controlling for all the variables that serve as threats to a regression model, however, is an 
impossible task. Therefore, cluster analysis was used.67 Cluster analysis represents a data 
analysis technique that isolates natural data groupings in the sample for the variables in 
question. Controlling for the two subpopulations that were isolated during cluster analysis 
did not change the negative impact of regional governance culture on the formality of 
cooperative efforts.  
 
Finally, because this finding is a deviation from what was initially anticipated (see 
original hypotheses in chapter 2), neither the survey questions nor the case study 
interview protocols were tailored to specifically evaluate this divergent finding. That 
said, several other results from this study allude to the negative relationship between 
regional governance culture and the formality of cooperative efforts. For example, simple 
pairwise correlations reveal significant positive correlations between the level of political 
conflict among municipalities (r=.263, p<.01), the extent of competition among 
                                                 
67 Thanks to Ed Rothman from CSCAR for running cluster analysis on my sample.  
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municipalities for growth and development (r=.233, p<.01), and whether respondents 
agreed that land use related problems might be better solved at a metropolitan or regional 
level. That is, when political conflict and competition among municipalities increase, so 
does the recognition of the need for regional level land use planning. Also, an analysis of 
municipalities that were previously involved in unsuccessful cooperative attempts (see 
chapter 6) reveals that 59% of these municipalities have cooperated subsequently on land 
use issues. Further, 80% of the cooperating municipalities have formalized their 
cooperative efforts. That is, municipalities with tumultuous pasts, particularly with regard 
to a general culture of cooperation, have tended to formalize their cooperative efforts. 
Finally, pairwise correlations also suggest a significant positive relationship between the 
extent of political conflict in a region and the perceived benefits from cooperation 
(r=.285, p<.01).  
 
All of these results taken in conjunction with the negative impact of regional governance 
culture on the formality of cooperative efforts suggest strongly and consistently that the 
finding itself is not an artifact of variable construction or other data related abnormalities. 
Rather, these findings taken in totality suggest that the need for formal cooperation might 
be interpreted in different ways. That is, a governance culture that is conducive to 
cooperation neither alleviates the costs of formal cooperation nor makes it easier for 
municipalities to cooperate formally. Instead, a regional governance culture characterized 
by conflictive relationships among municipalities, disagreements, and competition 
necessitates formal cooperation to both remedy the land use problems created by the 
history of past conflicts, and the political environment itself.  Although this dissertation 
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does not offer definitive evidence of these interpretations, in the following paragraphs I 
discuss further potential explanations for why regional governance culture has a negative 
impact on the formality of cooperative efforts.  
 
On its face, the negative effect of regional governance culture on the formality of 
cooperative efforts might seem counterintuitive. However, it is conceivable for the 
following reason. Municipalities might not feel the need for formal cooperation when 
general informal institutions in an area provide for a culture that is extremely favorable to 
cooperation. In other words, elected officials in an area with strong informal institutions 
for cooperation might trust each other to implement informally agreed-upon regional 
policies even in the absence of a joint agreement governing such implementation.  
 
Formalizing cooperation in land use settings is tremendously difficult for reasons already 
described. However, once an effort is formalized, tremendous benefits can be derived, 
most of which ease the pressure on participants to keep the effort moving. First, through 
formalization, municipalities become part of binding contracts. This ensures participation 
and action, limits the possibility of participants reneging, and alleviates reciprocity 
concerns to some extent. Second, formalization typically adds structure to a cooperative 
effort and allows for participant roles to be well defined. Third, formalization provides 
stability to a cooperative effort. This means that the formal effort will continue to exist 
through turnovers of elected officials and the uncertainties of the political process. In this 
manner, formal efforts help preserve institutional memory. Finally, because formal 
efforts have well-defined expectations of participants, and both implicit and explicit rules 
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for interaction, they relieve the pressure on key individuals to play the leadership role at 
all times.  
 
The need for cooperation in municipal government can be justified by several factors. 
Independent and autonomously functioning municipalities might pay little attention to 
area-wide problems. By virtue of functioning independently, they might fail to redefine 
themselves as a region and recognize regional issues of common concern. This quest for 
local autonomy and independence might derive from several years of political conflict 
among jurisdictions wherein the chance of establishing even minimal working 
relationships is rendered both impossible and improbable. Autonomous jurisdictions 
might also compete with each other for much-needed resources and economic gains, 
reinforcing the prevailing separatism of municipal government. Finally, there might be a 
conspicuous absence of institutions that unite municipal governments. This would in turn 
produce a patchwork quilt of municipal policies. All these conditions signal the absence 
of a regional governance culture or regionalist tendencies in an area. Consequently, when 
such regionalist tendencies are absent, the need for cooperation increases.  
 
It is conceivable, therefore, that formal cooperative arrangements could provide the 
necessary stability to sustain municipal cooperation in a region where the culture for 
cooperation is low, historic political conflicts are high, there is a noticeable absence of 
local leadership to spearhead local cooperative efforts, there is tremendous competition 
for development, there are limited institutions to promote cooperation, there is limited 
agreement on the regional land use issues, and there is lack of agreement on the solutions 
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to the identified regional problems. Conversely, in an area where there is a general 
culture of regional governance and municipalities have a good working relationship with 
each other, there might be less of a need to formalize land use cooperation. That is, 
municipalities might feel comfortable enough with each other to cooperate informally 
and still anticipate the benefits of formal cooperation. In other words, when regionalist 
institutions in an area are high, the trust levels among municipalities might be high 
enough to allow them to agree on joint land use policies informally and trust that 
municipalities will implement these joint policies individually without having to comply 
with a formal agreement. The need for formal cooperation on land use issues seems to be 
low when the informal institutions in an area are very conducive to cooperation. This 
accounts for the negative relationship between these two variables. 
 
7.1.5 Benefits from cooperation 
Finally, the more elected officials believe that cooperation will afford benefits to their 
municipality, the greater the extent of formal cooperation on land use issues. The 
regression results presented here do not distinguish between individual and group 
benefits (i.e., benefits accruing to an individual municipality and benefits accruing to a 
group of municipalities or a region). In other words, the survey question simply asked 
whether municipalities expected benefits to their municipality from cooperation. It did 
not distinguish between regional and individual benefits. However, case study interviews 
provide information on this distinction.   
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In 1999, General Motors and the Ann Arbor Railroad announced plans to build a massive 
auto distribution facility in rural Milan Township, 20 miles south of Ann Arbor along 
US23S, amidst thousands of acres of prime farmland. There would be room in this 
facility for 50,000 cars, four times Detroit Metropolitan Airport’s capacity, parked on 
enough asphalt to cover 35 Meijer parking lots. Two miles long and a half-mile wide, the 
facility would have gobbled up one of the area’s largest contiguous parcels of farmland 
and established the township’s first industrial beachhead. In order for this to fit into the 
community, Milan Township needed to change its master plan, rezone the 1,000 acres 
from agricultural to industrial land use, and approve a special use permit. Incidentally, the 
property under question is located at the border of Milan Township and London 
Township. Contiguous to this proposed facility, less than 100 feet away, are residential 
subdivisions and farmland located in neighboring London Township. London Township 
residents and officials opposed the proposed development because of its lack of 
consistency with the land uses proposed in their master plan and the impact the project 
would have on the land uses in their municipality. However, London Township residents 
and officials  have no official say in the Milan Township planning process, because of the 
political boundary separating the two townships. The concerned officials and residents 
appealed to the Monroe County Planning Commission to render a verdict in their favor 
and oppose the proposed development project. After reviewing the proposed 
development for consistency with the existing and proposed area-wide land use patterns, 
the Monroe County Planning Commission voted 6-1 against recommending the proposed 
development. Because the county’s role in Michigan is only advisory (even for 
development projects of regional impact and significance), the Milan Township Planning 
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Commission chose to ignore the county’s advice and recommended that the project be 
approved. Soon the Milan Township elected board voted in favor of the project as well, 
even as neighboring London Township officials continued to urge them to consider the 
impact the project would have on London Township. 
 
This case has become one of the quintessential examples of how the lack of cooperation 
can result in inconsistent land use policies across municipalities. Most elected officials 
refer to this case while talking about inconsistent boundary land uses. “We don’t want to 
plan for open space along our border and the township over next to us plans that space as 
an industrial area. So the benefit of cooperating formally and perhaps planning at least 
those boundary uses jointly is that we can at least ensure the compatibility of land uses 
across boundaries.”68 Such cooperation, elected officials indicate, is in their best interest.  
 
Other elected officials suggest that cooperation would enable municipalities to control 
their own destiny. This would occur in at least two ways: first, as a defense against 
mandates from the state or state-level policies that might force municipalities’ hands; 
second, as a defense against future growth. Both of these benefits from cooperation, 
elected officials explain, provide tremendous individual and collective benefits to 
municipalities. One official elaborates:  
We want to cooperate out of our own volition and considering what the state has 
been legislating in terms of consolidating townships, etc., we want to proactively 
decide to cooperate and through cooperation decide what we want on our own 
terms before the state comes in and tells us what we should want.69  
 
                                                 
68 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 
69 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
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Another official questions the state’s judgment on policies such as the one that recently 
allowed municipalities to establish on-site community septic tanks:  
We have real concerns about that . . . . Not that it couldn’t work, but would you 
rather have one septic system for 1000 homes, or 1000 separate septic tanks for 
1000 homes? Well, we know 1000 septic systems for 1000 homes will work. We 
have lived with that for a long time and our fathers before us. We know that that 
can work. We know commercial septic systems can work, too, but not under a 
homeowners’ association – no way. So we think by people banding together we 
can control how much growth we get to some extent – where it goes to a great 
extent and to minimize the impact and minimize any adverse impacts as much as 
we can.70 
 
Whoever feels this way also seem to believe that there is strength in numbers. Elected 
officials in the Manchester area have experienced successes with cooperation before. 
Several gravel pits have long operated in the Manchester area, and area officials report 
that gravel pit operators have historically resisted several of the local planning laws 
governing their operation. Moreover, there have been lawsuits and several controversies 
over gravel pit permits in the Manchester area. By talking with each other, elected 
officials from several of the municipalities realized that they were all receiving a number 
of applications for gravel pits and facing the same issues with regard to permit approval. 
They decided to work together on a mineral extraction ordinance. One official reports:  
It has worked for us very well. Especially as we encounter operating gravel pits 
right now that do not want to abide by the local laws. When they went into court 
complaining about our ordinances, we told the judge that several of the area 
municipalities had this same ordinance. We’ve got [the ordinance] in all of these 
townships, we said. It made a lot of difference to the judge. We have learned that 
it is good to cooperate.71 
 
Another official echoes, “You know the strength-in-numbers philosophy . . . . We were 
finding that as we independently went up against the big guys it was hard to be 
                                                 
70 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 
71 Local elected official, personal communication, January 17, 2008 
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recognized, but as a cohesive unit I think we have made a lot of headway, not only with 
other local governments, [but also] with the county and with the state.”72 Elected officials 
anticipate that cooperation will lead to more legally defensible regulations, an important 
benefit on the individual municipality level.  
 
The new Joint Municipal Planning legislation in Michigan affords municipalities 
protection against claims of exclusionary zoning and needed development.  It does so by 
allowing them to satisfy land use requirements by providing for such land uses in the 
larger region, rather than in each individual municipality. For example, if several 
municipalities decided to write and enforce a regional plan, then the state would 
guarantee that not all municipalities have to provide for every land use, if the demand for 
that land use can be satisfied by providing it in just one municipality or in the area most 
appropriate for it in the larger region. Elected officials believe that this kind of 
cooperation provides tremendous individual benefits. 
 
7.2 Regression model 2: Factors affecting a municipality’s decision to cooperate 
 
In this regression, I treated cooperation on land use issues as a dummy variable. This is a 
very simple and straightforward conception of cooperation that does not distinguish 
between informal and formal cooperation. In this conception, I construe cooperation as 
the simple decision by elected officials to cooperate or not to cooperate. In this 
interpretation, several variables could be hypothesized as affecting a municipality’s 
decision to cooperate.  
                                                 
72 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
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The variables included in this regression model fall under four key factors hypothesized 
to affect cooperation on land use issues. These variables and their effect on the decision 
to cooperate are illustrated in Figure 7.3 below. The significant variables are also 
expressed in bold font. Several of the variables in the model predict a municipality’s 
decision to cooperate significantly. The environmental factors affecting cooperation in 
this model are captured through the extent of perceived future growth pressure in a 
municipality, whether a municipality has experienced controversial land use decisions, 
and whether a municipality has been named in land use-related lawsuits. Of these 
environmental factors, the perceived growth pressure and controversial land use decisions 
in a municipality positively affect the decision to cooperate. Of the listed decision maker-
related factors, the extent of internal support for cooperation in a municipality and the 
perceived benefits from cooperation have significant positive effects on cooperative 
decisions. Whether elected officials have received training on the benefits of cooperation 
does not significantly impact a municipality’s decision to cooperate. Further, none of the 
formal institutions and informal institutions for cooperation in a region is a significant 
predictor of a municipality’s decision to engage in cooperation. In the following section I 
explain the significant findings.  
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Figure 7.3 Findings from regression model predicting the decision to cooperate 
 
 
7.2.1 Future growth pressure 
 
Of the three environmental factors included in this research model, perceived growth 
pressure and controversial land use decisions in a municipality positively influence the 
decision to cooperate. These results are conceivable for several reasons. When asked to 
explain their initial decision to cooperate, several elected officials indicated that a large 
part of their decision to cooperate was born out of their effort to be proactive about 
managing growth. These elected officials believe that cooperation is their first line of 
defense against rapid growth. They explain that the vestiges of rampant growth are 
everywhere in Michigan.  One elected official captures this sentiment well as he remarks, 
“Some of us have been around too long, a long time, and can remember how small Ann 
Arbor was at one time, and how much it has grown and how much the Livonias and 
Cantons and other cities that are 6-mile-by-6-mile cities have grown, [to] the same size of 
Formal institutions 
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cooperation  
Informal institutions 
1. Extent of regionalism in an 
area  
2. Cooperation on services  
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(significant + effect) 
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decisions (significant + 
effect) 
 
Decision maker-related factors 
1. Perceived benefit from 
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effect) 
2. PC, LEB, and staff support 
(significant + effect) 
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townships. Imagine that - complete cities now!  They were farms way back then.”73 As 
this sentiment suggests, a good number of elected officials know what happens when 
municipalities are faced with the possibility of growth, the temptation to increase the tax 
base and relax laws to allow for greater protection of property rights, and the results of 
local inaction in managing this future growth. Another elected official remarks,  
We know we are going to get growth - especially residential growth. I used to be 
in the farm business. Unfortunately, today residential is our best crop, and 
residential is the one that votes. But what we need to do as elected officials is find 
the balance between public and private rights, residential and commercial growth, 
and increasing the tax base yet keeping the sense of community.74  
 
Others echo this thought: “We have to grow. We cannot build a wall around ourselves. 
So let’s plan for commercial growth but let’s plan it where it doesn’t detract from 
downtown, it pays for the services, and it doesn’t distract from the sense of our 
community.”75 A number of elected officials expressed fear of losing their identity as a 
community and fear that they would no longer be able to refer to their area as a 
community if uncontrolled growth were to occur.  
 
The important caveat, however, is that the growth-pressure variable in my study is the 
“perceived” growth pressure in a municipality. I would argue that if a researcher faces a 
choice between studying the effect of the calculated growth pressure in a municipality 
and studying the effect of perceived growth pressure, the perception variable would be 
more pertinent and the better choice.  Although cooperation often ensues as a response to 
certain environmental conditions, the cooperation examined in this study is not 
                                                 
73 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
74 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 
75 Local elected official, personal communication, October 26, 2007 
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spontaneous or unconscious, but rather a conscious decision and a deliberate action 
undertaken by municipalities. In such scenarios, the story is much clearer when the 
perception variable is included, because it indicates the extent to which elected officials 
have internalized the external pressures that they face.  That is, it shows the extent to 
which elected officials can anticipate growth pressure by looking at the population, jobs 
and building permit numbers; internalize it; and perceive it as an environmental condition 
affecting their municipality. Although the quantitative part of my study cannot speak 
directly to the differences between the real and perceived growth pressures (I have 
included only perceived growth pressure as a variable), my case-study communities do 
provide some insight.  
 
The Chelsea-area municipalities certainly face more future growth pressure than the 
Manchester-area municipalities. The growth pushing outwards towards Chelsea comes 
from the Ann Arbor area through Dexter Village. Although the Chelsea area faces 
tremendous growth pressure, my conversations with elected officials in the area focused 
more on the question of service provision for the growing needs of the population, rather 
than a fear of loss of community due to future growth. My interviews did not leave me 
with the feeling that the Chelsea area was preparing itself for incoming growth through 
proactive planning. The concern about perceived growth pressure was more apparent in 
my conversations with Manchester-area officials. This perception of growth pressure has 
provided the momentum officials needed to craft Manchester’s joint planning effort, 
which is fundamentally focused on preserving rural character and providing options for 
managing regional growth. While Chelsea faces more serious growth pressure, the fact 
  203 
that elected officials seem somewhat removed from it in their thinking has distracted 
them from converging on the common problem of anticipated growth and using it as a 
foundation on which to build cooperation.  
 
While this disconnect between perceived and real growth pressure seems puzzling, it can 
be explained to some extent through two observations. On one hand, elected officials in 
both Chelsea and Manchester agree that the Manchester area is the county’s best-kept 
secret. On the other hand, the appeal of Chelsea seems to have been discovered already. 
Small indicators such as the truck traffic cutting right through downtown Chelsea 
highlight this observation. The second observation is that the Manchester area is better 
defined than the Chelsea area. For example, southwest of Ann Arbor, the Saline area is 
well distinguished from the Manchester area. West of Ann Arbor, however, the Dexter 
and Chelsea areas are neither well defined together nor separated adequately. The sense 
of “community” that Manchester elected officials hold so dear and fear losing to growth 
seems to heighten their perception of growth pressure. In contrast, the Chelsea-area 
municipalities have not defined their larger “community” yet. Today CAPT is 
contemplating increasing its boundary to include the Dexter-area communities. The 
perception of growth pressure is perhaps not as heightened here, because municipalities 
do not know what they are going to lose should growth come their way.  
 
7.2.2 Controversial land use decisions 
Regression results indicate that controversial land use decisions increase the likelihood of 
cooperation. Elected officials explain that while land use-related lawsuits make elected 
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officials dig in their heels and defend their jurisdiction, controversial land use decisions 
provide a window of opportunity for local action. In this way lawsuits seem to make 
municipalities reactive, while controversial land use decisions have the potential to make 
municipalities proactive. When municipalities face controversial land use decisions, they 
get a sampling of what is to come in the event that they fail to fix the “broken” land use 
policy at hand. Scholars studying cooperation have long insisted that the potential for 
cooperation increases tremendously in the event of uncertainty. Controversial land use 
decisions represent such uncertainties. When municipalities are faced with land use 
controversies, they are also faced with several unknowns: they might see a referendum; 
they might have set a precedent for future controversies; current land use policies might 
be rendered null and void; or there might be uncertainty over the extent of damage (for 
example, inconsistencies might be identified in the master plan,  in the zoning ordinance, 
or perhaps even  in both documents; there might be problems with the interpretation of 
these documents; or they might have to retroactively consider prior decisions similar to 
the one causing the controversy). When uncertainties manifest in this way, municipalities 
are faced with incomplete knowledge and information about the future, to the extent that 
the gap between the knowledge at hand and the knowledge needed to solve the crises 
widens. At such times they seek knowledge and information, legitimacy, and strength in 
numbers – all of which might be possible through cooperation with their neighbors.  
 
Results also indicate that elected officials engage in cooperation when they anticipate 
benefits from such cooperation. Further, the internal support structure for cooperation in a 
municipality is also a significant predictor of whether a municipality engages in 
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cooperation. Explanations for these two findings were provided under the previous 
regression model and could be extended to mean similar things in this model.  
 
7.2.3 Discussion  
This section provides a comparison of the model explaining the extent of formality of 
cooperative efforts on the cooperation continuum and the model predicting the decision 
to cooperate. 
 
The two regression models specified above provide many interesting findings. First, at 
least two environmental factors seem to be important in predicting a municipality’s initial 
decision to cooperate. These environmental factors, however, do not play a significant 
role in determining the extent of formality of a municipality’s cooperative effort. 
Conversely, neither formal nor informal institutions have a significant impact on a 
municipality’s initial decision to cooperate. But both types of institutions have significant 
impacts on the extent of formal cooperation among municipalities. The two variables that 
have significant impacts on both the initial decision to cooperate and the extent of formal 
cooperation are the extent of internal support in a municipality for cooperation, and 
whether elected officials in a municipality perceive benefits to accrue from cooperation.  
 
These results suggest that environmental conditions act as tipping points or triggers in 
inducing municipalities to take that step towards cooperation. The role county and 
regional agencies play in providing support structures for cooperation and providing an 
institutional environment that is conducive to cooperation does not seem to help 
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municipalities make the initial decision to cooperate.  However, these formal institutions 
help municipalities formalize their cooperative efforts. The results also highlight the 
importance of decision maker-related characteristics that play a role in determining both 
cooperative decisions and their formality. This suggests that much cooperation in land 
use settings ensues because of deliberate and conscious choices on the part of a 
municipality’s governing ranks. When municipalities can garner internal support for 
cooperation and understand the benefits of such cooperation, it creates a very receptive 
internal environment for cooperation (both the initial decision to cooperate and the formal 
cooperation) on land use issues.  
 
7.3 Regression model 3: Factors predicting informal versus formal cooperation  
 
In the final regression model predicting cooperation, I use a different conception of 
cooperation as the dependent variable. For this regression, I formulate cooperation as a 
nominal variable with three categories: no cooperation, informal cooperation, and formal 
cooperation. Instead of treating formal cooperation as higher on a ranked scale than 
informal cooperation, this conceptualization treats formal and informal cooperation as 
equally important concepts that can be considered ends in themselves. In treating 
cooperation this way, I am suggesting that an alternative view of cooperation might exist, 
wherein informal cooperation could be conceptually distinguished from formal 
cooperation. The regression model is constructed to develop an understanding of the 
factors that predict informal versus formal cooperation. This regression model therefore 
has two components: the first component predicts informal cooperation, and the second 
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component predicts formal cooperation. Further, “no cooperation,” which is coded “0,” is 
used as the reference category. The results from the multinomial regression are presented 




































Figure 7.4 Findings from regression model predicting informal and formal cooperation  
 
The part of the model predicting informal cooperation does not have many significant 
variables. The extent of internal support for cooperation is the only significant predictor 
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of informal cooperation. There might be at least two explanations for this finding. First, 
there is a numerical discrepancy in the number of cases contributing to the “no 
cooperation” and “informal cooperation” categories. That is, the category coded “zero,” 
reflecting no cooperation, has 92 cases. The category coded “one,” reflecting informal 
cooperation, has only 25 cases. The part of the model predicting informal cooperation 
therefore might not be stable enough for the 11 independent variables that are included in 
the model. With that caveat in mind, the second more substantive explanation is that there 
might not be an adequate difference between municipalities that do not cooperate and 
those that cooperate informally. If this result were to hold true through the addition of 
more cases, it would give more credence to the idea of cooperation on land use issues as 
more of a ranked scale, with formal cooperation much higher on the scale than informal 
cooperation. Another interpretation might be that informal cooperation is conceptually 
different from formal cooperation, but not different enough from no cooperation at all.  
From a planning perspective, in terms of setting standards for cooperation, this would 
mean that formal cooperation represents the desirable end (as a ranked scale would also 
suggest).  
 
The second component of the multinomial regression model predicts formal cooperation. 
This component yields several significant results. None of the environmental variables 
are significant predictors of formal cooperation. The presence of formal institutions (i.e., 
the effectiveness of county and regional agencies at providing support for cooperation) is 
a significant predictor of formal cooperation and has a positive effect on it. Both informal 
institutions -- the extent of regional governance culture in an area and the extent of 
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cooperation on services -- have significant negative impacts on formal land use 
cooperation. Finally, of the decision maker-related characteristics, the extent of internal 
support for cooperation and whether elected officials have received training on the 
benefits of cooperation have significant positive impacts on formal cooperation around 
land use issues. These results are similar to those from the ranked regression model, with 
one exception. The explanations for these results are therefore conceivable for reasons 
already provided in the earlier sections.  
 
The exception provides an interesting result to consider. In the model that treated 
cooperation as a ranked variable, the variable measuring the perceived benefits of 
cooperation was a significant predictor of the extent of formality of cooperative efforts. 
In this model, in which cooperation is considered a nominal category and independent 
variables predict formal cooperation from no cooperation at all, the perceived-benefits 
variable is not significant anymore. Instead, the variable measuring training received on 
the benefits of cooperation is significant. In other words, when non-cooperating elected 
officials receive training on the benefits of cooperation, they are more likely to cooperate 
formally. When the route to formal cooperation is through informal cooperation, 
however, the perceived benefits from such cooperation have a positive impact. At such 
times, training on the benefits of cooperation does not have a significant impact – 
signaling perhaps that elected officials experience these benefits themselves as they 
progress from informal cooperative activities to formal land use agreements. When 
elected officials have not cooperated informally, they are less likely to have experienced 
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the benefits from cooperation themselves. They therefore need training to educate them 
on the benefits of cooperation and consequently to induce them to cooperate formally.  
 
The multinomial regression model described above consisted of only 3 categories: no 
cooperation; informal cooperation; and formal cooperation. Municipalities were placed in 
these categories based on their most formal cooperative effort. This meant that the 
municipalities engaging in both formal and informal cooperative efforts were coded as 
participating in formal cooperation. That is, even if a municipality participated in a 
majority of informal efforts but also participated in at least one formal cooperative effort, 
this municipality was classified as participating in formal cooperation (see chapter 4 ). To 
resolve any doubts about whether this coding presents an underlying bias towards treating 
formal cooperation as higher than informal cooperation, particularly in cases where a 
municipality engages in both formal and informal cooperation, another multinomial 
regression model was proposed.  
 
In this second model, 4 categories were included: no cooperation; informal cooperation; 
formal cooperation; and both formal and informal cooperation. Municipalities were 
placed in each of these categories based on whether a “majority” of their cooperative 
efforts were informal or formal. Those municipalities that participated in an equal 
number of informal and formal cooperative activities were placed in the fourth category 
called “informal and formal cooperation”. Results from this second model are provided in 
table 7.1. Multinomial logistic regression shows that the independent variables that 
significantly predicted formal cooperation in the first model remain significant in the 
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second multinomial regression model. Also, this model suffers from the same problems 
associated with the first model. The “informal cooperation” and “informal and formal 
cooperation” categories do not have sufficient cases. This second multinomial regression 
model offers an alternate way of operationalizing informal and formal cooperation as 
nominal categories and confirms the results from the first multinomial regression model. 
The interpretations provided above therefore, can be applied to this model as well.  
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Table 7.1 Regression Results 
 
Results of OLS regression multiple regression on extent of formality of cooperative 
efforts 
 






























Capacity – Full time staff -.787
 
 
-.167 -1.103 .28 
Future Growth Pressure -1.732 -.212 -1.270 .21 
Land use related lawsuits 2.105 .218 1.112 .27 




Cooperation on services -6.940
 
 
-.308 -2.069 .04 
Extent of regional governance culture -.373 -.456 -2.408 .02 
  
Decision maker related characteristics 
 
Cooperation related training 3.994
 
 
.267 1.643 .11 
PC, staff, and LEB support for cooperation 2.270 .459 2.376 .02 
Growth management related training  .007 .001 .008 .99 








.445 2.259 .03 
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Future Growth Pressure 3.580 4.123 .04
Land use related lawsuits .514 .872 .35




Cooperation on services 
.183 1.073 .30
Extent of regional governance culture .918 1.741 .18
Prior unsuccessful cooperation .409 1.364 .24
  
Decision maker related characteristics 
 
Cooperation related training 
1.138 .027 .87
PC, staff, and LEB support for cooperation 2.178 4.229 .04




Effectiveness of regional and county planning 
agencies 
1.001 .790 .37
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Chi2 (22): 39.972 
Significance: .011 


















Future Growth Pressure 0.838 0.612 0.43
Land use related lawsuits 1.696 1.418 0.23
Land use related controversies -0.623 0.217 0.64




Cooperation on services -1.772 0.29 0.59
Extent of regional governance culture -0.33 3.565 0.06
  
Decision maker related characteristics 
 
Cooperation related training 0.398 0.046 0.83
PC, staff, and LEB support for cooperation 2.124 3.766 0.05
Perceived benefits from cooperation 22.488 . . 




Effectiveness of regional and county planning 
agencies 0.001 0.326 0.56














Chi2 (22): 39.972 
Significance: .011 



















Future Growth Pressure 0.027 0.001 0.97
Land use related lawsuits -0.803 0.45 0.50
Land use related controversies 0.074 0.003 0.95




Cooperation on services -6.536 3.681 0.04
Extent of regional governance culture -0.466 7.197 0.00
  
Decision maker related characteristics 
 
Cooperation related training 5.613 3.721 0.04
PC, staff, and LEB support for cooperation 2.406 5.801 0.01
Perceived benefits from cooperation 23.584 0 0.99




Effectiveness of regional and county planning 
agencies 0.004 4.245 0.03
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Chi2 (33): 52.485 
Significance: .017 


















Future Growth Pressure .211 0.031 0.861
Land use related lawsuits -.901 0.423 0.516
Land use related controversies .844 0.303 0.582




Cooperation on services -8.141 4.614 0.032
Extent of regional governance culture -.549 8.096 0.004
   
Decision maker related characteristics 
 
Cooperation related training 6.004 3.738 0.049
PC, staff, and LEB support for cooperation 3.013 7.409 0.006
Perceived benefits from cooperation 22.855 0 0.99




Effectiveness of regional and county planning 
agencies 0.004 3.806 0.049







Taken altogether, the findings in this dissertation can be summarized into a few key 
points.  
 
First, cooperation cannot be viewed as a one-dimensional concept. I have employed three 
conceptualizations of cooperation in this study. The first conceptualization measures the 
initial decision of a municipality to cooperate, the second conception measures the extent 
of formality of the cooperative efforts in place, and the third separates informal 
cooperation from formal cooperation. Using each of these constructions of cooperation in 
regression models, provides somewhat different and extremely interesting results.  
 
Second, environmental factors, particularly the perceived future growth pressure in a 
municipality and controversial land use decisions act as tipping points or triggers for the 
initiation of cooperation. Although interesting, this arguably reflects a reactionary 
approach to cooperation in Michigan. In other words, municipalities make decisions to 
cooperate after encountering pressing environmental conditions. Environmental factors 
produce uncertainties in a municipality’s future regarding both the quality of its physical 
environment and the future validity of the municipality’s existing regulative planning 
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institutions. Controversies cast serious doubt on the ability of planning institutions to 
hold up to further scrutiny because they have been challenged before and the “unknown” 
associated with growth pressure arises primarily from interdependencies among 
municipalities. That is, a single municipality might not be able to predict neighboring 
municipalities’ actions, and, in the case of a defined region, there might be uncertainty 
about whether municipalities can independently enact regionally consistent land use 
policies.  
 
Both controversial land uses and growth pressures create uncertainties and therefore 
demand action. To produce cooperative action, however, the region needs to be well 
defined. That is, municipalities should be able to identify the core group or cluster of 
jurisdictions that are interdependent with each other; share common concerns; and 
contribute to the regional identity of an area. The group of municipalities whose 
participation is needed to address regional issues should be clear. Well-defined regions 
offer some advantages. Municipalities are better able to identify physical 
interdependencies, which makes the benefits of cooperation easy to calculate.  
 
Case studies of the Manchester and Chelsea areas in Washtenaw County indicate that the 
Manchester-area municipalities have been better able to act – to cooperate – to deal with 
both growth pressures and controversial land use decisions. The Manchester-area 
municipalities operate within a well-defined region. That is, they know where their 
interdependencies lie and how they are related to each other; this knowledge enables 
them to define the cluster of municipalities that will comprise their region. This region is 
  219 
based on the Manchester school district boundaries and, partly, on the portion of the 
Raisin River watershed in Washtenaw County. Because of their well-defined boundaries, 
Manchester municipalities have been able to identify common issues of concern. Area 
officials have a common understanding of how growth pressures might undermine the 
existing character of their community or exacerbate existing problems in their region. 
Thus elected officials in the area have been able to converge because they have a 
common understanding of the problem at hand.  
 
This kind of coalition formation is substantiated by the advocacy-coalition framework. 
The well-defined group and the group’s common concerns also ensure that the benefits of 
managed growth in the region are more apparent. When the benefits are more apparent, 
internal support for cooperation is easy to conjure. Interviews reveal that the Manchester-
area officials evaluate the benefits of cooperation in the following manner. First, as 
indicated in previous chapters, Manchester-area officials warn that land use cooperation 
will be difficult if evaluated in terms of benefits accruing to an individual municipality. 
By reframing their reference and thinking about the larger region, they are able to assess 
benefits to the collective region. Further, several officials from this area indicated that to 
cooperate around land use issues, one cannot think in terms of just the short-term benefits 
and costs accruing to the individual municipality, but rather that the evaluation of 
cooperation should be based on the region, the greater good, and the long term. This 
signals the need for  a more cultural approach to decision making. Comments such as “It 
is the right thing to do” and “[We] need to balance the interests of a municipality against 
[those] of the region” substantiate this.  
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When municipalities in the Manchester area encounter controversial land use issues, they 
can turn to a well-defined group to turn to satisfy their need for information. Area 
officials justify cooperative action during such circumstances as arising from “the 
strength-in-numbers mentality” and the sense that “the cooperation provides some 
credibility, justifiability, and legitimacy to regulatory planning institutions.” Here, as 
evidenced by the mineral extraction scenario described in chapter 7, the urgency of the 
need for action garners internal support for cooperation. Area officials explain, “Even 
when we all don’t agree, sometimes we just need to get things done.” This sentiment is 
consistent with the regime theory-based postulation of how alliances form – from the 
fundamental need for action. Both of these theoretical justifications for cooperation are 
alive and well in the Manchester area.  
 
In contrast, in the absence of a well-defined regional boundary – i.e. a well defined group 
of municipalities comprising of the larger region, interdependencies are not well 
established in the Chelsea area. That is, municipalities seem uncertain about how they are 
interconnected, which leads to the fundamental conundrum of cooperation around land 
use issues that separates it from other more conventional types of cooperation. In the 
Chelsea area, the absence of a well-established physical interdependence undermines a 
common perception of growth pressure and an understanding of its impacts. Further, 
benefits and costs are difficult to calculate in the absence of a “regional” justification for 
problem solving. This combined with the lack of a moral compass on which to justify 
cooperation makes generating internal support for cooperation improbable.  
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Third, several factors affect the extent to which municipalities formalize their cooperative 
efforts on the cooperation continuum. The effectiveness of regional and county planning 
agencies at providing support for local cooperation is one such factor. This is not 
surprising considering that these agencies were established for the singular purpose of 
facilitating local cooperation. The fact that county and regional planning agencies do not 
play a role in the initiation of local cooperation perhaps is indicative of the general 
reluctance of planning agencies to make normative statements about cooperation. That is, 
planning agencies in Michigan operate pragmatically. Political realism is essential for 
their institutional survival and affects their ability to maintain credibility. They cannot 
push too hard for fear of alienating local officials. They conceive their job as one of 
facilitating cooperation – not initiating it. One official observes, “If the county planner 
marched in here and told us we had to cooperate or else . . . it is not going to happen. You 
can only facilitate and slowly, at an acceptable rate, [or] else everyone looks at the county 
or the RPA with suspicion.”76 Another official echoes this thought:  
There are some people who are very leery / apprehensive over the county being 
involved with us in our joint planning effort. They think there is an ulterior 
motive there. They ask, “Why would the county spend the money and staff time if 
they did not want something?” I say, “Well, they want the same things we do.”  
They say, “Well, I don’t know about that.”77 
 
County and regional officials also realize that in a permissive setting like Michigan, they 
do not have the regulatory authority to lead the charge on a vigorous pursuit of local 
cooperation. They also realize that the only way to sustain local cooperation in Michigan, 
                                                 
76 Local elected official, personal communication, November 28, 2007 
77 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 
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where there are no institutionalized channels for forging and sustaining such cooperation, 
is to allow cooperation to emerge from the bottom-up. They cannot be boosters for 
cooperation but what they can do is provide stability and support once a decision to 
cooperate has been made. That said, some of the most needed services for facilitating 
local cooperation are financial assistance and mediation services. The state of Michigan’s 
current economy, and evidence unearthed in this study about the sheer number of 
cooperative efforts that fail at the table, justify this need. Yet, county and regional 
agencies list financial and mediation services as their least priorities – perhaps a 
reflection of the fact that economic shortages also affect planning agencies, in that they 
are financially strapped and understaffed.  
 
 
Fourth, results from the regression models indicate that the proliferation of service 
agreements impacts formal cooperation negatively. This finding suggests that as elected 
officials cooperate around services, they expect several similar benefits from land use 
cooperation without much loss of independence and autonomy. However, it is typically, 
not possible to attain such net individual benefits in cases where cooperation is sought 
around land use issues. Having become accustomed to an economic calculus of decision 
making, elected officials might find it difficult to form other justifications for land use 
cooperation. In this way, elected officials will continue to cooperate around services, 
since deviating from this path of service contracting to land use cooperation might 
provide net costs. In fact, both the calculus approach and the theory of path dependence 
explain institutional persistence (continuing to cooperate around services rather than 
using service-related cooperation as the vehicle to better land use policies) as the product 
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of such an evaluation, which sees deviations from prevailing institutions as making 
individuals worse off. In this way, the persistence of service-related cooperation might 
also become an end in itself. 
 
Fifth, results also indicate that the relationship between regional governance culture and 
formal cooperation is negative. In other words, the greater the regional governance 
culture in an area, the lesser the amount of formal cooperation. In this dissertation, 
regional governance culture is used as a term that captures whether the political 
environment and governance culture in a region are conducive to cooperation. The 
political conflict in a region, the competition among municipalities for growth and 
development, whether elected officials in a region have a common understanding of how 
to address regional problems, and whether elected officials in a region understand the 
extra jurisdictional impacts and the scale of land use problems contribute to how the 
variable “regional governance culture” is measured and operationalized. There might be 
least two possible explanations for this unexpected result. The first is that informal 
institutions could be interpreted as either increasing or decreasing the need for formal 
cooperation. In other words, when the regional governance culture in an area is high, the 
prevalent normative culture ensures that individuals can be held to their word, that 
reciprocity is ensured, and that interactions are sustained – even without the boon of 
formal cooperation. In contrast, the risk of non-cooperation creates a demand for rules to 
promote stability (Maser, 1998, p. 541).  In the absence of such risks, the need for formal 
cooperation might be absent. The second explanation is that the regional governance 
culture creates a perception or an illusion of a tremendous amount of regional activity, 
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when in truth, the favorable attitudes towards cooperation and regional relationships 
might not actually result in cooperative behavior.   
 
Sixth, this study also presents some interesting information about the effects of 
anticipated benefits and training, on formal cooperation. On one hand, when the path to 
formal cooperation is through informal cooperation, elected officials seem to learn about 
the benefits of cooperation which in turn encourages them to formalize their cooperative 
efforts. On the other hand, training received on the benefits of cooperation is a significant 
predictor of formal cooperation from non-cooperation, but anticipated benefits from 
cooperation is not. More specifically, training on the benefits of cooperation predicts 
whether non-cooperating entities will engage in formal cooperation, while anticipation of 
benefits from cooperation predicts whether individuals will move up the scale from 
informal to formal cooperation. 
 
Seventh, a majority of local plans in Michigan are written by planning consultants. On 
several occasions, planning consultants write plans for many of the municipalities in an 
area. In the Manchester area, for example, three of the four municipalities engaged in the 
regional planning effort employ the same planning consultant independently. Can 
planning consultants, by virtue of the local knowledge they possess and the position they 
occupy in the local decision-making structure, encourage local cooperation? Writing one 
joint plan instead of three individual plans would definitely mean a financial loss for 
planning consultants. How do they view the costs and benefits of joint planning? One 
planning consultant from Washtenaw County offers his thoughts on this question: 
 Let me tell you this – I am a planner and a business man. I am a planner first, 
though, and a businessman second. I wear both these hats and think about both 
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these roles. From the business sense, I have to keep my business afloat, and that 
thinking would tell me that three governments working together is not profitable 
for me. But I like this idea of joint planning, of cooperative planning – that is the 
planner side of me – so I am supportive of this idea. I am losing money by 
supporting this idea, but I will because it is good for this area.78 
 
The role that planning consultants play in local planning processes in general, and 
cooperative efforts in particular, remains a black box. More exploration is needed in this 
area  
 
Eight, in considering whether the environment in Michigan is ripe enough to allow 
sweeping changes to the current land use system and regional planning requirements, 
policymakers might weigh a few alternative scenarios. On one hand, voluntary 
cooperation takes a long time to materialize; most of the cooperative efforts that have 
been formalized to joint planning commissions in Michigan today have been in place for 
more than 10 years. It takes patience for voluntary cooperation to evolve and eventually 
materialize into something that can have concrete impacts on local land use. One official 
explains: 
When you want to change something voluntarily, you cannot change it right off 
the bat. Because it is human nature – we all resist change. If we are going to have 
change, it has to come at a rate [at which] we can accept it and grow with it and 
move into it . . . . Coming from a rural background, a lot of us understand that to 
get a good crop and harvest a good crop, you need to plant the seed; you got to 
give it time to grow and nurture it. Give it what it needs and hopefully you get a 
good crop. If I . . . go into my township hall and say I want to change this, this, 
this, this right now, it will never happen. My board will just back right out of it. If 
I say “Maybe we ought to look into this someday,” and give it time, and after six 
months say something again, and a year later say something again, I can get it 
done. If I just go in and say we need this and we need it right now, it is not going 
to happen, and it’s just the way it is.79 
 
                                                 
78 Planner, Joint Planning Commission meeting, January 12, 2008 
79 Local elected official, personal communication, November 11, 2007 
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On the other hand, mandated cooperation will require tremendous oversight and 
enforcement.  It is also subject to the criticism that meaningful cooperation will be 
replaced by pro-forma compliance. Incentive-based approaches to cooperation offer a 
middle ground and an incremental approach to achieving cooperation. However, 
incentive packages have to be well crafted so that they not only promote more 
cooperation than a voluntary approach would allow, but also incrementally add up to a 
comprehensive package of land use and growth-management reform as seen in the 
mandated states.  
 
Finally, only a few municipalities in Michigan cooperate on planning and zoning issues 
in a manner that results in changes to the planning instituions and internal decision 
making structures in a municipality.. These municipalities have established Joint 
Planning Commissions and have written joint master plans and joint zoning ordinances. 
Although the effects of these joint policies remain to be seen, these municipalities have 
found a way to think about the long-term consequences of their policies and actions. One 
elected official discusses the importance of taking the long view: 
What will our legacy be? You don’t need a push from the state or county or 
anyone else. The only push you should need is a crystal ball to see what you will 
look like in the future. The Village of Manchester has a park called Carr Park. 
The Carr family owned that park in the 30s. They gave it to the village at that 
time. For a long time it was just bush and a couple of broken-down picnic tables. 
Sometime in the 40s, the village council decided they didn’t need it and started 
the proceeding to give it back to the heirs. The local merchants found out about it, 
got public opinion, and forced the village to stop and keep it. Today that park is 
used all the time – that park is heavily used.  It is an asset to the village and the 
surrounding townships, all because a few people said, “Wait a minute, someday 
this could be something,” while others said, “Let’s get rid of it.” That’s the side I 
want to be on. I want somebody to say, “Damn, they were smart back then.” 
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8.1 Recapitulation of basic research premises and contributions  
 
The aim of this research project was to first ascertain whether land use cooperation can 
evolve in Michigan, which is representative of many of the permissive planning states 
that do not institute substantial mandates and incentives to facilitate such cooperation. If 
evidence of cooperation could indeed be found in Michigan, the second aim was to 
develop an understanding of the factors that determine such cooperation. Also, a portion 
of this research effort was dedicated to understanding the key impediments to land use 
cooperation. The literature review revealed that a majority of studies of local government 
cooperation focused primarily on whether municipalities cooperate around service 
delivery functions (see for e.g., Thompson, 1997; Bartle and Swayze, 1997; Pagano, 
1999; Meek, Schildt, and Witt, 2002; Thurmaier and Wood, 2002; Wikstrom, 2002; 
Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). Further, several of these studies measure the outcome 
variable cooperation as a simplistic binary category or a frequency count of the number 
of cooperative activities performed by municipalities.  
 
A secondary aim of this research therefore was to theorize about the different dimensions 
of cooperation and investigate whether the factors that determine cooperation change 
depending of how cooperation is conceived. Finally, most studies of cooperation have 
examined the key factors affecting cooperation in isolation from each other. For example, 
scholars have singularly focused on whether environmental factors (e.g. fiscal capacity), 
structural factors (e.g. type of municipal administration), cultural factors (e.g. networks), 
and decision maker related factors (e.g. training) have affected cooperation on service 
delivery without developing models that account for several combinations of these 
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explanatory factors. Studying these factors in isolation has also meant that most studies of 
cooperation have employed either quantitative or qualitative analyses but not a mixture of 
both.  
 
This research presents a more complete picture of how cooperation evolves, by 
considering a comprehensive model of cooperation that accounts for the roles played by 
each of these four factors in determining cooperation. The conceptual framework used in 
this dissertation is derived from Giddens’ theory of structuration and allows for a 
mediation of the roles played by both structure and agency in determining outcomes. This 
approach favors using a mixed methodology for data analysis so that both macro (e.g. 
environmental factors) and micro factors (e.g. decision maker preferences) of decision 
making can be analyzed. In many ways, this research is a response to calls for mixed 
methods approaches (see Godschalk and Brower 1989) to study institutionally complex 
issues such as growth management and regional cooperation. By using case studies and 
surveys of elected officials, this dissertation provides one example of how Giddens’ 
theory might be used as the overall framework for studying regional cooperation.  
 
Although scholars have lamented the difficulty of defining and measuring concepts like 
“cooperation”, there has been limited theoretical advancement in the literature in terms of 
how such a concept might be operationalized. Further, few questions have been raised 
about whether cooperation is a more dynamic concept than it is construed to be. This 
dissertation provides evidence that this is indeed so, and argues that different ideas of 
what constitutes cooperation should be operationalized into analytically distinct variables. 
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This dissertation finds that the act of initiating cooperation is different from the act of 
formalizing a cooperative effort. Similarly, the factors that determine whether a 
municipality engages in cooperation are not always the factors that determine whether a 
cooperative effort is formalized. In keeping with this assessment, the obstacles to initial 
cooperation are not all the same obstacles that impede sustained cooperation. For 
example, most of the organizational theory literature contemplates the evolution of 
cooperation as arising from the fundamental need to manage uncertainties. In the land use 
context, such uncertainties manifest foremost as the environmental pressures on a 
municipality. These environmental pressures (e.g. growth pressure) serve as external 
threats and are often beyond an individual municipality’s control, thus necessitating 
cooperation. In this way, this research confirms that environmental factors are key 
explanatory variables of cooperation. However, this finding only holds true when the 
variable being predicted is initial cooperation. In other words, although they serve as 
triggers of cooperation, environmental factors do not significantly predict the extent of 
formal cooperation. This distinction is worth noting. Similarly, this research confirms the 
skepticism with which most planning scholars view the role of regional planning agencies 
in permissive planning states. That is, the planning literature in general is skeptical of the 
ability of regional level planning agencies to induce local cooperation in states where 
such agencies have minimal regulatory roles. This dissertation confirms this assertion. 
However, this dissertation also finds that regional level planning agencies play significant 
explanatory roles in determining the extent of formal land use cooperation. This finding 
is another distinct departure from past theorizing about the factors that contribute to the 
evolution of cooperation. In this manner, this dissertation argues for a more conceptually 
  230 
refined idea of cooperation and for a more inclusive framework for evaluating the factors 
affecting cooperation.  
 
Another set of contributions made by this research relates to the role played by informal 
institutions in facilitating cooperation. Scholars who have previously studied cooperation 
have made two assumptions about informal institutions: first, that prior cooperation will 
result in greater future cooperation; and second, that because political factors serve as the 
largest impediments to cooperation, cooperation will be greater in areas where there are 
minimal political conflicts among municipalities, where municipalities have good 
working relationships with each other, and where the political culture in an area is 
conducive to cooperation. This dissertation provides a different interpretation of the role 
of informal institutions in determining cooperation and in doing so makes significant 
contributions to existing theories of cooperation. The assumptions about the impact of 
prior cooperation on future cooperation would suggest that the number of 
intergovernmental service delivery agreements in a municipality would affect 
cooperation positively. This research shows that cooperation on services does not have a 
significant impact on municipalities’ decision to cooperation. Further, service related 
cooperation has a negative impact on the extent of formality of land use cooperation. This 
finding emphasizes the need for refinement in terms of thinking about what “prior 
cooperation” means. What kind of prior cooperation? How much prior cooperation? 
What if this prior cooperation is unsuccessful? At a minimum, examining these questions 
in greater detail will provide a more nuanced and clarified understanding (if not divergent 
understanding) of the taken for granted assumptions in studies of cooperation.  
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This research also shows that a regional governance culture characterized by minimal 
conflicts among municipalities, general agreement on area-wide problems and good 
relationships among municipalities does not significantly impact the decision to 
cooperation. Further, this regional governance culture has a negative impact on the extent 
of formal cooperation. This finding suggests that the connections between broader 
attitudes, beliefs and cultures, and subsequent behavior are not always straightforward. 
Further, this finding raises important policy related questions of whether a regional 
governance culture can be considered as a substitute for cooperation rather than a 
determinant of cooperation.  
 
This dissertation makes important contributions to the general growth management 
literature where most of the focus has been on states with substantial state level mandates 
and incentives for cooperation. By examining cooperation in a remarkably understudied 
permissive planning state, this dissertation explores both the promises and perils of 
voluntary municipal cooperation. While this research shows that municipalities in 
Michigan do cooperate on land use issues, these cooperative efforts exhibit varying levels 
of formality. The municipalities that decide to cooperate formally on land use issues seem 
remarkably resilient to political instabilities and have been able to garner the commitment 
and internal support needed to sustain such an effort. But this kind of voluntary 
cooperation takes a long time and not all municipalities decide to take this route of 
formalizing their cooperative effort by establishing joint master plans and ordinances. 
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The impediments are many and primarily manifest in the form of local resistance to 
giving up control and autonomy, and the lack of recognition of the need to cooperate.  
 
This dissertation finds that the need for cooperation seems to be first and foremost 
generated by external pressures (e.g. perceived future growth pressure). This finding 
raises questions of whether it is problematic to let crises or perceived threats drive the 
need for cooperation. On one hand, this research reveals that internal support for 
cooperation, and the formality and longevity of cooperative efforts are high when such 
efforts are organized to counter environmental pressures that are perceived to 
fundamentally alter the valued characteristics of a municipality. On the other hand, by 
allowing municipalities to tailor cooperative efforts to counter threats to locally 
significant resources, one might have to compromise on eliciting systematic protection 
for those resources that are critical from a statewide perspective.  To offer systematic 
protection to statewide significant resources, several growth management states mandate 
cooperation in specific geographic areas or on specific policy issues. For example, in 
Vermont, the state enforces only the affordable housing component of local plans. Other 
states have instituted additional requirements for cooperation in areas that are specifically 
designated as statewide environmental protection areas (New Jersey Pinelands and 
Florida State Areas of Critical Concern; Portland Metro: NC coastal region). The debate 
about whether cooperation should be viewed more as a general ideal to advance regional 
planning or whether it is sufficient to regard the usefulness of cooperation as a “fix” to 
local and regional problems is one that remains 
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8.2 Future research 
 
First, this study should be replicated in the other Great Lakes states and in states that 
offer similarly permissive institutional settings for planning. Further, many scholars have 
described cooperation as a necessary condition for effective planning and resource 
protection. Because this study did not evaluate the development patterns arising from 
cooperation, the next step would be to evaluate planning outcomes on the ground. In 
other words, does cooperation actually produce better land use patterns? Is cooperation a 
sufficient condition for the outcomes that planners desire? An extension of this study 
might also evaluate the joint plans produced as part of cooperative efforts and compare 
the quality of such plans with individual master plans to ascertain whether joint plans 
have the potential to advance regional goals more substantively than individual plans. 
The quest for regional planning has resulted in at least three different models of 
governance: those of Florida (mandated), New Jersey (incentivized) and Michigan 
(permissive).  Yet there have been no comparative studies to determine whether these 
models and their respective state-level institutions produce different regional outcomes. 
Finally, further research might evaluate the potential of Joint Planning Commissions, 
which seem exclusive to Michigan, to produce regional-level outcomes. Scholars might 
also explore whether there are comparable alternatives to JPCs in the other states and 
study the efficacies of these kinds of municipality level cooperative arrangements.  
 
 
Future research could also explore alternative conceptualizations of cooperation, a 
concept that scholars have found extremely difficult to measure.  The sample size used in 
this study was sufficient to answer several of the questions that were posed in this 
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dissertation. But one of my regression models did not have enough power to predict 
informal cooperation. Adding cases to this study as a follow-up might help in this regard. 
Further, because cooperation by its very nature involves a number of feedback loops, 
path analysis might render some interesting findings about the indirect and direct effects 
of the independent variables. For example, the environmental factors included in this 
study spur cooperative efforts but do not aid in formalizing them. Path analysis might 
help identify whether these environmental factors have indirect effects on formal 
cooperation through other intervening or endogenous independent variables.  
 
Finally, this study included only data obtained through survey research. Socio-economic 
data might be added to understand, for example, if there are systematic differences in 
perceived versus calculated growth pressures and to control for other factors.  
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Appendix 1 
 
An assessment of intergovernmental cooperation and 
growth management in Michigan 
  
 
1. Your Name: ___________________________Your title:________________________________ 
 
2. Name of your jurisdiction: ________________________________________________________ 
 
3. How does your jurisdiction engage in planning and zoning functions (please select one) 
 
  We do our own planning and zoning      The county plans and zones for our jurisdiction 
 
 We do not have planning or zoning   We share planning and zoning functions with the county 
 
 Other (please explain) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Does your jurisdiction have a master plan?    Yes    No 
 
5. Does your jurisdiction have a zoning ordinance?     Yes    No 
 
6. How many staff members does your jurisdiction employ for planning and zoning purposes? 
 
________ Number of Full Time Staff     ________ Number of Part Time Staff 
 
7. Who primarily assisted your jurisdiction with the preparation / update of your master plan? 
 
 Regional Planning Agency    County    Consultant                None 
 
 Other  If other, Please specify: _________________________________ 
  
8. Does your jurisdiction share natural resources such as inland lakes or high quality natural areas 
such as state/national parks with other local governments?      Yes    No 
 
9. How many local governments does your jurisdiction share political boundaries with? (please 
provide a number for each local government type) 
 
General Law Townships ________   Charter Townships _________     Villages _______ Cities ________ 
 
10. How would you characterize the extent of participation by the following groups on land use 
planning and zoning-related issues in your jurisdiction?  
 
 Extent of Participation 
Very                                                     Very  
low        Low     Moderate     High       high 
Don’t know 
Citizens                                            ____ 
Citizen groups (e.g. neighborhood 
groups) 
                                          ____ 
Non-profits                                            ____ 
Businesses                                           ____ 
Other Organizations (e.g. chambers)                                           ____ 
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11. On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means extremely “ineffective” and 5 means extremely “effective”, 
how effective have your county planning department and regional planning agency been at the 
following? 
 
 Effectiveness of the county 
planning department  
Extremely                  Extremely 
ineffective                   effective   
Effectiveness of the regional 
planning agency 
   Extremely               Extremely 
   ineffective                 effective   
N/A 
Providing technical assistance 
and staff support for 
cooperative land use efforts 
 
 1         2          3          4         5 
 
   1         2          3          4         5 
 
 
Providing technical assistance 
and staff support generally for 
planning and zoning purposes 
 
 1         2          3          4         5 
 
   1         2          3          4         5 
 
 
Providing opportunities for 
interactions among decision 
makers 
 
 1         2          3          4         5 
 
   1         2          3          4         5 
 
 
Playing a mediation role 
among local decision makers 
 
 1         2          3          4         5 
 
   1         2          3          4         5 
 
 
Providing financial incentives 
for encouraging cooperation 
 
 1         2          3          4         5 
 
   1         2          3          4         5 
 
 
Providing a forum for regional 
/countywide problem solving 
 
 1         2          3          4         5 
 
   1         2          3          4         5 
 
 
Providing leadership for 
cooperative planning efforts 
 
 1         2          3          4         5 
 




representation of the range of 
regional /countywide interests  
 
 1         2          3          4         5 
 
   1         2          3          4         5 
 
 
Setting regional /countywide 
land use priorities and goals 
 
 1         2          3          4         5 
 




12. Have you found any other organizations to be more successful at performing the above functions 
than the county and/or the regional planning agency?    Yes      No 
 




13. To what extent do you think the following individuals or groups in your jurisdiction support the 
idea of local and regional cooperation on land use planning and zoning issues?  
 
 Very low      Low       Moderate       High     Very high 
support      support    support         support     support 
Don’t 
know 
You personally                                                                _____ 
Local elected board                                                                _____ 
Planning commission                                                                _____ 
Planning department / staff                                                                _____ 
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14. To what extent do you personally agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
 Strongly                      Neither               Strongly 
disagree   Disagree    agree nor   Agree  agree 
                                    disagree 
Don’t 
know 
Some problems relating to land use planning, 
social equity, and environmental protection 
might be better solved at a broader scale (i.e. 
at the metropolitan or regional level) 
 
                                                    
 
___ 
The political culture in our region is very 
conducive to cooperation  
 
                                                    
 
___ 
We have strong leadership from public 
officials on land use cooperation in our region 
 
                                                    
 
___ 
Our region is characterized by tremendous 
competition among local governments for 
growth and development 
 
                                                    
 
___ 
Our region has a long history of political 
conflict among jurisdictions 
 
                                                    
 
___ 
Our region is characterized by strong regional 
institutions that serve as coordinating 
mechanisms for land use planning in the 
region 
 
                                                    
 
___ 
Local governments in our region generally 
agree on what the regional land use problems 
are and how these problems ought to be 
solved 
 
                                                    
 
___ 
Our jurisdiction has access to the financial, 
technical, institutional networks and resources 
needed to forge cooperative alliances around 
land use issues 
 
                                                    
 
___ 
Our jurisdiction has a history of good 
working relationships with our neighboring 
jurisdictions  
 
                                                    
 
___ 
Our jurisdiction and neighboring jurisdictions 
face very similar land use challenges  
 
                                                   
 
___ 
Our jurisdiction’s land use policies have 
tremendous impacts on countywide and 
regional development patterns 
 




15. Does your jurisdiction cooperate with other local jurisdictions or the county on the provision of 
the following services?  
Services  Yes – with 
other local 
governments 
Yes – with 
 the 
county 
No – we  




Fiscal services (e.g. property assessing)     
Information services (e.g. GIS)     
Building regulation (e.g. enforcement)      
Police (e.g. patrol, crime lab)     
Fire (e.g. inspection, ambulance)     
Refuse collection (e.g. solid waste, recycling)     
Water and sewer (e.g. collection, treatment)     
Transit (e.g. public bus)     
Parks and recreation (e.g. senior centers, trails)     
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16. Has your jurisdiction in the past five years participated in the following types of land use forums 
and activities organized at the regional or multi-county level?(Entities organizing such activities 
and forums might include Regional Planning Commission/ Council of Government or other 
relevant non-profits and organizations) 
 
 
17. Has your jurisdiction in the past five years participated in the following types of land use related 
activities and forums organized for jurisdictions within your county?  Please include activities 
organized by all relevant organizations including non-profits and county planning departments. 
 
Land use related 
activities 
Name of the committee / working group Name of organizing entity 
 
























18. How often do you meet decision makers from neighboring localities at land use related events/ 
forums held at the county or regional level? (please check one) 
 At least once a week   At least once a month     At least a few times a year 
 At least once a year     About once every two years 
Cultural services (e.g. museums, zoos)     
Environmental services (e.g. water quality, erosion)     
Roads and bridges (e.g. construction)     
Land use related 
activities at regional / 
multi-county level 
 
Name of the committee /  
working group / coalition / 
workshop / conference 
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19. Does your jurisdiction currently cooperate on land use planning and zoning issues with 
neighboring jurisdictions?  
 
   Yes     No     If no, please skip directly to question 22. 
 
If yes, in what ways does your jurisdiction cooperate on land use planning and zoning issues with 
your neighboring jurisdictions (please see options below and indicate all that apply)?  
 
Mechanism used for 
cooperation  
List the names of jurisdictions you currently have such arrangements with 
Joint agreements (e.g. 

























Joint zoning boards  
_______________________________________________________________ 
Joint zoning ordinances  
_______________________________________________________________ 
Joint Programs (e.g. 




Regional land use 





and staff meet  
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Joint committees / study 
groups / alliances 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Informal meetings / talks 













Collaborative land use 
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20. Has your jurisdiction received financial support from external sources for its cooperative land use 
effort? 
   Yes      No 
 
21. Has your jurisdiction received recognition for its cooperative effort? (e.g. honors and awards) 
   Yes      No 
 
22. Has your jurisdiction received designations in general? (e.g. Main Street Designation, Center of 
Regional Excellence, Cool City Designation) 
   Yes      No 
 
23. Has your jurisdiction been a part of any unsuccessful attempts to cooperate with neighboring 
jurisdictions? (please also consider efforts that are at a standstill / stalemate currently) 
 
         Yes             No 




24. Is your jurisdiction a member of a Regional Planning Association or Council of Government? 
   Yes      No 
 
25. Is your jurisdiction a member of other organizations and non-profits that focus on land use 
planning related issues? If yes, please list the names of these organizations where your jurisdiction 






26. Number of members on your:   Elected board: _______    Planning commission: _______ 
 
27. Approximately how many of your elected board and planning commission members have received 
formal training in the last five years in the following areas? (please provide a number) 
 




Economic development tools ____________ _____________        
Environmental and coastal management techniques ____________ _____________        
Public administration and/or public finance ____________ _____________        
Land use / master planning  ____________ _____________        
Growth management / smart growth principles and 
techniques 
____________ _____________        
Other     _____________________________ ____________ _____________        
 
28. Have you or other members of your elected board and planning commission attended training 
programs, lectures, or seminars that have specifically addressed the benefits of cooperation?   
    Yes     No 
 
29. To what extent has your jurisdiction faced growth pressures over the past 5 years? (please select 
one)  
               No growth pressure      Moderate growth pressure     Tremendous growth pressure 
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30. To what extent do you anticipate your jurisdiction will face growth pressures during the next 5 
years? (please select one) 
 
               No growth pressure      Moderate growth pressure    Tremendous growth pressure 
 
31. Has your jurisdiction over the last 5 years experienced a substantial turnover(s) in the makeup of 
its local elected board?      Yes                     No 
              
             If yes, was this turnover(s) through  
                general elections               recall elections or                 both  
 
             Was this turnover(s) primarily because of land use issues?                Yes                     No      
 
32. Has your jurisdiction been named in any lawsuits pertaining to land use issues / decisions? 
                Yes                     No 
 
33. Has your jurisdiction experienced controversial land use decisions and development disputes?     
   Yes                     No 
              
34. Have there been clashes between Pro-growth and No-growth or Slow-growth interests in your 
jurisdiction?         Yes                  No 
 
35. Is your jurisdiction predominantly (please select one) 
 
 Urban         Rural         Suburban        Other: ____________________ 
 
 
36. For how many years have you served in your current position? __________________ years 
 
37. Have you in the past served this jurisdiction under a different position?      Yes        No 
 
38. Have you in the past held political office(s) in other jurisdictions?       Yes               No 
 
39. Have you in the past held a land use related position(s) in other jurisdictions and/or organizations? 
   Yes               No 
 
40. Have you in the past 5 years been a member of the board of non-profits and other organizations 
focused on land use related issues?       Yes               No 
 
41. Have you in the past 5 years been a member of professional organizations? (e.g. Michigan 
Association of Planning)      Yes               No 
 
 
42. Does the elected board in your municipality believe that your jurisdiction would benefit from 
cooperating with neighboring jurisdictions on land use planning issues?    Yes               No 
 
 
43. How important are the following justifications of why local governments should cooperate with 
each other on land use planning and zoning issues?  
 
 Very            Important   Somewhat          Not 
Important                        Important   Important 
To ensure the compatibility of land uses                                                          
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and development patterns across 
jurisdictional lines 
To ensure the consistency of land use 
policies and decisions across jurisdictions 
                                                         
To minimize fiscal, social and 
environmental inequalities among 
jurisdictions 
                                                         
To improve planning and zoning capacity 
 
                                                         
To provide efficiency (e.g. cost savings) 
 
                                                         
Because places where people live work 
and play are often distributed across 
jurisdictional lines 
                                                         
Because sustainable land use patterns 
(e.g. compact growth and open space 
preservation) are best achieved at a 
regional scale 
                                                         
Because the land use challenges faced by 
most jurisdictions today cannot be solved 
exclusively at the local level 
                                                         
Other:____________________________
____ 
                                                         
 
44. What incentives should policy makers in Michigan provide to promote local government 










45. If your jurisdiction does not currently cooperate with neighboring jurisdictions on land use 










Thank you for completing this survey! Please return it to us in the enclosed envelope. 
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Appendix 2 
 
An assessment of intergovernmental cooperation and growth management in Michigan 
– County Perspective 
  
 
1. Your Name: ___________________________Your title:___________________________ 
 
2. Name of your County:________________________________________________________ 
 
3. How many local units of government do you have in your county? Please provide a number for 
each local government type: 
 
General Law Townships ________   Charter Townships _________     Villages _______ Cities ________ 
 
4. Does the county have a master plan?    Yes    No 
 
5. Does the county have a zoning ordinance?     Yes    No 
 
6. What role does the county play in local master plan preparation? (select all that apply) 
 We plan and zone for some local governments 
 We assist some local governments with master plan preparation i.e. write master plans for some 
government units 
 We provide technical assistance to consultants and local governments for plan preparation e.g. 
build out analysis 
 We provide data for local master plan preparation 
 We comment on local master plans, when local governments solicit our comments during plan 
preparation and plan updates 
 Other _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Does the county do planning and zoning for any of the local units of government? 
 
  Yes    No 
 
If yes, how many local units of government are under county planning and zoning? ______________ 
 
 
8. Overall, how would you characterize the relationship between the county planning department and 
the following agencies or entities 
 Extremely negative                    Extremely positive N/A 
County Board of 
Commissioners 
 1                2                  3                   4                5 
 
 














Regional Planning Agency 
 




9. How many staff members does the county planning department employ? 
 
________ Number of Full Time Staff     ________ Number of Part Time Staff 
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10. On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means “very low priority” and 5 means “very high priority”, how 
would you rate the following priorities of the county planning department? 
 
 County planning department priorities 
Very low priority                         Very high priority 
N/A 
Providing technical assistance 
and staff support for cooperative 
land use efforts 
 
 




Providing technical assistance 
and staff support generally for 
planning and zoning purposes 
 
 
 1                2                  3                   4                5 
 
 
Providing opportunities for 
interactions among decision 
makers 
 
 1                2                  3                   4                5 
 
 
Playing a mediation role among 
local decision makers 
 
 1                2                  3                   4                5 
 
 
Providing financial incentives 
for encouraging cooperation 
 
 1                2                  3                   4                5 
 
 
Providing a forum for regional 
/countywide problem solving 
 
 1                2                  3                   4                5 
 
 
Providing leadership for 
cooperative planning efforts 
 
 1                2                  3                   4                5 
 
 
Providing “fair” representation 
of the range of regional 
/countywide interests  
 
 
 1                2                  3                   4                5 
 
 
Setting regional /countywide 
land use priorities and goals 
 












11. To what extent do you think the following individuals or groups in your county support the idea of 
local and regional cooperation on land use planning and zoning issues?  
 
 Very low       Low        Moderate        High         Very high 
support         support    support         support        support 
Don’t 
know 
You personally                                                                         _____ 
County Board of 
Commissioners 




                                                                        _____ 
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12. To what extent do you personally agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
 Strongly                       Neither                   Strongly  
disagree    Disagree    agree nor    Agree       agree 
                                     disagree 
Don’t 
know 
Some problems relating to land use 
planning, social equity, and 
environmental protection might be 
better solved at a broader scale (i.e. at 
the metropolitan or regional level) 
 
                                                    
 
_____ 
The political culture in our region is 
very conducive to cooperation  
 
                                                    
 
_____ 
We have strong leadership from 
public officials on land use 
cooperation in our region 
 
                                                    
 
_____ 
Our region is characterized by 
tremendous competition among local 
governments for growth and 
development 
 
                                                    
 
_____ 
Our region has a long history of 
political conflict among jurisdictions 
 
                                                    
 
_____ 
Our region is characterized by strong 
regional institutions that serve as 
coordinating mechanisms for land 
use planning in the region 
 
                                                    
 
_____ 
Local governments in our region 
generally agree on what the regional 
land use problems are and how these 
problems ought to be solved 
 
                                                    
 
_____ 
Our county has access to the 
financial, technical, institutional 
networks and resources needed to 
forge cooperative alliances among 
local elected officials around land use 
issues 
 
                                                    
 
_____ 
Our county has a history of good 
working relationships with the local 
governments in the county 
 
                                                    
 
_____ 
Local governments in our county 
face very similar land use challenges  
 




13. Does the county master plan specifically address the importance of regional cooperation? 
  Yes    No 
 
14. Does the county organize specific activities / workshops on the importance of local and regional 
cooperation? 
  Yes    No 
 
15. Does the county offer training sessions on local and regional cooperation?  
  Yes    No 
 
16. Does the county dedicate staff for local and regional cooperative planning initiatives? 
  Yes    No 
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17. Does the county offer financial support for local and regional planning initiatives? 
  Yes    No 
 
 
18. Has the county over the past five years organized any of the following types of land use related 
activities and forums for local governments within your county?   
 
Land use related activities Name of the committee / working group 
Committees  ______________________________________________________ 
 
Working/Study groups ______________________________________________________ 
 









19. Have any or several local governments in your county received designations as special 
demonstration communities? (e.g. Main Street Designation, Center of Regional Excellence, Cool 
City Designation) 
 
   Yes      No 
 
20. Have any or several local governments in your county been a part of unsuccessful attempts to 
cooperate with neighboring jurisdictions? (please also consider efforts that are at a standstill / 
stalemate currently) 
 
         Yes             No 




21. What are the key reasons why local governments in your county do not currently cooperate with 








22. Are there any or several non-profits in your county that are organized around providing support 
for local and regional land use cooperation? (e.g. Western Michigan Strategic Alliance, United 
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23. Do any or several local governments in your county cooperate on planning and zoning issues? 
  Yes    No (if no, please skip to question 24) 
 
If yes, do local governments in your county employ any of the following kinds of mechanisms for 
cooperative planning and zoning efforts? 
Mechanism used 
for cooperation  
List the names of jurisdictions in your county that employ the following  
cooperative mechanisms 
Joint agreements 







































Regional land use 







staff meet  
 
______________________________________________________________ 
Joint committees / 




Informal meetings / 
















use projects (when 
need arises)  
 
______________________________________________________________ 
Share planning staff  
______________________________________________________________ 







24. How important are the following justifications of why local governments should cooperate with 
each other on land use planning and zoning issues?  
 
 Very           Important   Somewhat         Not 
Important                      Important  Important 
To ensure the compatibility of land uses and  
development patterns across jurisdictional lines 
                                                       
To ensure the consistency of land use policies  
and decisions across jurisdictions 
                                                       
To minimize fiscal, social and environmental 
 inequalities among jurisdictions 
                                                       
To improve planning and zoning capacity  
 
                                                       
To provide efficiency (e.g. cost savings) 
 
                                                       
Because places where people live work and  
play are often distributed across jurisdictional lines 
                                                       
Because sustainable land use patterns (e.g. 
compact growth and open space preservation) are 
best achieved at a regional scale 
                                                       
Because the land use challenges faced by most 
 jurisdictions today cannot be solved exclusively  
at the local level 
                                                       
Other:_________________________________ 
______________________________________ 
                                                       
 
 
25. What incentives should policy makers in Michigan provide to promote local government 
















Thank you for completing this survey! Please return it to us in the enclosed envelope. 
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